Monotone stopping games
Keyword(s):
Zero Sum
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We consider the extension of optimal stopping problems to non-zero-sum strategic settings called stopping games. By imposing a monotone structure on the pay-offs of the game we establish the existence of a Nash equilibrium in non-randomized stopping times. As a corollary, we identify a class of games for which there are Nash equilibria in myopic stopping times. These games satisfy the strategic equivalent of the classical ‘monotone case' assumptions of the optimal stopping problem.
2000 ◽
Vol 37
(01)
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pp. 64-72
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2015 ◽
Vol 47
(01)
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pp. 128-145
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Keyword(s):
2000 ◽
Vol 37
(1)
◽
pp. 64-72
◽
2009 ◽
Vol 53
(3)
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pp. 558-571
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2017 ◽
Vol 13
(1)
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pp. 399-411
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