The Conscientious Objector and the Law

1943 ◽  
Vol 53 (1) ◽  
pp. 198
Author(s):  
Arthur Garfield Hays ◽  
Julien Cornell
1953 ◽  
Vol 20 (3) ◽  
pp. 441 ◽  
Author(s):  
Francis Heisler

2010 ◽  
Vol 59 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Marina Casini

Il contributo muove da una sintetica rassegna di alcuni provvedimenti emanati dall’amministrazione della Regione Puglia, provvedimenti che hanno suscitato un vivace dibattito e un’azione giudiziaria. Essi, infatti, prevedono l’esclusione dei medici obiettori di coscienza all’aborto dai Consultori familiari istituiti con la Legge 405 del 1975. In questo modo tali provvedimenti sono censurabili per violazione del principio di non discriminazione, ma anche perché svuotano i Consultori dei compiti loro assegnati in ordine alla tutela della vita nascente, consolidando un’applicazione nefasta della normativa sull’aborto, già in sé ingiusta. ---------- The contribution starts from a brief overview of some measures taken by the Regione Puglia Authority, measures that have raised a lively debate and a legal action. Indeed, they allow the exclusion of doctors conscientious objector to abortion from the Family Advice bureaus established by the Law 405/1975. In this way these measures are censurable for breach of the principle of non-discrimination, and also because they deprive Advice bureaus of their duties regarding the protection of unborn life, strengthening a disastrous enforcement of the law on abortion, already unjust in itself.


2002 ◽  
Vol 41 (1) ◽  
pp. 58-83 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nadja Durbach

In 1898, after forty-five years of enforcing mandatory infant smallpox vaccination, the British parliament passed an act to allow parents to “opt out” of the compulsory system. The 1898 Vaccination Act introduced a conscience clause that entitled parents who objected to the practice of vaccination to claim certificates of conscientious objection by applying to a magistrate for an exemption. This provided working- and lower-middle-class anti-vaccinationists a measure of relief from the repeated fines they had suffered for noncompliance with the law, and from the threat of imprisonment. By the end of 1898, over 200,000 certificates of conscientious objection had been issued. Many of these were granted in anti-vaccination strongholds where exemptions outnumbered vaccinations, but conscientious objection to vaccination was by no means limited to these regions. Once an amended conscience clause was passed in 1907, which made conscientious objector status much easier to attain, the national exemption rate grew to 25 percent of all births.The vaccination conscience clauses were controversial. As most of the applicants who applied for these exemption certificates came from the working classes, and many were women, these acts generated a national debate over the classed and gendered nature of the conscience and the meanings of conscientious objection. The years between 1898 and 1907 thus mark a significant moment in the making of the modern subject and citizen. For, as the debate over conscientious objection to vaccination reveals, who exactly was entitled to make a claim to possess a conscience, with its concomitant rights, was itself a contested issue.


2012 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 31-58
Author(s):  
Yossi Nehushtan

Abstract There are several possible views of the proper way in which the state should respond to claims to be granted conscientious exemptions. This article discusses, and ultimately rejects, two main approaches to the issue of granting conscientious exemptions: the neutral approach and the ‘equal-regard’ approach. According to the neutral approach the decision whether to grant an exemption should not be affected, at least not directly, by the content of a person’s conscience. The equal-regard approach suggests that, when an exemption is granted to a non-religious conscientious objector, an exemption should also be granted to his equivalent religious objector, and vice versa. It is suggested that the state has to take sides and to evaluate the content of one’s conscience in order to decide whether to grant him an exemption from the law. The general argument that intolerance should normally not be tolerated provides one reason, among others, why the content of someone’s conscience is significant when deciding when to grant conscientious exemptions.


1944 ◽  
Vol 44 (4) ◽  
pp. 591 ◽  
Author(s):  
Osmond K. Fraenkel ◽  
Julien Cornell

2015 ◽  
Vol 20 (3) ◽  
pp. 72-84 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paula Leslie ◽  
Mary Casper

“My patient refuses thickened liquids, should I discharge them from my caseload?” A version of this question appears at least weekly on the American Speech-Language-Hearing Association's Community pages. People talk of respecting the patient's right to be non-compliant with speech-language pathology recommendations. We challenge use of the word “respect” and calling a patient “non-compliant” in the same sentence: does use of the latter term preclude the former? In this article we will share our reflections on why we are interested in these so called “ethical challenges” from a personal case level to what our professional duty requires of us. Our proposal is that the problems that we encounter are less to do with ethical or moral puzzles and usually due to inadequate communication. We will outline resources that clinicians may use to support their work from what seems to be a straightforward case to those that are mired in complexity. And we will tackle fears and facts regarding litigation and the law.


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