scholarly journals Discrimination and the Commerce Clause: Application of State Civil Rights Acts in Interstate and Foreign Commerce

1949 ◽  
Vol 58 (2) ◽  
pp. 329

Author(s):  
David S. Schwartz

The thirty-odd years from the New Deal turnaround to the late 1960s represented a high-water mark for McCulloch v. Maryland. For the first time, the Supreme Court fully applied McCulloch to the Commerce Clause and the Reconstruction Amendments, and removed the concept of reserved state powers as a barrier to implied powers under these constitutional provisions. The post–New Deal Court recognized Congress’s authority to regulate virtually all aspects of the national economy and to legislate race relations and other issues of civil rights. Prior to 1941, the Court had limited McCulloch’s applicability to the Commerce Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment by subjecting the legislative powers of Congress to implied limitations arising out of the Tenth Amendment doctrine of reserved state powers. With the Tenth Amendment constraint removed, McCulloch for the first time was being applied to something like its full potential.



1926 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 80-106
Author(s):  
Robert E. Cushman

The decisions arising under the commerce clause of the Constitution during the 1924 term of the Supreme Court did not involve any striking extension of national authority in that field. There was no case approaching in significance the Recapture Clause Case decided in the previous term. However, the reinforcement of a familiar principle through a striking application of it, or the lucid and pungent expression of an old doctrine, lends some significance to several cases which otherwise have no far-reaching importance.In the case of Brooks v. United States the court sustained the constitutionality of the National Motor Vehicle Theft Act of 1919. The act subjected to heavy penalties any one who transported or caused to be transported in interstate or foreign commerce any motor vehicle, knowing it to have been stolen, and any one who, with the same guilty knowledge, “shall receive, conceal, store, barter, sell, or dispose of any motor vehicle, moving as, or which is a part of, or which constitutes interstate or foreign commerce.” It is certainly no surprise to learn from the opinion of Chief Justice Taft that the power to regulate commerce which is broad enough to enable Congress to bar from interstate transportation lottery tickets, diseased cattle, adulterated food, prize-fight films, and the like, and to penalize the interstate transportation of women for immoral purposes, is a power which can likewise be used to punish those who abuse the privileges of interstate and foreign commerce by using them in the furtherance of larceny or the disposal of stolen goods.



2020 ◽  
Vol 73 (1) ◽  
pp. 168-186
Author(s):  
Claudia Angelos ◽  
Sara Berman ◽  
Mary Lu Bilek ◽  
Carol L. Chomsky ◽  
Andrea Anne Curcio ◽  
...  

The COVID-19 pandemic and resulting shutdowns are affecting every aspect of society. The legal profession and the justice system have been profoundly disrupted at precisely the time when there is an unprecedented need for legal services to deal with a host of legal issues generated by the pandemic, including disaster relief, health law, insurance, labor law, criminal justice, domestic violence, and civil rights. The need for lawyers to address these issues is great but the prospect of licensing new lawyers is challenging due to the serious health consequences of administering the bar examination during the pandemic. State Supreme Courts are actively considering alternative paths to licensure. One such alternative is the diploma privilege, a path to licensure currently used only in Wisconsin. Wisconsin’s privilege, limited to graduates of its two in-state schools, has triggered constitutional challenges never fully resolved by the lower courts. As states consider emergency diploma privileges to address the pandemic, they will face these unresolved constitutional issues. This Article explores those constitutional challenges and concludes that a diploma privilege limited to graduates of in-state schools raises serious Dormant Commerce Clause questions that will require the state to tie the privilege to the particular competencies in-state students develop and avenues they have to demonstrate those competencies to the state’s practicing bar over three years. Meeting that standard will be particularly difficult if a state adopts an in-state privilege on an emergency basis. States should consider other options, including privileges that do not prefer in-state schools. The analysis is important both for states considering emergency measures and for those that might restructure their licensing after the pandemic.



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