scholarly journals Diploma Privilege and the Constitution

2020 ◽  
Vol 73 (1) ◽  
pp. 168-186
Author(s):  
Claudia Angelos ◽  
Sara Berman ◽  
Mary Lu Bilek ◽  
Carol L. Chomsky ◽  
Andrea Anne Curcio ◽  
...  

The COVID-19 pandemic and resulting shutdowns are affecting every aspect of society. The legal profession and the justice system have been profoundly disrupted at precisely the time when there is an unprecedented need for legal services to deal with a host of legal issues generated by the pandemic, including disaster relief, health law, insurance, labor law, criminal justice, domestic violence, and civil rights. The need for lawyers to address these issues is great but the prospect of licensing new lawyers is challenging due to the serious health consequences of administering the bar examination during the pandemic. State Supreme Courts are actively considering alternative paths to licensure. One such alternative is the diploma privilege, a path to licensure currently used only in Wisconsin. Wisconsin’s privilege, limited to graduates of its two in-state schools, has triggered constitutional challenges never fully resolved by the lower courts. As states consider emergency diploma privileges to address the pandemic, they will face these unresolved constitutional issues. This Article explores those constitutional challenges and concludes that a diploma privilege limited to graduates of in-state schools raises serious Dormant Commerce Clause questions that will require the state to tie the privilege to the particular competencies in-state students develop and avenues they have to demonstrate those competencies to the state’s practicing bar over three years. Meeting that standard will be particularly difficult if a state adopts an in-state privilege on an emergency basis. States should consider other options, including privileges that do not prefer in-state schools. The analysis is important both for states considering emergency measures and for those that might restructure their licensing after the pandemic.

1932 ◽  
Vol 26 (4) ◽  
pp. 660-682
Author(s):  
Charles G. Haines

Law as it is made by the courts, interstitially as suggested by Mr. Justice Holmes, and interpreted in the cases that arise during a year, covers only a portion of the law-making process of the American states. Judicial interpretation and judicial legislation are determined largely by the types of controversies which arise involving the interpretation and application of constitutions and laws, and by the personnel of the courts before whom the issues are litigated. It is difficult to discover the tendencies or trends which are in the molding during a decade or more of legal history; for such a short term as a year, generalizations or conclusions may be attempted only with great caution and with well understood reservations.The significant decisions affecting state constitutional law in 1931-32 in the state supreme courts or courts of appeal and in the inferior federal courts may conveniently be grouped under the following headings: (1) the separation and delegation of powers; (2) the protection of civil rights; (3) due process of law and equal protection of the laws; (4) due process and public utility regulations; (5) due process and the police power; (6) taxation; and (7) miscellaneous decisions.


1973 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 394-405 ◽  
Author(s):  
Arthur P. Miles

Fundamental changes have occurred in juvenile court pro cedure, the administration of probation and parole, and the op eration of correctional institutions. While they do not constitute a "criminal law revolution," they are steps in "an orderly evolu tion." These changes, which re-emphasize our constitutional guar antees of civil rights, have been brought about largely through decisions in the federal and state supreme courts, not through sociological theory. Sociological theories of the causes of crime- especially individual psychological, social psychological learning, and functional sociological theories—have not been validated by empirical research and do not explain crime from a truly scien tific point of view. They have not been of much practical utility to correctional workers.


1999 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 204-205
Author(s):  
Megan Cleary

In recent years, the law in the area of recovered memories in child sexual abuse cases has developed rapidly. See J.K. Murray, “Repression, Memory & Suggestibility: A Call for Limitations on the Admissibility of Repressed Memory Testimony in Abuse Trials,” University of Colorado Law Review, 66 (1995): 477-522, at 479. Three cases have defined the scope of liability to third parties. The cases, decided within six months of each other, all involved lawsuits by third parties against therapists, based on treatment in which the patients recovered memories of sexual abuse. The New Hampshire Supreme Court, in Hungerford v. Jones, 722 A.2d 478 (N.H. 1998), allowed such a claim to survive, while the supreme courts in Iowa, in J.A.H. v. Wadle & Associates, 589 N.W.2d 256 (Iowa 1999), and California, in Eear v. Sills, 82 Cal. Rptr. 281 (1991), rejected lawsuits brought by nonpatients for professional liability.


2006 ◽  
Author(s):  
Herbert M. Kritzer ◽  
Paul Brace ◽  
Melinda Gann Hall ◽  
Brent D. Boyea

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