THE “DEMONSTRATION EFFECT”

2017 ◽  
pp. 67-78
Keyword(s):  
Demonstration Effect

POLICY MAKING AND THE DEMONSTRATION EFFECT: PRIVATIZATION IN A DEPRIVED REGION

1992 ◽  
Vol 70 (3) ◽  
pp. 369-385 ◽  
Author(s):  
MICHAEL E. H. CONNOLLY ◽  
ANDREW W. STARK
Keyword(s):  
Policy Making ◽  
Demonstration Effect

scholarly journals 'Greenfields' and 'Brownfields': automotive industrial development in the UK and in Portugal

Finisterra ◽  
2012 ◽  
Vol 31 (62) ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew Pike ◽  
Mário Vale
Keyword(s):  
Industrial Policy ◽  
Automobile Industry ◽  
Industrial Development ◽  
Development Strategies ◽  
North West ◽  
Demonstration Effect ◽  
North East ◽  
The North ◽  
The Uk ◽  
The Impact

The industrial policy in the UK and in Portugal, as in most EU countries, seeks to attract new investment capacity, to create jobs and to promote the impact of the so-called "demonstration efect" of "greenfield" development strategies pursued in the new plants of inward investors on existing or "brownfield" plants. This industrial policy focus is particularly evident in the automobile industry.This paper compares the industrial policy oriented towards the automobile industry in the UK and in Portugal. Two recent "greenfield" investments are analised: Nissan in the North-East region (UK) and Ford/VW in the Setúbal Peninsula (Portugal), as well as three "brownfield" plants: Ford Halewood and GM Vauxhall Ellesmere Port in the North-West region (UK) and Renault in Setúbal (Portugal). The first part starts with a discussion of industrial policy in the automobile sector, the role of "greenfield" development strategies and the "demonstration effect" on "brownfield" plants. Then, the limits of new inward investment are pointed out, basically their problems and restrictions. Afterwards, the structural barriers to the "demonstration effect" within "brownfield" plants are outlined and some possabilities for alternative "brownfield" development strategies are presented.

scholarly journals Creating Useful and Usable Weather and Climate Information: Insights from Participatory Scenario Planning in Malawi

2021 ◽  
pp. 77-92
Author(s):  
Dorothy Tembo-Nhlema ◽  
Katharine Vincent ◽  
Rebecka Henriksson
Keyword(s):  
Scenario Planning ◽  
Decision Makers ◽  
Climate Information ◽  
Seasonal Forecasts ◽  
Early Adopters ◽  
Demonstration Effect ◽  
Initial Investigation ◽  
Usable Information ◽  
Weather And Climate ◽  
Grassroots Level

AbstractFor climate information to be used at the grassroots level, it needs to be understood, collectively interpreted and effectively communicated. Participatory Scenario Planning (PSP) is one method of co-producing useful and usable sectoral and livelihood advisories for decision-makers, based on locally downscaled weather (typically seasonal forecasts). The chapter outlines an initial investigation into the history and application of PSP in Malawi, finding that it can generate useful and usable information that is deemed credible, legitimate and salient by its intended users. Its usability is reinforced through the demonstration effect which leads to even sceptical farmers adopting it after they have witnessed proof of its effectiveness from early adopters. In Malawi, the sustainability of PSP is threatened due to limited integration in planning frameworks and reliance on projects, hence need for a mechanism to ensure its regular occurrence and embeddedness in formal governance structures.

The demonstration effect of transactions between strangers on those between acquaintances: evidence from land rentals in rural China

2020 ◽  
Vol 52 (43) ◽  
pp. 4780-4793
Author(s):  
Tongwei Qiu ◽  
Biliang Luo ◽  
S. T. Boris Choy ◽  
Xianlei Ma ◽  
Qinying He
Keyword(s):  
Rural China ◽  
Demonstration Effect

The Emperor Strikes Back: Political Status, Career Incentives and Grain Procurement during China's Great Leap Famine

2014 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 179-211 ◽  
Author(s):  
James Kai-sing Kung
Keyword(s):  
Regression Discontinuity ◽  
Causal Effect ◽  
Central Committee ◽  
Regression Discontinuity Design ◽  
Political Career ◽  
Demonstration Effect ◽  
Political Status ◽  
Great Leap ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Career Incentives

Using China's Great Leap Famine as example, this article shows how political career incentives can produce disastrous outcomes under the well-intended policies of a dictator. By exploiting a regression discontinuity design, the study identifies the causal effect of membership status in the Chinese Communist Party's Central Committee—full (FM) Versus alternate members (AM)—on grain procurement. It finds that the difference in grain procurement between AMs and FMs who ranked near the discontinuity threshold is three times that between all AMs and all FMs on average. This may explain why Mao exceptionally promoted some lower-ranked but radical FMs shortly before the Leap: to create a demonstration effect in order to spur other weakly motivated FMs into action.

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