The Effect of Geographic Distance on Earnings Management Decisions

Author(s):  
Matthew J. Hayes ◽  
Michael J. Mowchan

Prior research has found evidence that country factors and management styles influence earnings management decisions in various geographic locations. Extending this research, we utilize an experimental setting to isolate the effect of geographic distance on the willingness to manage earnings in a near/distant location. In an initial experiment, we find less acceptable earnings management methods generate greater concerns about the method (ethicality and riskiness) leading to less willingness to manage earnings. Yet, greater geographic distance between the decisionmaker and reporting location attenuates these concerns, resulting in increased willingness to use a less acceptable method. In contrast, individuals are willing to use a more acceptable method to manage earnings regardless of geographic distance. These findings are consistent with construal level theory (CLT) and are corroborated in a second experiment where we find that greater geographic distance reduces managers’ focus on the means of earnings management, thereby reducing concerns about the method.

2020 ◽  
Vol 32 ◽  
pp. 101146 ◽  
Author(s):  
Clara Chia Sheng Chen ◽  
Yan-Yu Chou ◽  
Peihwang Wei

2012 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 61 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dewi Kusuma Wardani ◽  
Indra Wijaya Kusuma

This study explores the informational and opportunistic characteristics of earnings management in ASEAN countries. Earnings management has an impact on the profitability of the companies. A positive relation between earnings management and future profitability reveals that earnings management is informational. However, negative a relation between earnings management and future profitability indicates that earnings management is opportunistic. This study uses data from the OSIRIS database. Four hundred and eighty five (485) companies from the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand are used as a sample. This study focuses on 2 types of earnings management: (1) accrual earnings management and (2) real earning management. Modified Jones model is used for the accrual earnings management. Real earnings management follows Roychowdury (2006). The results show that the characteristics of earnings management are not consistent. Real earnings management is informational in Thailand, but opportunistic in Indonesia. Accruals earnings management is informational in the Philippines, but opportunistic in Malaysia. Country factors such as culture may explain the inconsistency of the results in ASEAN.Keywords: accruals earnings management; ASEAN countries; future profitability; informational; opportunistic; real earnings management


2002 ◽  
Vol 77 (s-1) ◽  
pp. 175-202 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark W. Nelson ◽  
John A. Elliott ◽  
Robin L. Tarpley

This paper reports analyses of data obtained using a field-based questionnaire in which 253 auditors from one Big 5 firm recalled and described 515 specific experiences they had with clients who they believe were attempting to manage earnings. This approach enables us to analyze separately managers' decisions about how to attempt earnings management and auditors' decisions about whether to prevent earnings management by requiring adjustment of the financial statements. Our results indicate that managers are more likely to attempt earnings management, and auditors are less likely to adjust earnings management attempts, which are structured (not structured) with respect to precise (imprecise) standards. We also find that managers are more likely to make attempts that increase current-year income, but auditors are more likely to require that those attempts be adjusted, that managers are more likely to make attempts that decrease current-year income with unstructured transactions and/or when standards are imprecise, and that auditors are more likely to require adjustment of attempts that they identify as material or that are attempted by small clients.


2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 (1) ◽  
pp. 16329
Author(s):  
Zagdbazar Davaadorj ◽  
Bolortuya Enkhtaivan ◽  
Wei Ning ◽  
Albi Alikaj

2020 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 1
Author(s):  
Elizabeth Demers ◽  
Chong Wang

Motivated by the disconnect between survey evidence documenting that executives prioritize implicit contracting (i.e., labor market-based career concerns) when making earnings management decisions (Graham et al., 2005) and the extant literature’s focus on explicit contracting to explain earnings manipulation, we analytically examine the role of managerial career concerns in earnings management. Building on Holmstrom (1982, 1999), we present a career concerns-based earnings management model that incorporates the unique reversing nature of earnings management. A key insight derived from the model is that whether the predictions of a traditional career concerns model prevail, which is to say that managers engage in more income-increasing behavior in their early years, critically depends upon the reversal characteristics of the earnings management vehicle chosen.


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