Regulatory Treatment of Changes in Fair Value and the Composition of Banks' Investment Portfolios

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Iselin ◽  
Jung Koo Kang ◽  
Joshua M. Madsen
Keyword(s):  
Investment Decisions ◽  
Fair Value ◽  
Municipal Bonds ◽  
Regulatory Capital ◽  
Difference In Differences ◽  
Opt Out ◽  
Tier 1 ◽  
Potential Impact ◽  
Asset Classes ◽  
Investment Portfolios

In the wake of the financial crisis of 2007-2008, Basel III recommended that bank regulators include changes in the fair value of available-for-sale (AFS) debt securities in Tier 1 capital. However, the U.S. implementation allowed smaller banks to continue excluding these changes through a one-time opt out election. This paper investigates a potential impact of this opt out provision by examining the investment decisions of smaller banks in the 1990's when changes in the fair value of AFS debt securities were temporarily included in regulatory capital. Using a sample of smaller banks and a difference-in-differences research design, we find that low-capitalized banks reduced their investments in more volatile asset classes (e.g., corporate bonds, non-agency MBS) and increased their investments in less volatile asset classes (e.g., treasuries and municipal bonds) after changes in fair value were included in regulatory capital. These findings suggest that providing smaller banks with an opt out election potentially allows low-capitalized, riskier banks to continue to hold more volatile securities in their AFS portfolios.

scholarly journals Are Banks’ Below Par Own Debt Repurchases a Cause for Prudential Concern?

2018 ◽  
Vol 35 (3) ◽  
pp. 501-529
Author(s):  
Martien Lubberink ◽  
Annelies Renders
Keyword(s):  
Fair Value ◽  
Alternative Methods ◽  
Basel Iii ◽  
Regulatory Capital ◽  
Liability Management ◽  
Tier 1 ◽  
Capital Ratios ◽  
European Banks ◽  
Using Data ◽  
Tier 1 Capital

In the lead-up to the implementation of Basel III, European banks repurchased debt securities that traded below par. Banks engaged in these Liability Management Exercises (LMEs) to realize a fair value gain that prudential rules exclude from regulatory capital calculations. The LMEs enabled banks to augment Core Tier 1 capital, given that alternative methods to increase capital ratios were not feasible in practice. Using data of 720 European LMEs conducted between April 2009 and December 2013, we show that poorly capitalized banks repurchased securities and lost about €9.1bn in premiums to compensate their holders. Banks also repurchased the most loss-absorbing securities, for which they paid the highest premiums. These premiums increase with leverage and in times of stress. Hence debt repurchases are a cause for prudential concern.

Agreeing to disagree: structuring future capital investment provisions in joint ventures

2020 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 12-22
Author(s):  
Edgar Elliott ◽  
Lois D’Costa ◽  
James Bamford
Keyword(s):  
Joint Ventures ◽  
Capital Investment ◽  
Joint Venture ◽  
Investment Decisions ◽  
Capital Investments ◽  
Agreeing To Disagree ◽  
Structural Work ◽  
Opt Out ◽  
Contractual Structures

Abstract Prior to entering into any joint venture agreement (JVA), dealmakers should be aware of the options available to resolve future investment disagreements. There are three broad capital investment structures commonly found in joint ventures: (i) standard passmark rules; (ii) non-consent/opt-out; and (iii) sole risk. Within each category, deal practitioners have numerous options to tailor capital investment structures. As much as possible, deal practitioners should contemplate the most likely areas of disagreement, and then tailor the capital investment structures appropriately to ensure that the joint ventures (JV) can manage capital investment decisions in an efficient, value-preserving way. While it is impossible to establish a formula to determine which specific contractual structures will best accommodate future capital investments in a given JV, companies should weigh various factors to inform their position. We reviewed 40 JVAs to understand various capital investment mechanics and how they differ based on the nature of the venture and owner context. Our research found an extremely diverse array of creative structural work-arounds to address different owner appetites to make future capital investments. The purpose of this article is to describe, illustrate and provide benchmarks on different mechanics and contractual terms found in joint venture agreements, and to offer guidance as to which future capital investment mechanics should be included in venture agreements.

scholarly journals The IFRS option to reclassify financial assets out of fair value in 2008: the roles played by regulatory capital and too-important-to-fail status

2017 ◽  
Vol 22 (4) ◽  
pp. 1698-1731 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Fiechter ◽  
Wayne R. Landsman ◽  
Kenneth Peasnell ◽  
Annelies Renders
Keyword(s):  
Fair Value ◽  
Financial Assets ◽  
Regulatory Capital
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