scholarly journals Are Banks’ Below Par Own Debt Repurchases a Cause for Prudential Concern?

2018 ◽  
Vol 35 (3) ◽  
pp. 501-529
Author(s):  
Martien Lubberink ◽  
Annelies Renders

In the lead-up to the implementation of Basel III, European banks repurchased debt securities that traded below par. Banks engaged in these Liability Management Exercises (LMEs) to realize a fair value gain that prudential rules exclude from regulatory capital calculations. The LMEs enabled banks to augment Core Tier 1 capital, given that alternative methods to increase capital ratios were not feasible in practice. Using data of 720 European LMEs conducted between April 2009 and December 2013, we show that poorly capitalized banks repurchased securities and lost about €9.1bn in premiums to compensate their holders. Banks also repurchased the most loss-absorbing securities, for which they paid the highest premiums. These premiums increase with leverage and in times of stress. Hence debt repurchases are a cause for prudential concern.

Author(s):  
Michael Iselin ◽  
Jung Koo Kang ◽  
Joshua M. Madsen

In the wake of the financial crisis of 2007-2008, Basel III recommended that bank regulators include changes in the fair value of available-for-sale (AFS) debt securities in Tier 1 capital. However, the U.S. implementation allowed smaller banks to continue excluding these changes through a one-time opt out election. This paper investigates a potential impact of this opt out provision by examining the investment decisions of smaller banks in the 1990's when changes in the fair value of AFS debt securities were temporarily included in regulatory capital. Using a sample of smaller banks and a difference-in-differences research design, we find that low-capitalized banks reduced their investments in more volatile asset classes (e.g., corporate bonds, non-agency MBS) and increased their investments in less volatile asset classes (e.g., treasuries and municipal bonds) after changes in fair value were included in regulatory capital. These findings suggest that providing smaller banks with an opt out election potentially allows low-capitalized, riskier banks to continue to hold more volatile securities in their AFS portfolios.


2017 ◽  
Vol 25 (3) ◽  
pp. 253-270 ◽  
Author(s):  
Colleen Baker ◽  
Christine Cummings ◽  
Julapa Jagtiani

Purpose Basel III and the capital stress testing introduced new requirements and new definitions while retaining the structure of the pre-2010 requirements. The total number of requirements increased, making it difficult to determine which and how many constraints are binding. The purpose of this paper is to discuss the new financial regulations in the post-financial crisis period, focusing on the capital and liquidity regulations. Design/methodology/approach The authors explore the impact of financial regulations using various data sources – financial and accounting data from Y-9C Reports. Market data such as daily bond trading from TRACE through the Wharton Data Research Services and Treasury yield from the Bloomberg. The authors use regression analysis to examine the roles of capital adequacy and liquidity regulations. Findings The authors’ analysis in this paper suggest that Basel III, CET1 and Level 1 HQLAs requirements post-financial crisis have reshaped the balance sheets of large financial institutions, with some differential impacts on traditional versus capital markets banks. These changes appear to respond to the binding constraints (CET1 being a preponderance of required regulatory capital, Level 1 HQLAs a majority of required HQLAs and the expense of both) created by these new requirements, which also appear to have constrained asset growth at such institutions. Consistent with the authors’ view, their results suggest that the new requirements are less constraining for large traditional banks (such institutions show a rapid increase in CET1 capital to steady-state levels by 2012 and strong retail deposit rebuilding resulting in a relatively low required HQLA) and much more so, particularly the liquidity requirement, for the capital markets banks (such institutions show continuous building of CET1 capital over the post-crisis observation period, declines in the share of trading assets and increases in the share of HQLAs combined with efforts to increase retail deposits). Credit risk spreads rose dramatically during the financial crisis of 2008-2009. Although decreased, they remain higher and with greater dispersion (for both groups of banks) than pre-crisis. Preliminary regression analysis suggests that the market responds to changes in measured liquidity, rather than the regulatory capital ratios, when pricing bank risk (as reflected on bond spreads). Research limitations/implications The estimation is based on historical relationship in the data. We must be cautious in extrapolating the results in a different environment. Practical implications There appears to be an arbitrage between HQLA and retail deposits. Capital markets banks and traditional banks follow different business models as evident in the analysis in this paper. Social implications Market pricing suggests that the liquidity measures are more transparent and easier to understand. Capital ratios are not as easy to interpret. Originality/value Original research. To the authors’ knowledge, there is no paper that examines impacts of capital and liquidity regulations after the crisis at capital markets banks vs traditional banks – using both accounting data and market data.


2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Li Chen ◽  
David Emanuel ◽  
Lina Z. Li ◽  
Mu Yang

PurposeThe authors examine whether Chinese banks use loan loss provisions (LLPs) for capital management, income smoothing and signaling purposes, and assess the effect of the recent regulatory changes following the implementation of Chinese Basel III on such behavior.Design/methodology/approachThe authors use a unique set of hand-collected data on bank capital combined with financial data downloaded from the China Stock Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR) database. Multivariate regression models are used to test our hypotheses.FindingsThe authors find that while there is no evidence to suggest capital management practice before the Chinese Basel III, the implementation of the new regulations induced listed banks to manage tier-1 capital via LLPs. The authors also find strong support that Chinese banks engage in income smoothing via LLPs management, and there is no change in such tendency following the issuance of Chinese Basel III. Lastly, the authors do not find support for the signaling behavior by Chinese banks using LLPs.Practical implicationsThe authors’ evidence suggests that elevated tier-1 capital and provisioning requirements may induce capital management by banks, which indicates a potential unintended effect brought forth by the new Basel regulations.Originality/valueTo the best of authors’ knowledge, this study is the first to examine Chinese banks' behavior relating to LLPs in terms of capital management, income smoothing and signaling. In particular, the authors use a sample containing a large number of Chinese commercial banks – previously a major data issue in other studies.


2016 ◽  
Vol 30 (2) ◽  
pp. 138-162
Author(s):  
Beebee Salma Sairally ◽  
Marjan Muhammad ◽  
Madaa Munjid Mustafa

This research aims to compare the regulatory capital instruments for Islamic banking institutions (ibis)—in particular the qualifying Additional Tier 1 (AT1) capital instruments—as defined by Basel iii, Bank Negara Malaysia (bnm) and ifsb-15 (issued by the Islamic Financial Services Board). Principally, the research examines the Sharīʿah issues, especially related to subordination, arising in equity-based contracts when used for structuring AT1 capital instruments. In particular, it examines the muḍārabah ṣukūk issued by the Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank (adib) in 2012. The study finds that the most appropriate Sharīʿah contract that would be suitable for structuring AT1 capital instruments would be mushārakah. The present study is considered an original attempt in examining an under-researched topic relating to Basel iii and its Sharīʿah perspective. The study will be an important reference point to Islamic banks when structuring AT1 capital instruments.


2021 ◽  
Vol 54 (2) ◽  
pp. 265-299
Author(s):  
Alois Paul Knobloch ◽  
Felix Krauß

Common Equity Tier 1 capital of credit institutions is adjusted by the prudential filter for the cash flow hedge reserve according to art. 33(1)(a) CRR. Thereby, fair value changes of hedging instruments, especially of derivatives, are neutralized by imputed fair value changes of future cash flows that are part of a cash flow hedge. However, these future cash flows are (mostly) expected to occur under market conditions and, thus, imputed fair value changes are not reflected in changes of present values derived from real transactions that exist at the time of the regulatory capital calculation. As a result, positive effects on Common Equity Tier 1 capital can be viewed critically in regard to the prudence principle of banking supervision if an initial reduction in Common Equity Tier 1 capital due to losses from hedging instruments is corrected. Furthermore, the adjustment is case specific and depends on the hedge effectiveness, which is questionable because of consistency reasons. To solve these weaknesses, we suggest to eliminate the prudential filter for the cash flow hedge reserve as a whole. This would lead to a better quality of Common Equity Tier 1 capital by improving its loss absorbency and as a side effect to a reduction in complexity enhancing supervision through regulatory authorities and market discipline. Furthermore, we demonstrate the impact that the proposed abolishment of the prudential filter for the cash flow hedge reserve would have on the Common Equity Tier 1 capital ratios of the largest European banks in 2014–2019


2019 ◽  
Vol 52 (3) ◽  
pp. 375-421
Author(s):  
Felix Krauß

Abstract The calculation of the regulatory capital ratios according to the Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR) is based on the IFRS consolidated financial statements. Therefore, banks are able to influence their regulatory capital ratios through discretionary powers when measuring with fair values according to IFRS 13. This paper analyzes the effects that discretionary fair value changes have on the regulatory capital ratios. Furthermore, the impact of the prudent valuation according to article 105 CRR on the regulatory capital ratios is examined. While the results depend on a multitude of factors and vary from case to case, there are situations in which the same fair value change of an identical financial asset can have opposing effects on certain regulatory capital ratios depending on bank specific factors like its regulatory capitalization or its tax rate. As a result, decreasing fair values can in some circumstances lead to higher regulatory capital ratios and thus, indicate a greater solvency. In order to identify possible conflicts of interest, the effects of fair value changes on the comprehensive income are also included in the analysis because the comprehensive income serves as an important target figure for banks in addition to the regulatory capital ratios. JEL Classification: F380, G380, M410, M480


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