Moral Perception, Aesthetic Perception, and Intuitive Judgment

2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Audi
Keyword(s):  
Moral Intuition ◽  
Moral Knowledge ◽  
Moral Perception ◽  
Aesthetic Perception ◽  
Aesthetic Object ◽  
Intuitive Judgment ◽  
Aesthetic Cognition

This chapter provides a comparison between moral and aesthetic knowledge and other aspects of the similarity between moral and aesthetic cognition. The connections between aesthetics and ethics are especially important for understanding moral perception and moral intuition. There is aesthetic perception, as opposed to mere perception of an aesthetic object, just as there is moral perception, as opposed to mere perception of a moral phenomenon. One may also find aesthetic disagreements that, even more than moral disagreements, challenge the view that normative domains have objective standards. The chapter shows how singular moral knowledge is like singular aesthetic knowledge in resting on a response to properties which ground the truth of the normative propositions known.

Emotion and Intuition as Sources of Moral Judgment

2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Audi
Keyword(s):  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Moral Intuition ◽  
Moral Knowledge ◽  
Moral Perception ◽  
Normal Person ◽  
Moral Intuitions ◽  
Moral Concepts

This chapter examines how moral perception is possible for virtually any normal person with an elementary mastery of moral concepts. But moral perception is by no means the only route to moral intuition or moral knowledge; reflection is another way. Moral intuitions may also arise in a quite different way: from emotion. The importance of emotional evidence in ethical matters is best appreciated when its relation to moral perception and moral intuition is taken into account. The chapter argues that people sometimes know things that they would not otherwise know, which is possible through the evidence of emotion, often where the emotion is connected with intuition.

Moral Perception Defended

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Audi
Keyword(s):  
Perception And Action ◽  
Moral Knowledge ◽  
Moral Perception ◽  
Cognitive Penetration ◽  
Aesthetic Perception ◽  
Natural Properties ◽  
Moral Sensibility ◽  
Structural Analogy ◽  
Moral Properties

This chapter extends Robert Audi's theory of moral perception and answers some objections from the literature. It distinguishes the perceptible from the perceptual; develops a structural analogy between perception and action; explains how moral perception can be causal; clarifies respects in which moral perception is representational; and indicates how it can ground moral knowledge. The presentational character of moral perception is described, particularly the phenomenological integration between moral sensibility and non-moral perception of the natural properties that ground moral properties. The question whether moral perception is inferential is approached by clarifying the notion of inference and pursuing an analogy between moral perception and perception of emotion. Aesthetic perception is also considered as instructively analogous to moral perception. The final sections explore cognitive penetration in relation to moral perception, conceptual and developmental aspects of moral perception, and the latitude Audi’s account of it allows in the epistemology and ontology of ethics.

Moral Perception and Its Rivals

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sarah McGrath
Keyword(s):  
Moral Knowledge ◽  
Moral Perception ◽  
Attractive Alternative ◽  
Alternative Account ◽  
Perceptual Knowledge ◽  
Relevant Class

Proponents of moral perception hold that some of our moral knowledge is perceptual knowledge. Discussions of whether moral perception is possible often seem to assume that there is some attractive alternative account of how we arrive at moral knowledge in those cases that are regarded as among the best candidates for cases of full-fledged moral perception. This chapter challenges that assumption by critically examining some alternative accounts of how we arrive at knowledge in the relevant class of cases, arguing that the more closely one examines these alternative accounts, the more implausible they seem as accounts of how we actually manage to arrive at moral knowledge. A modest version of moral perception is sketched, one that does not suffer from any similarly implausible commitments. There are some concluding reflections on why it matters whether some of our moral knowledge is perceptual.

Moral Perception: Causal, Phenomenological, and Epistemological Elements

2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Audi
Keyword(s):  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Moral Belief ◽  
Moral Knowledge ◽  
Moral Perception ◽  
Perceptual Knowledge ◽  
Moral Properties ◽  
Do So

This chapter analyzes how perception is a kind of experiential information-bearing relation between the perceiver and the object perceived. It argues that even if moral properties are not themselves causal, they can be perceptible. But the dependence of moral perception on non-moral perception does not imply an inferential dependence of all moral belief or moral judgment on non-moral belief or judgment. This kind of grounding explains how a moral belief arising in perception can constitute perceptual knowledge and can do so on grounds that are publicly accessible and, though not a guarantee of it, a basis for ethical agreement. The chapter also shows how perceptual moral knowledge is connected not only with other moral knowledge but also with intuition and emotion.

Moral Perception without (Prior) Moral Knowledge

2018 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 164-181 ◽  
Author(s):  
Preston J. Werner
Keyword(s):  
A Priori ◽  
Background Knowledge ◽  
Moral Knowledge ◽  
Moral Perception

Proponents of impure moral perception claim that, while there are perceptual moral experiences, these experiences epistemically depend on a priori moral knowledge. Proponents of pure moral perception claim that moral experiences can justify independently of substantive a priori moral knowledge. Some philosophers, most notably David Faraci (2015), have argued that the pure view is mistaken, since moral perception requires previous moral background knowledge, and such knowledge could not itself be perceptual. I defend pure moral perception against this objection. I consider two ways to understand the notion of “background knowledge” that is crucial to the objection. On a (stronger) reading, the claim that background knowledge is necessary for moral perception is likely false. On a second and weaker reading, the claim is true, but the background knowledge in question could be perceptual, and thus compatible with pure moral perception. Thus, the objection fails.

scholarly journals La fenomenología de la razón y la experiencia estética. Edmund Husserl y Vasily SesemanNN

2021 ◽  
pp. 129
Author(s):  
Dalius Yonkus
Keyword(s):  
Aesthetic Experience ◽  
Edmund Husserl ◽  
Necessary Conditions ◽  
Intentional Object ◽  
Phenomenological Reduction ◽  
Phenomenological Method ◽  
Aesthetic Perception ◽  
Aesthetic Object ◽  
The Aesthetic ◽  
Do So

La estética fenomenológica debería ser capaz de revelar cómo la estructura de cualquier objeto estético dado está conectada con la experiencia de ese objeto, así como demostrar las condiciones necesarias para la propia experiencia estética. Para hacerlo, hay que argumentar en contra de los supuestos unilaterales, como por ejemplo la suposición del objetivismo estético que postula la belleza como rasgo exclusivo de la realidad independiente del sujeto; o la creencia opuesta, que la belleza es esencial y únicamente la proyección del gusto subjetivo sobre las cosas en el mundo. Sesemann analiza el objeto estético y el acto estético, enfatizando su conexión. Esta conexión se refiere a lo que se describe en la fenomenología de Husserl como la correlación entre el objeto intencional y el acto intencional. Esta conexión puede ser descubierta sólo mediante el método fenomenológico: realizando la reducción fenomenológica. En este documento se explicará en primer lugar la percepción estética en la estética de Sesemann. Más adelante, se examina la concepción de la estructura del objeto estético en el contexto de la estética de Sesemann: la composición de los elementos, las sensaciones en relación con el significado, etc. Por último, el artículo sugiere que la estética de Sesemann se basa fundamentalmente en el método de la reducción fenomenológica.Phenomenological aesthetics should also be able to show how the structure of any given aesthetic object is connected with the experience of that object, as well as to demonstrate the necessary conditions for the aesthetic experience itself. In order to do so, one must argue against one-sided assumptions, such as the aesthetic objectivism’s supposition that beauty is exclusively the trait of reality not at all dependent on the subject’s experience of it; or its opposite belief that beauty is essentially and solely the projection of the subjective taste onto the things in the world. Sesemann analizes the aesthetic object and aesthetic act by emphasizing their connection. This connection relates to what is described in Husserls phenomenology as the correlation between the intentional object and the intentional act. This connection can be discovered only by using the phenomenological method: by doing phenomenological reduction. This paper will first explain the aesthetic perception in Sesemann‘s aesthetics. Later, it examine the conception of the aesthetic object‘s structure in Sesemann‘s aesthetic: composition of elements, sensations in connection with meaning; etc. Finally, the paper will argue that Sesemann‘s aesthetics is essentially based on the method of phenomenological reduction.

Moral Perception

2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Audi
Keyword(s):  
Moral Psychology ◽  
Human Experience ◽  
Moral Knowledge ◽  
Moral Disagreement ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Moral Perception

We can see a theft, hear a lie, and feel a stabbing. These are morally important perceptions. But are they also moral perceptions—distinctively moral responses? This book develops an original account of moral perceptions, shows how they figure in human experience, and argues that they provide moral knowledge. The book offers a theory of perception as an informative representational relation to objects and events. It describes the experiential elements in perception, illustrates moral perception in relation to everyday observations, and explains how moral perception justifies moral judgments and contributes to objectivity in ethics. Moral perception does not occur in isolation. Intuition and emotion may facilitate it, influence it, and be elicited by it. The book explores the nature and variety of intuitions and their relation to both moral perception and emotion, providing the broadest and most refined statement to date of this widely discussed intuitionist view in ethics. It also distinguishes several kinds of moral disagreement and assesses the challenge it poses for ethical objectivism. Philosophically argued but interdisciplinary in scope and interest, the book advances our understanding of central problems in ethics, moral psychology, epistemology, and the theory of the emotions.

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