History and Economics

Author(s):  
Ian Kumekawa

This introductory chapter takes a brief look into the life and career of Arthur Cecil Pigou, as an economist and as a historical figure. Pigou lived through at least two periods of radical transition in the economic discipline. During the first, in the early 1900s, he was a pioneer, a new breed of economist who helped usher out the age of political economy and usher in that of economic science. As this new discipline spread throughout Britain, Europe, and the United States, Pigou's work was adopted as part of the new orthodoxy of economic thought that increasingly was leveraged by national governments. But in the subsequent period of transformation in the 1930s, Pigou found himself in an entirely different position. During this time, though he was an established “giant” of his field, the contours of his discipline were swiftly becoming unfamiliar to him.

2021 ◽  

This volume brings together leading political scientists to explore the distinctive features of the American political economy. The introductory chapter provides a comparatively informed framework for analyzing the interplay of markets and politics in the United States, focusing on three key factors: uniquely fragmented and decentralized political institutions; an interest group landscape characterized by weak labor organizations and powerful, parochial business groups; and an entrenched legacy of ethno-racial divisions embedded in both government and markets. Subsequent chapters look at the fundamental dynamics that result, including the place of the courts in multi-venue politics, the political economy of labor, sectional conflict within and across cities and regions, the consolidation of financial markets and corporate monopoly and monopsony power, and the ongoing rise of the knowledge economy. Together, the chapters provide a revealing new map of the politics of democratic capitalism in the United States.


2011 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 659-662 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brian Waddell

Jacob S. Hacker and Paul Pierson's Winner-Take-All Politics: How Washington Made the Rich Richer—And Turned Its Back on the Middle Class is both a work of political science and a contribution to broad public discussion of distributive politics. Its topic could not be more relevant to a US polity wracked by bitter partisan disagreements about taxes, social spending, financial regulation, social insecurity, and inequality. The political power of “the rich” is a theme of widespread public attention. The headline on the cover of the January–February 2011 issue of The American Interest—“Inequality and Democracy: Are Plutocrats Drowning Our Republic?”—is indicative. Francis Fukuyama's lead essay, entitled “Left Out,” clarifies that by “plutocracy,” the journal means “not just rule by the rich, but rule by and for the rich. We mean, in other words, a state of affairs in which the rich influence government in such a way as to protect and expand their own wealth and influence, often at the expense of others.” Fukuyama makes clear that he believes that this state of affairs obtains in the United States today.Readers of Perspectives on Politics will know that the topic has garnered increasing attention from political scientists in general and in our journal in particular. In March 2009, we featured a symposium on Larry Bartels's Unequal Democracy: The Political Economy of the New Gilded Age. And in December 2009, our lead article, by Jeffrey A. Winters and Benjamin I. Page, starkly posed the question “Oligarchy in the United States?” and answered it with an equally stark “yes.” Winner-Take-All Politics thus engages a broader scholarly discussion within US political science, at the same time that it both draws upon and echoes many “classic themes” of US political science from the work of Charles Beard and E. E. Schattschneider to Ted Lowi and Charles Lindblom.In this symposium, we have brought together a group of important scholars and commentators who offer a range of perspectives on the book and on the broader themes it engages. While most of our discussants are specialists on “American politics,” we have also sought out scholars beyond this subfield. Our charge to the discussants is to evaluate the book's central claims and evidence, with a focus on three related questions: 1) How compelling is its analysis of the “how” and “why” of recent US public policy and its “turn” in favor of “the rich” and against “the middle class”? 2) How compelling is its critique of the subfield of “American politics” for its focus on the voter–politician linkage and on “politics as spectacle” at the expense of an analysis of “politics as organized combat”? 3) And do you agree with its argument that recent changes in US politics necessitate a different, more comparative, and more political economy–centered approach to the study of US politics?—Jeffrey C. Isaac, Editor


2017 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 531-549 ◽  
Author(s):  
Huiyu Zhao ◽  
Robert Percival

AbstractThe proper division of responsibility for environmental protection between national and state governments has long been the subject of fierce debate. During the 1970s the United States Congress decided to shift the most important environmental responsibilities from state governments to the federal government. The main reason for this decision was to prevent a ‘race to the bottom’ in that states competing for industries could otherwise be lax in implementing and enforcing federal environmental standards. Yet, some scholars have argued that there could just as easily be a ‘race to the top’ among states as they compete to attract people and businesses concerned with environmental protection. China, in turn, is plagued with severe air and water pollution and soil contamination, which is attributed largely to ineffective enforcement of its national environmental laws. This article investigates whether China’s experience confirms the race-to-the-bottom theory. It demonstrates that devolution of responsibility for environmental protection to lower levels of government tends to result in lax implementation and enforcement of national environmental laws, particularly where national governments also create strong incentives for economic growth. It concludes that China’s highly devolved system of environmental governance is consistent with this theory, even if it does not provide conclusive evidence of its correctness.


Elements ◽  
2009 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Tim Mooney

Federalism has played an important role in the explosion of legalized gambling in the United States in the last two decades. Indian gaming, in particular, has challenged state and national governments to come to terms with the place of American Indian tribes within the federalist system and organize a meaningful framework for the expansion of gaming on tribal lands. Now largely controlled by a federal statutory framework, Indian gaming has left states in a subordinate position in negotiating the establisment of major casino enterprises within their own borders. Confusion in states' rights during negotiations has further weakened their bargaining position, leading to extensive tribal casino development. The cooperation between states and tribes and states and casino corporations have facilitated casino proliferation throughout the United States, a trend that appears destined to contiue until the market is fully saturated.


Author(s):  
Lorraine Eden

For more than ten years now, transfer pricing has been the top international taxation issue faced by multinational enterprises (MNEs). This article aims to outline, for the reader, the complex issue of transfer pricing, as seen by MNE managers and by governments faced with the daunting task of taxing business profits. The article is organized as follows. First, it briefly discusses transfer pricing from the MNE's perspective and the problems that this raises for national governments. It then reviews the basic rules of international taxation as they apply to MNE profits. The specific rules and procedures that apply to transfer pricing, as practiced in the United States and recommended by the OECD, are then outlined. It concludes with a discussion of unresolved problems that are likely to plague transfer pricing over the next few years.


2001 ◽  
Vol 61 (4) ◽  
pp. 974-1008 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robin L. Einhorn

Economic historians have traced the origin of the uniform property tax in the United States to the insertion of uniformity clauses into state constitutions in the Northwest and to efforts to tax commercial wealth. This article shows that the tax was created by legislation in the Northeast and that the first constitutional clauses were adopted in the South to protect slaveholders. It is time for historians of the U.S. political economy to abandon the dated paradigms of the “progressive history” tradition.


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