scholarly journals ¿Ha sido un milagro? Brevísimo repaso al debate contemporáneo del no-miracles argument en el realismo científico.

2020 ◽  
pp. 61-70
Author(s):  
Yulfren Jhonattan González Ramírez
Keyword(s):  
No Miracles Argument

La filosofía como madre de todas las disciplinas, reflexiona ante los acontecimientos que suceden alrededor del ser humano, la filosofía de la ciencia, por su parte, trata la relación entre el ethos científico y su conocimiento. Las teorías científicas permiten al hombre (antropológicamente entendido) entender los fenómenos a los cuales estamos expuestos y dan validez a los argumentos que más se acerquen a la realidad de los hechos. Este trabajo hace una revisión a la polémica surgida entre realistas y anti-realistas sobre el “argumento del milagro” (no-miracles argument, en inglés) planteado por Hilary Putman.

4. Realism and anti‐realism

2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Samir Okasha
Keyword(s):  
Scientific Realism ◽  
Van Fraassen ◽  
No Miracles Argument ◽  
Bas Van Fraassen ◽  
Aim Of Science ◽  
The World ◽  
True Description ◽  
Underdetermination Argument

‘Realism and anti-realism’ is concerned with the debate between scientific realism and its converse, anti-realism or instrumentalism. Realists hold that the aim of science is to provide a true description of the world. Anti-realists hold that it is to provide a true description of the ‘observable’ part of the world. The ‘no miracles’ argument, one of the strongest arguments for scientific realism, is shown to be a plausibility argument — an inference to the best explanation. Central to the debate between realism and anti-realism is the observable/unobservable distinction and the views of realist Grover Maxwell and anti-realist Bas van Fraassen are described. The underdetermination argument is also explained.

Newman’s Objection and the No Miracles Argument

Erkenntnis ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 82 (5) ◽  
pp. 993-1014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Smithson
Keyword(s):  
No Miracles Argument

Exhuming the No-Miracles Argument

Analysis ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 73 (2) ◽  
pp. 205-211 ◽  
Author(s):  
C. Howson
Keyword(s):  
No Miracles Argument

Scientific Realism

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Timothy D. Lyons
Keyword(s):  
Scientific Realism ◽  
Final Section ◽  
Modus Tollens ◽  
Scientific Theories ◽  
No Miracles Argument ◽  
Historical Argument ◽  
Empirical Equivalence ◽  
Socratic Scientific Realism ◽  
Epistemic Realism ◽  
Axiological Scientific Realism

This article endeavors to identify the strongest versions of the two primary arguments against epistemic scientific realism: the historical argument—generally dubbed “the pessimistic meta-induction”—and the argument from underdetermination. It is shown that, contrary to the literature, both can be understood as historically informed but logically valid modus tollens arguments. After specifying the question relevant to underdetermination and showing why empirical equivalence is unnecessary, two types of competitors to contemporary scientific theories are identified, both of which are informed by science itself. With the content and structure of the two nonrealist arguments clarified, novel relations between them are uncovered, revealing the severity of their collective threat against epistemic realism and its “no-miracles” argument. The final section proposes, however, that the realist’s axiological tenet “science seeks truth” is not blocked. An attempt is made to indicate the promise for a nonepistemic, purely axiological scientific realism—here dubbed “Socratic scientific realism.”

scholarly journals The no miracles argument and the base rate fallacy

Synthese ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 194 (4) ◽  
pp. 1295-1302 ◽  
Author(s):  
Leah Henderson
Keyword(s):  
Base Rate ◽  
No Miracles Argument ◽  
Base Rate Fallacy

Reconsidering Structural Realism

2003 ◽  
Vol 33 (4) ◽  
pp. 517-536 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dan McArthur
Keyword(s):  
Scientific Realism ◽  
Structural Realism ◽  
Scientific Change ◽  
Empirical Content ◽  
No Miracles Argument ◽  
Critical Attention ◽  
Discontinuous Nature

In the lengthy debate over the question of scientific realism one of the least discussed positions is structural realism. However, this position ought to attract critical attention because it purports to preserve the central insights of the best arguments for both realism and anti-realism. John Worrall has in fact described it as being ‘the best of both worlds’ that recognizes the discontinuous nature of scientific change as well as the ‘no-miracles’ argument for scientific realism. However, the validity of this claim has been called into question by Stathis Psillos. He questions its ability to correctly account for the examples of scientific change that its supporters, like Worrall (following Poincaré), claim ought to be understood in a structural realist light.In this paper I examine these arguments for and against structural realism and demonstrate that neither Worrall nor Psillos is fully correct. I agree with Psillos’ claim that realism with regards to a theory ought not to be ‘all or nothing,’ that one should not always take the whole of a theory to be true or else commit only to the belief in its directly empirical content.

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