Reconsidering Structural Realism

2003 ◽  
Vol 33 (4) ◽  
pp. 517-536 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dan McArthur
Keyword(s):  
Scientific Realism ◽  
Structural Realism ◽  
Scientific Change ◽  
Empirical Content ◽  
No Miracles Argument ◽  
Critical Attention ◽  
Discontinuous Nature

In the lengthy debate over the question of scientific realism one of the least discussed positions is structural realism. However, this position ought to attract critical attention because it purports to preserve the central insights of the best arguments for both realism and anti-realism. John Worrall has in fact described it as being ‘the best of both worlds’ that recognizes the discontinuous nature of scientific change as well as the ‘no-miracles’ argument for scientific realism. However, the validity of this claim has been called into question by Stathis Psillos. He questions its ability to correctly account for the examples of scientific change that its supporters, like Worrall (following Poincaré), claim ought to be understood in a structural realist light.In this paper I examine these arguments for and against structural realism and demonstrate that neither Worrall nor Psillos is fully correct. I agree with Psillos’ claim that realism with regards to a theory ought not to be ‘all or nothing,’ that one should not always take the whole of a theory to be true or else commit only to the belief in its directly empirical content.

scholarly journals The Non-Miraculous Success of Formal Analogies in Quantum Theories

2020 ◽  
pp. 255-275
Author(s):  
Doreen Fraser
Keyword(s):  
Case Studies ◽  
History Of Science ◽  
Scientific Realism ◽  
Structural Realism ◽  
Higgs Model ◽  
Historical Case ◽  
Quantum Theories ◽  
No Miracles Argument ◽  
Approximate Truth ◽  
History Of

The Higgs model was developed using purely formal analogies to models of superconductivity. This is in contrast to historical case studies such as the development of electromagnetism, which employed physical analogies. As a result, quantum case studies such as the development of the Higgs model carry new lessons for the scientific (anti-)realism debate. Chapter 13 argues that, by breaking the connection between success and approximate truth, the use of purely formal analogies is a counterexample to two prominent versions of the ‘No Miracles’ Argument (NMA) for scientific realism: Stathis Psillos’ Refined Explanationist Defense of Realism and the Argument from History of Science for structural realism. The NMA is undermined, but the success of the Higgs model is not miraculous because there is a naturalistically acceptable explanation for its success that does not invoke approximate truth. The chapter also suggests some possible strategies for adapting to the counterexample for scientific realists who wish to hold on to the NMA in some form.

scholarly journals D. Dennett’s Real Patterns as a Modal Ontology: Essentialist Interpretation of Truth-Making

2020 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 59-74
Author(s):  
Nikita V. Golovko
Keyword(s):  
Scientific Realism ◽  
Structural Realism ◽  
Realistic Interpretation ◽  
Starting Point ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Modal Ontology

The paper aims to make a satisfactory realistic interpretation of the solution of the truth-making problem within the framework of D. Dennett’s real patterns conception in order to show that D. Dennett’s ontology can be interpreted in a realistic sense not only within the framework of J. Ladyman’s structural realism. As a starting point, the solution of the truth-making problem within the concept of “serious essentialism” by E. J. Lowe is considered. Our thesis is that the expansion of the D. Dennett’s conception with E. J. Lowe’s “serious essentialism” leads us to the conclusion that D. Dennett’s ontology not only receives a satisfactory realistic interpretation of the solution of the truth-making problem, but also provides an opportunity to answer properly to the definition of scientific realism given by M. Devitt.

4. Realism and anti‐realism

2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Samir Okasha
Keyword(s):  
Scientific Realism ◽  
Van Fraassen ◽  
No Miracles Argument ◽  
Bas Van Fraassen ◽  
Aim Of Science ◽  
The World ◽  
True Description ◽  
Underdetermination Argument

‘Realism and anti-realism’ is concerned with the debate between scientific realism and its converse, anti-realism or instrumentalism. Realists hold that the aim of science is to provide a true description of the world. Anti-realists hold that it is to provide a true description of the ‘observable’ part of the world. The ‘no miracles’ argument, one of the strongest arguments for scientific realism, is shown to be a plausibility argument — an inference to the best explanation. Central to the debate between realism and anti-realism is the observable/unobservable distinction and the views of realist Grover Maxwell and anti-realist Bas van Fraassen are described. The underdetermination argument is also explained.

scholarly journals LA RELATIVITÀ E LA REALTÀ DEL MOMENTO PRESENTE

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mauro Dorato
Keyword(s):  
Scientific Realism ◽  
Structural Realism ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Present Moment ◽  
Entity Realism

In this paper I examine the problem of scientific realism from the viewpoint of the question of reality of time, and of the present moment in particular. For this purpose, I examine four different views about the reality of time, corresponding in the debate on scientific realism to theory realism, entity realism, structural realism and what we could call “weak realism” (intersubjectice agreement). I conclude that the relational character of “being present” need not entail the reducibility of mental states to physical states, but rather the necessity of considering together the objective succession of physical events perceived by our brain and the awareness of this succession made possible by our brain.

Scientific Realism

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Timothy D. Lyons
Keyword(s):  
Scientific Realism ◽  
Final Section ◽  
Modus Tollens ◽  
Scientific Theories ◽  
No Miracles Argument ◽  
Historical Argument ◽  
Empirical Equivalence ◽  
Socratic Scientific Realism ◽  
Epistemic Realism ◽  
Axiological Scientific Realism

This article endeavors to identify the strongest versions of the two primary arguments against epistemic scientific realism: the historical argument—generally dubbed “the pessimistic meta-induction”—and the argument from underdetermination. It is shown that, contrary to the literature, both can be understood as historically informed but logically valid modus tollens arguments. After specifying the question relevant to underdetermination and showing why empirical equivalence is unnecessary, two types of competitors to contemporary scientific theories are identified, both of which are informed by science itself. With the content and structure of the two nonrealist arguments clarified, novel relations between them are uncovered, revealing the severity of their collective threat against epistemic realism and its “no-miracles” argument. The final section proposes, however, that the realist’s axiological tenet “science seeks truth” is not blocked. An attempt is made to indicate the promise for a nonepistemic, purely axiological scientific realism—here dubbed “Socratic scientific realism.”

Scientific Realism and Scientific Change

1982 ◽  
Vol 32 (128) ◽  
pp. 201 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Worrall
Keyword(s):  
Scientific Realism ◽  
Scientific Change

The Source of Epistemic Normativity: Scientific Change as an Explanatory Problem

2021 ◽  
pp. 004839312098790
Author(s):  
Thodoris Dimitrakos
Keyword(s):  
History Of Science ◽  
Scientific Realism ◽  
Analytic Philosophy ◽  
Philosophical Problem ◽  
Scientific Change ◽  
Epistemic Normativity ◽  
Scientific Rationality ◽  
History Of

In this paper, I present the problem of scientific change as an explanatory problem, that is, as a philosophical problem concerning what logical forms of explanation we should employ in order to understand the major conceptual ruptures throughout the history of science. I distinguish between two logical forms of explanation: (a) empirical-scientific and (b) normative explanations. Based on this distinction, I distinguish between the scientific and the liberal versions of naturalism concerning the issue of scientific change. I argue in favor of the latter by showing that normative explanations are indispensable in order to fully understand scientific change. I also argue that we can defend scientific rationality without violating the naturalistic framework which is dominant in contemporary analytic philosophy. I conclude that endorsing scientific realism within a naturalistic framework is the only option for preserving scientific rationality.

scholarly journals Epistemic structural realism, modality and laws of nature

2018 ◽  
Vol 33 (3) ◽  
pp. 447
Author(s):  
Bruno Borge
Keyword(s):  
Scientific Realism ◽  
Laws Of Nature ◽  
Structural Realism ◽  
Scientific Theories ◽  
Epistemic Structural Realism ◽  
The One

According to epistemic structural realism (EER) scientific theories provide us only with knowledge about the structure of the unobservable world, but not about its nature. The most significant objection that this posi- tion has faced is the so-called Newman’s problem. In this paper I offer an alternative objection to EER. I argue that its formulation leads to undesirable skeptical positions in two fields close to scientific realism: the debates on modality and laws of nature. I also show that there is an interesting sense in which my objection is stronger than the one offered by Newman.

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