The Psychopath Objection to Divine Command Theory

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew Alexander Flannagan
Keyword(s):  
Divine Command ◽  
Moral Obligations ◽  
Divine Command Theory ◽  
Objective Sense ◽  
Recent Debate

Abstract: Recently, Erik Wielenberg has developed a novel objection to divine command meta-ethics (DCM). The objection that DCM "has the implausible implication that psychopaths have no moral obligations and hence their evil acts, no matter how evil, are morally permissible". This article criticizes Wielenberg's argument. Section 1 will expound Wielenberg's new "psychopath" argument in the context of the recent debate over the Promulgation Objection. Section 2 will discuss two ambiguities in the argument; in particular, Wielenberg’s formulation is ambiguous between whether Wielenberg uses the word "obligation" in an objective or subjective sense. Section 3 will argue that this ambiguity undercuts the argument. If Wielenberg is using the word obligation in a subjective sense, his arguments do not show that that psychopaths "have no moral obligations". By contrast, if Wielenberg is using the word obligation in an objective sense, his arguments do not show that Divine command theorists are committed to denying psychopaths have obligations.

scholarly journals The Prior Obligations Objection to Theological Stateism

2019 ◽  
Vol 36 (3) ◽  
pp. 372-384
Author(s):  
Frederick Choo ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Moral Obligation ◽  
Divine Command ◽  
Moral Obligations ◽  
Divine Command Theory

Theological stateist theories, the most well-known of which is Divine Command Theory (DCT), ground our moral obligations directly in some state of God. The prior obligations objection poses a challenge to theological stateism. Is there a moral obligation to obey God’s commands? If no, it is hard to see how God’s commands can generate any moral obligations for us. If yes, then what grounds this prior obligation? To avoid circularity, the moral obligation must be grounded independent of God’s commands; and therefore DCT fails to ground all moral obligations in God’s commands. I argue that DCT proponents should embrace “metaethical DCT.” On this view, there is no moral obligation to obey God. God creates our moral obligations out of normative nothingness. I argue that this helps DCT proponents to escape the prior obligations objection. Other theological stateist theories can modify their theory similarly to meet this objection.

scholarly journals Divine command theory and psychopathy

2018 ◽  
Vol 56 (4) ◽  
pp. 542-557
Author(s):  
ERIK J. WIELENBERG
Keyword(s):  
Divine Command ◽  
Moral Obligations ◽  
Divine Command Theory

AbstractI advance a novel challenge for Divine Command Theory based on the existence of psychopaths. The challenge, in a nutshell, is that Divine Command Theory has the implausible implication that psychopaths have no moral obligations and hence their evil acts, no matter how evil, are morally permissible. After explaining this argument, I respond to three objections to it and then critically examine the prospect that Divine Command Theorists might bite the bullet and accept that psychopaths can do no wrong. I conclude that the Psychopathy Objection constitutes a serious and novel challenge for Divine Command Theory.

An argument for the Divine Command Theory of Right Action

Sophia ◽  
1989 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 2-19 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Forrest
Keyword(s):  
Divine Command ◽  
Divine Command Theory ◽  
Right Action

scholarly journals Beyond Divine Command Theory: Moral realism in the Hebrew Bible

2009 ◽  
Vol 65 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Jaco W. Gericke
Keyword(s):  
Hebrew Bible ◽  
Moral Realism ◽  
Moral Epistemology ◽  
Prima Facie ◽  
Divine Command ◽  
Divine Command Theory ◽  
Israelite Religion ◽  
False Dichotomy ◽  
Euthyphro Dilemma

Philosophical approaches to ancient Israelite religion are rare, as is metaethical reflection on the Hebrew Bible. Nevertheless, many biblical scholars and philosophers of religion tend to take it for granted that the biblical metaethical assumptions about the relation between divinity and morality involve a pre-philosophical version of Divine Command Theory by default. In this paper the author challenges the popular consensus with several arguments demonstrating the presence of moral realism in the text. It is furthermore suggested that the popular consensus came about as a result of prima facie assessments informed by anachronistic metatheistic assumptions about what the Hebrew Bible assumed to be essential in the deity–morality relation. The study concludes with the observation that in the texts where Divine Command Theory is absent from the underlying moral epistemology the Euthyphro Dilemma disappears as a false dichotomy.

scholarly journals What if God commanded something terrible? A worry for divine-command meta-ethics

2009 ◽  
Vol 45 (3) ◽  
pp. 249-267 ◽  
Author(s):  
WES MORRISTON
Keyword(s):  
Moral Obligation ◽  
Divine Command ◽  
Divine Command Theory ◽  
Divine Transcendence

AbstractIf God commanded something that was obviously evil, would we have a moral obligation to do it? I critically examine three radically different approaches divine-command theorists may take to the problem posed by this question: (1) reject the possibility of such a command by appealing to God's essential goodness; (2) avoid the implication that we should obey such a command by modifying the divine-command theory; and (3) accept the implication that we should obey such a command by appealing to divine transcendence and mystery. I show that each approach faces significant challenges, and that none is completely satisfying.

Swinburne on the Euthyphro Dilemma. Can Supervenience Save Him?

2008 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 17-29
Author(s):  
Simin Rahimi
Keyword(s):  
Possible Worlds ◽  
Divine Command ◽  
Divine Command Theory ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
Euthyphro Dilemma ◽  
Moral Duties ◽  
Necessary Truths

Modern philosophers normally either reject the „divine command theory” of ethics and argue that moral duties are independent of any commands, or make it dependent on God's commands but like Robert Adams modify their theory and identify moral duties in terms of the commands of a loving God. Adams regards this theory as metaphysically necessary. That is, if it is true, it is true in all possible worlds. But Swinburne's (1981) position is unprecedented insofar as he regards moral truths as analytically necessary. In this paper Swinburne's argument will be discussed and I will reveal some of the difficulties involved in categorising general moral principles (if there are such principles) as logical (analytical/necessary) truths.

Contemporary Moral Apologists

2019 ◽  
pp. 198-209
Author(s):  
David Baggett ◽  
Jerry L. Walls
Keyword(s):  
Problem Of Evil ◽  
Divine Command ◽  
Moral Argument ◽  
Divine Command Theory ◽  
Moral Goodness ◽  
William Lane Craig ◽  
Natural Signs ◽  
The Problem Of Evil ◽  
Moral Duties ◽  
Moral Arguments

A. C. Ewing worked on moral goodness; Austin Farrer focused on the value and dignity of persons; George Mavrodes underscored the odd nature of binding moral duties in a naturalistic world. Robert Adams did work in theistic ethics that produced innovative variants of the moral argument; his wife, Marilyn Adams, demonstrated how God’s incommensurable goodness can address versions of the problem of evil. Linda Zagzebski identified three ways we need moral confidence. C. Stephen Evans defended divine command theory and a natural signs approach to apologetics. John Hare did landmark work on moral arguments. William Lane Craig used the moral argument to powerful effect in books and debates. C. Stephen Layman used the overriding reason thesis and conditional thesis in his variant of the argument. Scott Smith, Mark Linville, Angus Menuge, and Angus Ritchie have offered brilliant epistemic moral arguments. Paul Copan has used history to augment the moral argument.

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