Habermas and the Question of Bioethics

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 61
Author(s):  
Hille Haker

In The Future of Human Nature, Jürgen Habermas raises the question of whether the embryonic genetic diagnosis and genetic modification threatens the foundations of the species ethics that underlies current understandings of morality. While morality, in the normative sense, is based on moral interactions enabling communicative action, justification, and reciprocal respect, the reification involved in the new technologies may preclude individuals to uphold a sense of the undisposability (Unverfügbarkeit) of human life and the inviolability (Unantastbarkeit) of human beings that is necessary for their own identity as well as for reciprocal relations. Engaging with liberal bioethics and Catholic approaches to bioethics, the article clarifies how Habermas’ position offers a radical critique of liberal autonomy while maintaining its postmetaphysical stance. The essay argues that Habermas’ approach may guide the question of rights of future generations regarding germline gene editing. But it calls for a different turn in the conversation between philosophy and theology, namely one that emphasizes the necessary attention to rights violations and injustices as a common, postmetaphysical starting point for critical theory and critical theology alike. In 2001, Jürgen Habermas published a short book on questions of biomedicine that took many by surprise.[1] To some of his students, the turn to a substantive position invoking the need to comment on a species ethics rather than outlining a public moral framework was seen as the departure from the “path of deontological virtue,”[2] and at the same time a departure from postmetaphysical reason. Habermas’ motivation to address the developments in biomedicine had certainly been sparked by the intense debate in Germany, the European Union, and internationally on human cloning, pre-implantation genetic diagnosis, embryonic stem cell research, and human enhancement. He turned to a strand of critical theory that had been pushed to the background by the younger Frankfurt School in favor of cultural theory and social critique, even though it had been an important element of its initial working programs. The relationship of instrumental reason and critical theory, examined, among others, by Max Horkheimer, Theodor W. Adorno, and Herbert Marcuse and taken up in Habermas’ own Knowledge and Interest and Theory of Communicative Action became ever-more actual with the development of the life sciences, human genome analysis, and genetic engineering of human offspring. Today, some of the fictional scenarios discussed at the end of the last century as “science fiction” have become reality: in 2018, the first “germline gene-edited” children were born in China.[3] Furthermore, the UK’s permission to create so-called “three-parent” children may create a legal and political pathway to hereditary germline interventions summarized under the name of “gene editing.”In this article, I want to explore Habermas’ “substantial” argument in the hope that (moral) philosophy and (moral) theology become allies in their struggle against an ever-more reifying lifeworld, which may create a “moral void” that would, at least from today’s perspective, be “unbearable” (73), and for upholding the conditions of human dignity, freedom, and justice. I will contextualize Habermas’ concerns in the broader discourse of bioethics, because only by doing this, his concerns are rescued from some misinterpretations.[1] Jürgen Habermas, The Future of Human Nature (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2003).[2] Ibid., 125, fn. 58. 8[3] Up to the present, no scientific publication of the exact procedure exists, but it is known that the scientist, Jiankui He, circumvented the existing national regulatory framework and may have misled the prospective parents about existing alternatives and the unprecedented nature of his conduct. Yuanwu Ma, Lianfeng Zhang, and Chuan Qin, "The First Genetically Gene‐Edited Babies: It's “Irresponsible and Too Early”," Animal Models and Experimental Medicine  (2019); Matthias Braun, Meacham, Darian, "The Trust Game: Crispr for Human Germline Editing Unsettles Scientists and Society," EMBO reports 20, no. 2 (2019).

2008 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Aécio Amaral

Resumo Em O Futuro da Natureza Humana, Jürgen Habermas afirma que os avanços recentes no campo das biotecnologias constituem um desafio para a ética do discurso nas Ciências Sociais. Por trás de sua crítica aos defensores da eugenia liberal reside o reconhecimento de que o Diagnóstico Genético Pré-Implantação potencialmente põe em cheque o papel exercido pela razão comunicativa na constituição de uma ética individual de auto-compreensão. A ‘ética da espécie’ proposta por Habermas como contraposição a esse fenômeno se nos apresenta como moralmente reativa, na medida em que sua crítica não alcança abarcar os aspectos metafísicos que estão no núcleo do discurso da eugenia liberal. O artigo é dividido em dois momentos: perceber como a recente intervenção de Habermas ecoa o motivo da alegada colonização do mundo-da-vida pela razão tecnológica, e demonstrar como a concepção de técnica que embasa seu relato o impede de divisar a crítica dos aspectos metafísicos da cultura genética contemporânea.Palavras-chave Jürgen Habermas; cultura genética; sociedade da informação; ciência e mundo-da-vida; ética do discurso Abstract In The Future of Human Nature, Jürgen Habermas recognizes that current advances in biotechnology are challenging discourse ethics in Social Sciences. Behind his fear of the possibility of liberal eugenics, lies the recognition that pre-implanted genetic diagnosis potentially puts into question the role played by communicative reason in the constitution of the individual’s ethics of self-understanding. The ethics of species proposed by Habermas sounds morally reactive, insofar as his critique does not manage to encompass the metaphysical features which are at the core of liberal eugenics discourse. This paper is divided into two moments: the current echoing in Habermas’ work of the motif of the alleged colonization of the lifeworld by technological reason, and a demonstration of how his conception of technique which underlies such a perspective prevents him of envisaging the critique of the metaphysical aspects of contemporary genetic culture. Keywords Jürgen Habermas, genetic culture, paradigm information, science and lifeworld, discourse ethics 


Daímon ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 155-170
Author(s):  
César Ortega Esquembre

El objetivo de este artículo es defender que la pragmática transcendental ofrece la fundamentación normativa de la teoría crítica como teoría de la acción comunicativa. Para ello se expondrá en primer lugar el problema de la normatividad en la Teoría Crítica de la sociedad. Tras describir la forma que adquiere esta teoría tras el giro lingüístico operado por Jürgen Habermas, se reconstruirán en tercer lugar los elementos fundamentales de la pragmática transcendental apeliana y habermasiana. En cuarto y último lugar se mostrará que este modelo constituye la fundamentación normativa de la nueva teoría crítica. The aim of this paper is to argue that transcendental pragmatics constitutes the normative foundation of critical theory, understood as theory of communicative action. To that end, the issue of normativity within Critical Theory discussions is first exposed. After describing the form this theory takes from the linguistic turn carried out by Jürgen Habermas, key elements of Karl Otto Apel´s and Jürgen Habermas´ transcendental pragmatics are thirdly reconstructed. Fourth paragraph shows that this model operates as the normative foundation of the new critical theory.


1996 ◽  
Vol 47 (2) ◽  
pp. 367
Author(s):  
William Outhwaite ◽  
J. M. Bernstein ◽  
Lorenzo C. Simpson

Author(s):  
John Rountree

Jürgen Habermas is a primary figure in the Frankfurt School of critical theory that emerged in Germany after World War II. He wrote several important works addressing a variety of fields, including legal hermeneutics, to liberal political philosophy, to systems theory, and language analysis. Throughout his research, he has lauded intersubjective “communicative action” as a key paradigm for politics, law, and ethics. Habermas’s theory of communicative action frames human beings as rational arguers. In his view, communication involves discussants disputing “validity claims” to gain mutual understanding and reach consensus. When he applies this communicative action perspective to culture and society, Habermas diagnoses the pathologies that occur when people coordinate their actions strategically through artificial systems rather than cooperatively through dialogue. When he applies it to ethical theory, he draws out the assumptions interlocutors must make when they argue—they are obliged to attempt to justify claims so that they could be universally accepted by those involved in the discourse. In addition to theorizing communication, Habermas throughout his work analyzes the structures and systems that enable public communication in civil society. From this perspective, democratic society relies on spaces and institutions that allow for the public to debate matters of common concern, particularly when they involve the state. In his historical account, Habermas argues that the “public sphere” transformed during the Enlightenment to give communicative outlets to an emerging bourgeois class. From a legal and philosophical perspective, he outlines conditions for political and communicative agency in a modern constitutional state. Communication scholars have had a mixed reaction to Habermas. He offers a vision of critical theory that allows for practical reason, but some assert that his theories are too idealistic and counterfactual to apply to real-life discourse. However, other scholars have nuanced his theory by putting him in dialogue with the rhetorical tradition. Publics and counterpublics especially have become common parlance and have helped explain protest, advocacy, and the constitution of communities in democratic culture.


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