THE POSSIBILITY OF LIBERAL EUGENICS: ABSOLUTISM OF MORALITY VS PARTICULARISM OF MORALITY

Статья посвящена вопросам евгеники, актуальность которых обусловлена не только научной притягательностью предмета исследования, но и определённым социальным и политическим контекстом. Этическая коммуникация по этому поводу отражает полярные мнения, анализ которых необходим для создания системы моральных требований в рамках сопоставления с классическим пониманием морали. Исследуя проблемы либеральной евгеники, автор статьи ставит перед собой две основные задачи: 1) определить, что включает в себя понятие «моральная система», ограничивая действие моральных запретов (партикуляризм морали) или, наоборот, рассматривая негативные нравственные нормы как всеобщие и универсальные (абсолютизм морали); 2) установить, возможны ли в этой связи евгенические «вмешательства», связанные с «улучшением» человека, или они принципиально недопустимы. В ходе решения первой задачи автор приходит к выводу, что либеральная евгеника не противоречит индивидуально-перфекционистской морали: моё желание реализуемо, если оно никак не ущемляет интересы других людей и не причиняет им вред. Следовательно, классическое понимание морали, претендующее на универсальность и общезначимость, в данном случае изживает себя и в условиях прикладных исследований неприемлемо, так как моральные нормы здесь идеализированы и абстрагированы от конкретной человеческой жизни. Поэтому в рамках исследования второй задачи автор полагает, что моральная переориентация необходима, замечая при этом, что полная легализация может привести к стиранию границ представлений о добре и зле. Кроме того, в случае патерналистского подхода мораль должна основываться на принципе предосторожности, связанном с ответственностью перед будущими поколениями, что заставляет возвращаться к абсолютным моральным запретам. Автор показывает, что неугасающий интерес к евгеническим исследованиям порождён стремлением человека к совершенствованию. Основываясь на анализе моральных дилемм, представленных в конкретных казусах, автор статьи доказывает, что, несмотря на заманчивость евгенических перспектив, они могут иметь непредсказуемые последствия. Исследование позволяет сделать вывод о том, что сила морального абсолютизма в связи с этим остается значимой, даже несмотря на то, что подвергается критике. Тем не менее, моральная допустимость вмешательств в генные структуры человека и его эмбрионов может быть оправдана. Однако с учетом того, что невозможно объять и предвидеть все случаи конкретной человеческой жизни, здесь речь не идёт о выработке критериев, так как со временем это приведет к их безграничному и неконтролируемому увеличению. Чтобы не допустить размывания границ морально дозволенного, выходом из ситуации, который предлагает автор, может стать партикуляризация морали. Это не новая моральная система, а своего рода «негативный пояс эвристики», дающий возможность этически обосновывать каждый уникальный случай в либеральной евгенике. Зафиксирована необходимость семиотической диагностики границ морально дозволенного в каждом уникальном кейсе. Questions of eugenics still remain relevant, which is not only due to the scientific appeal of the subject of the research, but also has a certain social and political subtext. Ethical communication includes a different number of opinions on this issue: their analysis is important for creating a system of moral requirements in comparison with the traditional, classical understanding of morality. In order to talk about the possibility of liberal eugenics, the author of the article sets two main tasks: 1) to determine what the concept “moral system” includes, isolating the boundaries of the action of morality (particularizing) or, conversely, making it universal in its prescriptions (absolutizing); 2) to establish whether eugenic “interventions” associated with genetic variability are possible in this regard, or they are unacceptable. In the course of solving the first problem, the author comes to the conclusion that the logic does not contradict the individual-perfectionist morality: my desire is realizable if it does not infringe on the interests of other people and does not cause them any harm. Consequently, the traditional (classical) understanding of morality, which claims to be universal and universally valid, has outlived itself, and in the context of applied research is unacceptable since moral norms are idealized and abstracted from a specific human life. Therefore, within the framework of the study of the second task, the author believes that moral reorientation is necessary. However, full legalization can lead to the blurring of the boundaries of ideas about good and evil, and, in the case of a paternalistic approach, morality should be based on the precautionary principle associated with responsibility to future generations, which in this case forces us to return to absolute moral restrictions. Human curiosity generates a desire for eugenic research: the author of the article, by analyzing the moral dilemmas presented in specific cases, demonstrates that despite the fact that eugenic prospects seem quite tempting, they are fraught with certain “pitfalls” that can have unpredictable consequences. Therefore, even if moral absolutism does not stand up to criticism, its power remains significant. There is no doubt that the moral permissibility of interventions in the gene structures of potential members of the community should have its own limits of “justification”: if universal criteria are developed, their number will increase over time because it is impossible to grasp and anticipate all the cases of a particular human life, and this will lead to the blurring of the boundaries of the morally permissible. Therefore, the particularism of morality, as a way out of the situation, is not a new moral system, but a kind of a negative belt of heuristics that helps to ethically justify each specific unique case in liberal eugenics. The necessity of semiotic diagnostics of the boundaries of the morally permissible in each unique case has been fixed.

The Human Rights System Facing Challenges of Biotechnological Improvement of the Human Nature

The opening possibilities of turning the mankind’s biological evolution into controlled technological process are inevitable result of development of the anthropocentric technogenic civilization in the direction of transforming the nature and subordinating it to a man. If the biological risks of this scenario can be reduced to acceptable level in the foreseeable future according to expert opinion, then the social risks, associated with the possibility of splitting the human community into “improved” elite and masses of “commoner”will only increase. At the same time, it is becoming more and more obvious that law, which is the main element of the cultural matrix of technogenic civilization, carries its main risks: law as a normative form of individual freedom is not able to withstand properly the threats to all mankind, which are caused by the social practices of liberal eugenics. The attempt of the Oviedo Convention to solve this problem by establishing prohibition of genetic editing of the human embryo line created preconditions for discrimination against a certain group of people based on their genetic status, as well as for disproportionate restrictions on the scientific freedom in this area of research. This clearly demonstrated the unlawful nature of such a prohibition. The desire to disguise that this type of regulation goes beyond the law framework by including it in the system of the rights of future generations without proper legalizing this concept doesn’t withstand criticism. Recently the biomedical community has been moving from the idea of unequivocal prohibition of inherited editing of the human genome towards the establishing legal restrictions, that take into account the positions of all stakeholders, and monitoring their compliance. Particular importance is attached to the organization of public discussions and the preparing society to take a responsible and conscious solution to the problem. The success of this risky but perhaps the only possible strategy will mainly depend on the social context in which it can be implemented.

The future of humanity

With the recent advancements in scientific comprehension of genetics and the decipherment of complex techniques for editing human genomes, liberal eugenics—eugenic ideal premised on the liberal values of autonomy and pluralism that leaves reproductive choices to parents rather than anachronistic statist authoritarian interventions—has inevitably become a polarising conundrum in contemporary liberal societies as to its utility and destructiveness. Focusing on one species of liberal eugenics—namely, genome editing interventions—I contend that liberal eugenics could be harmful—harm herein construed as that which undermines the salient liberal values of equality, autonomy, and pluralism—since it is itself antithetical to the bases of the liberal society. This contention is based upon three premises: first, that individuals are rather seldom rational decision-makers such that leaving all reproductive choices to the whims of individual parents would be immensely counterproductive to future offspring’s right to open future; second, that liberal eugenics—much like its authoritarian antecedent—could intersect with myriad identities, including race, class, sex, disability, and sexual orientation in ways that might exacerbate social divisions, marginalise different groups, and engender homogeneity; and third, that it undermines individual autonomy of the future person as a member of the liberal community, particularly if their capacities and abilities are tailored to fit parents’ specific life projects and putatively reasonable conceptions of the good. The underscored potential malaises of liberal eugenics should, I argue, be discursively negotiated between parents and the state via the development of robust general laws that regulate heritable genome editing interventions to ensure that the welfare of the future persons is prioritised and that the liberal commitment to autonomy is immune to antiliberal perversions.

Possible Barriers Further Down the Slope

This chapter examines hypothetical barriers on the slope below where the somatic/germline and disease/enhancement walls once were. The first is the goals of medicine barrier, where any trait that the medical profession defines as a disease could be modified. The second is the family genes barrier, where people would be allowed to modify their children to any set of traits that the parents could in principle produce through sexual reproduction. The third is the boundary of humanity barrier, where any genes from outside of the human species are not allowed. Finally, the liberal eugenics barrier would allow any genetic modification that did not harm someone else.

Epilogue

The epilogue analyzes some of the ways the ideologies considered in the study play out in contemporary, real-world devaluation and exploitation of nonhuman beings, old human beings, and disabled human beings. It then compares some of the logic shared by the old eugenics and the new “liberal eugenics” advocated by many contemporary philosophers. It ends by suggesting that efforts to secure human rights are not threatened by efforts to secure animal rights—that both aims should be pursued together.

Answering the Bioethicists’ Objection

Bioethicists criticize Jürgen Habermas’s argument against “liberal eugenics” for many reasons. This essay examines one particular critique, according to which Habermas misunderstands the implications of human evolution. In adopting Hannah Arendt’s concept of “natality,” Habermas seems to fear that genetically modified children will lose the contingency of their births, which would impair their capacity for political action; but according to evolutionary theory, bioethicists argue, this fear is unfounded. I explore this objection by entertaining the hypothesis that Habermas’s argument assumes Arendt’s interpretation of Darwinian evolution in addition to her conception of natality, and then I answer it by contrasting the conceptions of evolution held by Habermas, by Arendt, and by Habermas’s critics. Les bioéthiciens critiquent l’argument de Jürgen Habermas contre « l’eugénisme libéral » pour de nombreuses raisons. Cet essai examine une critique en particulier, selon laquelle Habermas comprend mal les implications de l’évolution humaine : en adoptant le concept de la « natalité » de Hannah Arendt, Habermas semble craindre que les enfants soumis à une modification génétique ne perdent la contingence propre à leur naissance, une perte qui diminuerait leur capacité pour l’action politique, mais selon la théorie de l’évolution, les bioéthiciens soutiennent que cette peur est sans fondement. J’explore cette objection à Habermas en considérant l’hypothèse que, en plus du concept de la natalité, Habermas suppose aussi l’interprétation arendtienne de l’évolution biologique de Darwin, et j’y répond en confrontant cette conception de l’évolution avec la conception propre à Habermas et avec celle des bioéthiciens qui lui ont répondu.