“Sensory Storage of Fragmentary Displays”: Refutation of a Theory of Iconic Memory?

1984 ◽  
Vol 58 (1) ◽  
pp. 241-242 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lee S. Cohene

Holding and Orenstein (1984) purport to have demonstrated evidence that is contrary to a theory of iconic memory; however, the conclusions of these authors are called into question for methodological reasons.

2010 ◽  
Vol 20 (6) ◽  
pp. 699-704 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Miller ◽  
Thomas H. Rammsayer ◽  
Karl Schweizer ◽  
Stefan J. Troche

PMLA ◽  
2004 ◽  
Vol 119 (3) ◽  
pp. 526-529
Author(s):  
Gwyneth Jones

Synesthesia … one day in 1997 (soon after the national gallery acquired the picture), i walked up the familiar marble stairs, crossed the rotunda, and was confronted, for the first time, by George Stubbs's Whistlejacket, the stunning, naked portrait—no groom or rider, no landscape—of a chestnut Arabian stallion. I smelled the stable, horse manure, and leather, and I had the thrill of knowing what was happening inside my skull. How the attention response had sent a cloud of fire leaping through my brain, tugging on associated traces, map on map of firing and partially firing neurons springing back into existence (never the same twice, yet continuous with my earliest childhood and the millions of years before that). Surprise and the power of the artist were making me read internal stimulus as external: recall had become once again perception (McCrone 194-217). This is an iconic memory for me. It holds, packed down and ready to unfold, both the direction my work has taken through my career and the context of that work: my own life and times; the history that made me; the Next Big Thing in science; and my privileged, difficult position as a science fiction writer, an arts graduate, and a woman.


1981 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 50-67 ◽  
Author(s):  
D. J. K. Mewhort ◽  
A. J. Campbell ◽  
F. M. Marchetti ◽  
Jamie I. D. Campbell
Keyword(s):  

2018 ◽  
Vol 373 (1755) ◽  
pp. 20170349 ◽  
Author(s):  
Claire Sergent

When do we become conscious of a stimulus after its presentation? We would all agree that this necessarily takes time and that it is not instantaneous. Here, I would like to propose not only that conscious access is delayed relative to the external stimulation, but also that it can flexibly desynchronize from external stimulation; it can process some information ‘offline’, if and when it becomes relevant. Thus, in contrast with initial sensory processing, conscious experience might not strictly follow the sequence of events in the environment. In this article, I will review gathering evidence in favour of this proposition. I will argue that it offers a coherent framework for explaining a great variety of observations in the domain of perception, sensory memory and working memory: the psychological refractory period, the attentional blink, post-dictive phenomena, iconic memory, latent working memory and the newly described retro-perception phenomenon. I will integrate this proposition to the global neuronal workspace model and consider possible underlying brain mechanisms. Finally, I will argue that this capacity to process information ‘offline’ might have made conscious processing evolutionarily advantageous in spite of its sluggishness and capacity limitations. This article is part of the theme issue ‘Perceptual consciousness and cognitive access’.


2010 ◽  
Vol 21 (11) ◽  
pp. 1643-1645 ◽  
Author(s):  
Erik Blaser ◽  
Zsuzsa Kaldy
Keyword(s):  

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