scholarly journals Ceteris paribus majority for social ranking

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adrian Haret ◽  
Hossein Khani ◽  
Stefano Moretti ◽  
Meltem Öztürk
Keyword(s):  
Social Choice ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
Social Choice Theory ◽  
Social Ranking ◽  
Ceteris Paribus ◽  
Majority Principle ◽  
Single Peakedness

We study the problem of finding a social ranking over individuals given a ranking over coalitions formed by them. We investigate the use of a ceteris paribus majority principle as a social ranking solution inspired from the classical axioms of social choice theory. Faced with a Condorcet-like paradox, we analyze the consequences of restricting the domain according to an adapted version of single-peakedness. We conclude with a discussion on different interpretations of incompleteness of the ranking over coalitions and its exploitation for defining new social rankings, providing a new rule as an example.

scholarly journals Social Ranking Manipulability for the CP-Majority, Banzhaf and Lexicographic Excellence Solutions

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tahar Allouche ◽  
Bruno Escoffier ◽  
Stefano Moretti ◽  
Meltem Öztürk
Keyword(s):  
Social Choice ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
Social Choice Theory ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Power Indices ◽  
Computational Social Choice ◽  
Social Ranking ◽  
Ceteris Paribus ◽  
The Social ◽  
Theoretical Results

We investigate the issue of manipulability for social ranking rules, where the goal is to rank individuals given the ranking of coalitions formed by them and each individual prefers to reach the highest positions in the social ranking. This problem lies at the intersection of computational social choice and the algorithmic theory of power indices. Different social ranking rules have been recently proposed and studied from an axiomatic point of view. In this paper, we focus on rules representing three classical approaches in social choice theory: the marginal contribution approach, the lexicographic approach and the (ceteris paribus) majority one. We first consider some particular members of these families analysing their resistance to a malicious behaviour of individuals. Then, we analyze the computational complexity of manipulation, and complete our theoretical results with simulations in order to analyse the manipulation frequencies and to assess the effects of manipulations.

Precursors to Public Choice

2019 ◽  
pp. 796-816
Author(s):  
Iain McLean
Keyword(s):  
Public Choice ◽  
Social Choice ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
Social Choice Theory ◽  
Ancient Greek ◽  
The Social ◽  
Mathematical Skill ◽  
The Many ◽  
Selection Of

This chapter reviews the many appearances, disappearances, and reappearances of axiomatic thought about social choice and elections since the era of ancient Greek democracy. Social choice is linked to the wider public-choice movement because both are theories of agency. Thus, just as the first public-choice theorists include Hobbes, Hume, and Madison, so the first social-choice theorists include Pliny, Llull, and Cusanus. The social-choice theory of agency appears in many strands. The most important of these are binary vs. nonbinary choice; aggregation of judgement vs. aggregation of opinion; and selection of one person vs. selection of many people. The development of social choice required both a public-choice mindset and mathematical skill.

Social choice theory

2013 ◽  
pp. 263-284
Author(s):  
Martin Peterson
Keyword(s):  
Social Choice ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
Social Choice Theory

scholarly journals How to Judge Voting Schemes

1995 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 91-98 ◽  
Author(s):  
Amartya Sen
Keyword(s):  
Social Choice ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
Social Choice Theory ◽  
Axiomatic Method ◽  
Voting Procedures

This symposium on voting procedures presents many interesting findings and insights. This note scrutinizes them and discusses two general issues. First, the assumption that voters’ preferences are menu-independent (and based on one canonical ordering of the alternatives) underestimates the importance of the process of voting (voting for x, against y). Second, evaluation can be a two-way process, including the axiomatic method (of social choice theory), going from isolated properties to voting schemes, and the converse method of first identifying attractions and perversities of particular voting schemes (as in this symposium) and then using properties for later axiomatic use.

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