scholarly journals Shortlisting Rules and Incentives in an End-to-End Model for Participatory Budgeting

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Simon Rey ◽  
Ulle Endriss ◽  
Ronald de Haan
Keyword(s):  
Social Choice ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
Social Choice Theory ◽  
Real Life ◽  
Prior Work ◽  
Participatory Budgeting ◽  
Strategic Behaviour ◽  
Second Stage ◽  
End To End ◽  
Two Stages

We introduce an end-to-end model for participatory budgeting grounded in social choice theory. Our model accounts for the interplay between the two stages commonly encountered in real-life partici- patory budgeting. In the first stage participants pro- pose projects to be shortlisted, while in the second stage they vote on which of the shortlisted projects should be funded. Prior work of a formal nature has focused on analysing the second stage only. We in- troduce several shortlisting rules for the first stage and analyse them in both normative and algorith- mic terms. Our main focus is on the incentives of participants to engage in strategic behaviour during the first stage, in which they need to reason about how their proposals will impact the range of strate- gies available to everyone in the second stage.

scholarly journals A CONCEPT OF PROGRESS FOR NORMATIVE ECONOMICS

2006 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 19-54 ◽  
Author(s):  
PHILIPPE MONGIN
Keyword(s):  
Twentieth Century ◽  
Social Choice ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
Social Choice Theory ◽  
Welfare Economics ◽  
Simple Criterion ◽  
Normative Economics ◽  
Recent Developments ◽  
Two Stages ◽  
Historical Transition

The paper discusses the sense in which the changes undergone by normative economics in the twentieth century can be said to be progressive. A simple criterion is proposed to decide whether a sequence of normative theories is progressive. This criterion is put to use on the historical transition from the new welfare economics to social choice theory. The paper reconstructs this classic case, and eventually concludes that the latter theory was progressive compared with the former. It also briefly comments on the recent developments in normative economics and their connection with the previous two stages.

scholarly journals A welfarist critique of social choice theory: interpersonal comparisons in the theory of voting

2015 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 34
Author(s):  
Aki Lehtinen
Keyword(s):  
Social Choice ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
Social Choice Theory ◽  
Strategic Voting ◽  
Voting Theory ◽  
Voting Rules ◽  
Philosophical Critique ◽  
Strategic Behaviour ◽  
Interpersonal Comparisons ◽  
Normative Evaluation

This paper provides a philosophical critique of social choice theory insofar as it deals with the normative evaluation of voting and voting rules. I will argue that the very method of evaluating voting rules in terms of whether they satisfy various conditions is deeply problematic because introducing strategic behaviour leads to a violation of any condition that makes a difference between voting rules. I also argue that it is legitimate to make interpersonal comparisons of utilities in voting theory. Combining a realistic account of voters’ behaviour with a utilitarian evaluation of the outcomes then leads to the judgment that strategic voting is beneficial. If it is, then Arrow's theorem does not have far-reaching consequences for democracy because one of its conditions is not normatively acceptable.

Precursors to Public Choice

2019 ◽  
pp. 796-816
Author(s):  
Iain McLean
Keyword(s):  
Public Choice ◽  
Social Choice ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
Social Choice Theory ◽  
Ancient Greek ◽  
The Social ◽  
Mathematical Skill ◽  
The Many ◽  
Selection Of

This chapter reviews the many appearances, disappearances, and reappearances of axiomatic thought about social choice and elections since the era of ancient Greek democracy. Social choice is linked to the wider public-choice movement because both are theories of agency. Thus, just as the first public-choice theorists include Hobbes, Hume, and Madison, so the first social-choice theorists include Pliny, Llull, and Cusanus. The social-choice theory of agency appears in many strands. The most important of these are binary vs. nonbinary choice; aggregation of judgement vs. aggregation of opinion; and selection of one person vs. selection of many people. The development of social choice required both a public-choice mindset and mathematical skill.

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