scholarly journals Three Millian Ways to Resolve Open Questions

2017 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-18
Author(s):  
Andrew Cullison
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Language ◽  
Original Formulation ◽  
Open Questions ◽  
Open Question Argument ◽  
Proper Name ◽  
Open Question

Millianism is a thesis in philosophy of language that the meaning of a proper name is simply its referent. Millianism faces certain puzzles called Frege's Puzzles. Some Millians defend the view by appealing to a metaphysics of belief that involves Ways of Believing. In the first part of this paper, I argue that ethical naturalists can adopt this Millian strategy to resist Moore’s Open Question argument. While this strategy of responding to the Open Question Argument has already appeared in the literature, I show that the Millian strategy can be easily extended to other versions of the Open Question Argument that are alleged to be stronger than the original formulation. The allegedly stronger versions of the Open Question Argument are not straightforwardly Frege's Puzzles, but they still have analogue versions that have been presented against Millianism. What the Ways Millian can say against those analogue versions can easily be applied to these other versions of the Open Question Argument.

Open question argument

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tristram McPherson
Keyword(s):  
Natural Sciences ◽  
Ethical Naturalism ◽  
Natural Properties ◽  
The Core ◽  
Open Questions ◽  
Open Question Argument ◽  
Naturalistic Account ◽  
Open Question

The open question argument is the heart of G.E. Moore’s case against ethical naturalism. Ethical naturalism is the view that goodness, rightness, etc. are natural properties; roughly, the sorts of properties that can be investigated by the natural sciences. Moore claims that, for any candidate naturalistic account of an ethical term according to which ‘good’ had the same meaning as some naturalistic term A, we might without confusion ask: ‘I see that this act is A, but is it good?’ Moore claimed that the existence of such open questions shows that ethical naturalism is mistaken. In the century since its introduction, the open question argument has faced a battery of objections. Despite these challenges, some contemporary philosophers claim that the core of Moore’s argument can be salvaged. The most influential defences link Moore’s argument to the difficulty that naturalistic ethical realists face in explaining the practical role of ethical concepts in deliberation.

Realism, Naturalism, and Moral Semantics

2001 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 154-176 ◽  
Author(s):  
David O. Brink
Keyword(s):  
Recent Work ◽  
Philosophy Of Language ◽  
Moral Realism ◽  
Direct Reference ◽  
Ethical Naturalism ◽  
Moral Beliefs ◽  
First Approximation ◽  
Open Question Argument ◽  
The World ◽  
Open Question

The prospects for moral realism and ethical naturalism have been important parts of recent debates within metaethics. As a first approximation,moral realismis the claim that there are facts or truths about moral matters that are objective in the sense that they obtain independently of the moral beliefs or attitudes of appraisers.Ethical naturalismis the claim that moral properties of people, actions, and institutions are natural, rather than occult or supernatural, features of the world. Though these metaethical debates remain unsettled, several people, myself included, have tried to defend the plausibility of both moral realism and ethical naturalism. I, among others, have appealed to recent work in the philosophy of language—in particular, to so-called theories of “direct reference” —to defend ethical naturalism against a variety of semantic worries, including G. E. Moore's “open question argument.” In response to these arguments, critics have expressed doubts about the compatibility of moral realism and direct reference. In this essay, I explain these doubts, and then sketch the beginnings of an answer—but understanding both the doubts and my answer requires some intellectual background.

Normative Principles are Synthetic A Priori

Episteme ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 18 (3) ◽  
pp. 367-383
Author(s):  
Paul Boghossian
Keyword(s):  
A Priori ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Moral Principle ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
Justified Belief ◽  
Normative Concepts ◽  
Open Question Argument ◽  
Moral Domains ◽  
And Mathematics ◽  
Open Question

AbstractI argue for the claim that there are instances of a priori justified belief – in particular, justified belief in moral principles – that are not analytic, i.e., that cannot be explained solely by the understanding we have of their propositions. §1–2 provides the background necessary for understanding this claim: in particular, it distinguishes between two ways a proposition can be analytic, Basis and Constitutive, and provides the general form of a moral principle. §§3–5 consider whether Hume's Law, properly interpreted, can be established by Moore's Open Question Argument, and concludes that it cannot: while Moore's argument – appropriately modified – is effective against the idea that moral judgments are either (i) reductively analyzable or (ii) Constitutive-analytic, a different argument is needed to show that they are not (iii) Basis-analytic. Such an argument is supplied in §6. §§7–8 conclude by considering how these considerations bear on recent discussions of “alternative normative concepts”, on the epistemology of intuitions, and on the differences between disagreement in moral domains and in other a priori domains such as logic and mathematics.

scholarly journals Posible respuesta tomista a la ley de Hume y a la pregunta abierta de Moore

2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 73-92
Author(s):  
Augusto Trujillo Werner
Keyword(s):  
Open Question Argument ◽  
Open Question

Este artículo se refiere a la doctrina práctica de Aquino sobre dos dificultades filosóficas que subyacen en gran parte del debate ético contemporáneo. Una es la Is-ought thesis de Hume y la otra es su consecuencia radical la Open-question argument de Moore. Estas paradojas éticas parecen tener sus raíces en un scepticismo epistemológico y en una antropología deficiente. La posible respuesta a ellas se puede encontrar en que: a) Tomás de Aquino defiende la esencial racionalidad y unidad del ser humano; b) La ley natural tomista es una consecuencia natural del ser racional; c) La razón humana es esencialmente teórica y práctica al mismotiempo. El intelecto humano de Aquino naturalmente realiza tres operaciones principales: 1º) Aprehender las nociones inteligidas y universales ens, verum y bonum. 2º) Formular los primeros principios teóricos y prácticos. 3º) Ordenar que se haga el bien inteligido y universal y se evite lo contrario. Por estas razones,la respuesta filosófica de Aquino a ambas dificultades no es exclusivamente ética, sino que abarca armónicamente la ontología, antropología y epistemología. La ética de Tomás de Aquino es fundamentalmente diferente de las éticas que califican las acciones como buenas o por mero consenso social (contractualismo) o simplemente calculando sus consecuencias (consecuencialismo). 

Direct Reference and the Open Question Argument

dialectica ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 67 (4) ◽  
pp. 383-402
Author(s):  
Niklas Möller
Keyword(s):  
Direct Reference ◽  
Open Question Argument ◽  
Open Question

Open questions concerning antiautomorphisms of division rings with quasi-generalized Engel conditions

2019 ◽  
Vol 18 (09) ◽  
pp. 1950167 ◽  
Author(s):  
M. Chacron ◽  
T.-K. Lee
Keyword(s):  
Finite Order ◽  
Division Ring ◽  
Affirmative Answer ◽  
Major Result ◽  
Division Rings ◽  
Open Questions ◽  
Engel Condition ◽  
Open Question ◽  
Positive Integers

Let [Formula: see text] be a noncommutative division ring with center [Formula: see text], which is algebraic, that is, [Formula: see text] is an algebraic algebra over the field [Formula: see text]. Let [Formula: see text] be an antiautomorphism of [Formula: see text] such that (i) [Formula: see text], all [Formula: see text], where [Formula: see text] and [Formula: see text] are positive integers depending on [Formula: see text]. If, further, [Formula: see text] has finite order, it was shown in [M. Chacron, Antiautomorphisms with quasi-generalised Engel condition, J. Algebra Appl. 17(8) (2018) 1850145 (19 pages)] that [Formula: see text] is commuting, that is, [Formula: see text], all [Formula: see text]. Posed in [M. Chacron, Antiautomorphisms with quasi-generalised Engel condition, J. Algebra Appl. 17(8) (2018) 1850145 (19 pages)] is the question which asks as to whether the finite order requirement on [Formula: see text] can be dropped. We provide here an affirmative answer to the question. The second major result of this paper is concerned with a nonnecessarily algebraic division ring [Formula: see text] with an antiautomorphism [Formula: see text] satisfying the stronger condition (ii) [Formula: see text], all [Formula: see text], where [Formula: see text] and [Formula: see text] are fixed positive integers. It was shown in [T.-K. Lee, Anti-automorphisms satisfying an Engel condition, Comm. Algebra 45(9) (2017) 4030–4036] that if, further, [Formula: see text] has finite order then [Formula: see text] is commuting. We show here, that again the finite order assumption on [Formula: see text] can be lifted answering thus in the affirmative the open question (see Question 2.11 in [T.-K. Lee, Anti-automorphisms satisfying an Engel condition, Comm. Algebra 45(9) (2017) 4030–4036]).

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document