Normative Principles are Synthetic A Priori

Episteme ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 18 (3) ◽  
pp. 367-383
Author(s):  
Paul Boghossian
Keyword(s):  
A Priori ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Moral Principle ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
Justified Belief ◽  
Normative Concepts ◽  
Open Question Argument ◽  
Moral Domains ◽  
And Mathematics ◽  
Open Question

AbstractI argue for the claim that there are instances of a priori justified belief – in particular, justified belief in moral principles – that are not analytic, i.e., that cannot be explained solely by the understanding we have of their propositions. §1–2 provides the background necessary for understanding this claim: in particular, it distinguishes between two ways a proposition can be analytic, Basis and Constitutive, and provides the general form of a moral principle. §§3–5 consider whether Hume's Law, properly interpreted, can be established by Moore's Open Question Argument, and concludes that it cannot: while Moore's argument – appropriately modified – is effective against the idea that moral judgments are either (i) reductively analyzable or (ii) Constitutive-analytic, a different argument is needed to show that they are not (iii) Basis-analytic. Such an argument is supplied in §6. §§7–8 conclude by considering how these considerations bear on recent discussions of “alternative normative concepts”, on the epistemology of intuitions, and on the differences between disagreement in moral domains and in other a priori domains such as logic and mathematics.

scholarly journals On James Sterba’s Refutation of Theistic Arguments to Justify Suffering

Religions ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 64
Author(s):  
Bruce R. Reichenbach
Keyword(s):  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Recent Book ◽  
Middle Ground ◽  
Moral Decision Making ◽  
Existence Of God ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
Divine Intervention ◽  
Horrendous Evils ◽  
Consistent Application ◽  
Moral Requirements

In his recent book Is a Good God Logically Possible? and article by the same name, James Sterba argued that the existence of significant and horrendous evils, both moral and natural, is incompatible with the existence of God. He advances the discussion by invoking three moral requirements and by creating an analogy with how the just state would address such evils, while protecting significant freedoms and rights to which all are entitled. I respond that his argument has important ambiguities and that consistent application of his moral principles will require that God remove all moral and natural evils. This would deleteriously restrict not only human moral decision making, but also the knowledge necessary to make moral judgments. He replies to this critique by appealing to the possibility of limited divine intervention, to which I rejoin with reasons why his middle ground is not viable.

Folklorisation and the Emergent Moral Degeneration: A Functionalist Approach

2021 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Siziwe Mandubu
Keyword(s):  
Young People ◽  
South African ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Behavioral Norms ◽  
South African Society ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
Societal Norms ◽  
Moral Standards ◽  
The Social ◽  
Functionalist Approach

Living in an egalitarian society has resulted in the corrosion of the moral base among certain sectors in the community. Some people misconstrue egalitarianism as an authorisation to act as they see fit. Young people, in particular, are gradually losing touch with reality in relation to acceptable behavioral norms in the South African society. Based on the functionalist theory of balancing the social equilibrium among people, the article delineates moral standards as the most fundamental and general principles of behaviour and reflects on how the society expects one to act in certain situations. The article, therefore, explores the primary concepts within functionalism and attempts to outline that the society is a system of interconnected parts that work together in harmony to maintain a state of stability and social cohesion. The article will use the folktale “uDyakalashe noMvolofu” (“The Jackal and the Wolf”) to reflect on the expected societal norms. It demonstrates that folktales, which used to transfer values, morals and shape the conduct of people in the olden days are still appropriate in reshaping the outlook and perceptions of today’s generation. As such, the shrewd nature of folklore in the moral regeneration of the current generation of young people is exposed. While there are many folktales in this category, “uDyakalashe noMvolofu” (“The Jackal and the Wolf”) provides the theme relevant for the analysis of the topic to highlight that moral standards generate moral principles and moral judgments.

Über Gewissen und Gewissheit

2016 ◽  
Vol 64 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Dina Emundts
Keyword(s):  
Immanuel Kant ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Categorical Imperative ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
The Third ◽  
The Status

AbstractThis paper suggests an understanding of the concept of “Gewissen” (conscience) according to which Gewissen is best understood as a receptivity to moral principles that corresponds to certain moral feelings. In the first part of the paper this suggestion is spelled out and alternatives to it are discussed. As is shown in the second part, this suggestion goes back to the thought of Immanuel Kant, but it can be developed even if one does not follow Kant in his understanding of the categorical imperative as an a priori principle. However, if one does not follow Kant with respect to the status of the categorical imperative, there are some interesting consequences for our understanding of conscience and especially for our understanding of its relation to knowledge and certainty. These consequences are discussed in the third part of this paper.

scholarly journals Posible respuesta tomista a la ley de Hume y a la pregunta abierta de Moore

2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 73-92
Author(s):  
Augusto Trujillo Werner
Keyword(s):  
Open Question Argument ◽  
Open Question

Este artículo se refiere a la doctrina práctica de Aquino sobre dos dificultades filosóficas que subyacen en gran parte del debate ético contemporáneo. Una es la Is-ought thesis de Hume y la otra es su consecuencia radical la Open-question argument de Moore. Estas paradojas éticas parecen tener sus raíces en un scepticismo epistemológico y en una antropología deficiente. La posible respuesta a ellas se puede encontrar en que: a) Tomás de Aquino defiende la esencial racionalidad y unidad del ser humano; b) La ley natural tomista es una consecuencia natural del ser racional; c) La razón humana es esencialmente teórica y práctica al mismotiempo. El intelecto humano de Aquino naturalmente realiza tres operaciones principales: 1º) Aprehender las nociones inteligidas y universales ens, verum y bonum. 2º) Formular los primeros principios teóricos y prácticos. 3º) Ordenar que se haga el bien inteligido y universal y se evite lo contrario. Por estas razones,la respuesta filosófica de Aquino a ambas dificultades no es exclusivamente ética, sino que abarca armónicamente la ontología, antropología y epistemología. La ética de Tomás de Aquino es fundamentalmente diferente de las éticas que califican las acciones como buenas o por mero consenso social (contractualismo) o simplemente calculando sus consecuencias (consecuencialismo). 

scholarly journals Disgust sensitivity and moral judgments of purity: The role of transgression weirdness

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fieke Maria Antoinet Wagemans ◽  
Mark John Brandt ◽  
Marcel Zeelenberg
Keyword(s):  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Disgust Sensitivity ◽  
Total N ◽  
Moral Domains ◽  
Moral Transgressions ◽  
The Relationship

Disgust sensitivity is more strongly related to moral judgments in the purity domain than to moral judgments in other moral domains. While this finding highlights the distinctiveness of moral domains, anti-modularity accounts suggest that the relationship is caused by the relative weirdness of purity transgressions and come to the conclusion that moral domains do not represent distinct mechanisms. In two studies (total N = 2,307), we test whether transgression weirdness accounts for disgust sensitivity’s stronger association with moral judgments of the purity as compared to other moral domains, but find little evidence for this claim. The relationship between disgust sensitivity and moral judgments of purity even remains when taking into account both (perceived) weirdness and (perceived) harmfulness of moral transgressions. These studies show that transgression weirdness and harmfulness cannot explain the disgust sensitivity–purity link, contradicting predictions following from popular anti-modularity accounts.

scholarly journals Testing Economic Theory

2018 ◽  
pp. 303-313
Author(s):  
Christopher P. Guzelian
Keyword(s):  
A Priori ◽  
Number System ◽  
Physical Reality ◽  
Economic Research ◽  
Economic Knowledge ◽  
Fractional Reserve Banking ◽  
Physical Universe ◽  
And Mathematics ◽  
Reserve Banking ◽  
The One

Two years ago, Bob Mulligan and I empirically tested whether the Bank of Amsterdam, a prototypical central bank, had caused a boom-bust cycle in the Amsterdam commodities markets in the 1780s owing to the bank’s sudden initiation of low-fractional-re-serve banking (Guzelian & Mulligan 2015).1 Widespread criticism came quickly after we presented our data findings at that year’s Austrian Economic Research Conference. Walter Block representa-tively responded: «as an Austrian, I maintain you cannot «test» apodictic theories, you can only illustrate them».2 Non-Austrian, so-called «empirical» economists typically have no problem with data-driven, inductive research. But Austrians have always objected strenuously on ontological and epistemolog-ical grounds that such studies do not produce real knowledge (Mises 1998, 113-115; Mises 2007). Camps of economists are talking past each other in respective uses of the words «testing» and «eco-nomic theory». There is a vital distinction between «testing» (1) an economic proposition, praxeologically derived, and (2) the rele-vance of an economic proposition, praxeologically derived. The former is nonsensical; the latter may be necessary to acquire eco-nomic theory and knowledge. Clearing up this confusion is this note’s goal. Rothbard (1951) represents praxeology as the indispensible method for gaining economic knowledge. Starting with a Aristote-lian/Misesian axiom «humans act» or a Hayekian axiom of «humans think», a voluminous collection of logico-deductive eco-nomic propositions («theorems») follows, including theorems as sophisticated and perhaps unintuitive as the one Mulligan and I examined: low-fractional-reserve banking causes economic cycles. There is an ontological and epistemological analog between Austrian praxeology and mathematics. Much like praxeology, we «know» mathematics to be «true» because it is axiomatic and deductive. By starting with Peano Axioms, mathematicians are able by a long process of creative deduction, to establish the real number system, or that for the equation an + bn = cn, there are no integers a, b, c that satisfy the equation for any integer value of n greater than 2 (Fermat’s Last Theorem). But what do mathematicians mean when they then say they have mathematical knowledge, or that they have proven some-thing «true»? Is there an infinite set of rational numbers floating somewhere in the physical universe? Naturally no. Mathemati-cians mean that they have discovered an apodictic truth — some-thing unchangeably true without reference to physical reality because that truth is a priori.

Direct Reference and the Open Question Argument

dialectica ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 67 (4) ◽  
pp. 383-402
Author(s):  
Niklas Möller
Keyword(s):  
Direct Reference ◽  
Open Question Argument ◽  
Open Question

Advances in Research on the Model of Intuitive Morality and Exemplars (MIME)

2021 ◽  
pp. 230-249
Author(s):  
Allison Eden ◽  
Ron Tamborini ◽  
Melinda Aley ◽  
Henry Goble
Keyword(s):  
Moral Judgment ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Selective Exposure ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Dual Process ◽  
Social Perceptions ◽  
Short Term ◽  
Moral Intuitions ◽  
Process Perspective

This chapter describes the model of intuitive morality and exemplars (MIME), which examines connections between moral judgment and exposure to narrative media. The MIME explicates distinct, a priori–defined domains of moral intuitions that cut across cultural boundaries and identifies underlying processes that shape related social perceptions to describe how media and moral judgment are intertwined. The model’s dual-process perspective suggests some moral judgments are determined by quick gut reflexes and others by reflective deliberation. The MIME’s multistage process contains short-term and long-term components. The short-term component describes how exemplars that prime moral intuitions affect the appraisal of media content, which then prompts selective exposure to media that upholds primed intuitions. The long-term component describes how aggregate patterns of exposure to media that upholds primed intuitions encourages further (mass) production of content featuring those intuitions. This reciprocal process describes how media systems and audiences influence the salience of one another’s moral intuitions.

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