scholarly journals Worldwide Diffusion of Corporate Governance (CG) Regulations and Practices: A Literature Review

2015 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 55-68
Author(s):  
Zubair Ahmad ◽  
Zeeshan Mahmood

Research objectives: The main objective of this paper was to understand the diffusion of CG codes around the world. More specifically this paper examined what types of CG codes have emerged around the world? What causes the diffusion of shareholder centric model of CG around the world? What areas are still unexplained to better understand the diffusion of CG? Findings: This paper presented that pure economics and legitimacy reasons alone or together are not sufficient to explain the dynamics of how corporate governance reforms emerged and developed in different contexts. This study assumes that it is important to move the debate beyond the efficiency/legitimacy and convergence/divergence dichotomy and pay more attention to the process of emergence and development of corporate governance reforms. Implications: Prior institutional research ignores countries' internal dynamics that can play an important role in shaping corporate governance reforms. The corporate governance model cannot exist in isolation; each country has its own unique institutional arrangements and can influence the process of diffusion. There is some consensus amidst corporate governance scholars that "the-one-size-fits-all" rule is flawed, and thus a wide diversity of approaches of corporate governance should be expected due to vast differences in national contexts where firms are embedded (Cuervo, 2002, Reaz and Hossain, 2007). Policy makers and researchers should consider broader institutional dynamics related to macro and micro institutional processes while developing and understanding CG diffusion around the world.

2005 ◽  
Vol 34 (2) ◽  
pp. 169-194 ◽  
Author(s):  
Guanghua Yu

Corporate governance has attracted enormous attention both in the area of law and in the area of financial economics. In comparative corporate governance studies, many people have devoted their energy to finding a best corporate governance model. I argue that a functional analysis does not support the view that there is a single best model in the world. I further use the transplantation of an English-style takeover law into China to explain that the importation of foreign law is not always based on careful analysis of whether the imported foreign law is the best in the world. Furthermore, I discuss the subsequent adjustment of the transplanted English takeover law to the takeover market in China to show that the transplantation of foreign law is subject to local political and economic conditions. If there is no best corporate governance model and the transplantation of foreign law into other countries with different social and political background does not achieve similar objectives, the search for a best corporate governance model is misguided.


2007 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 117-140 ◽  
Author(s):  
Luca Enriques ◽  
Paolo Volpin

The fundamental problem of corporate governance in the United States is to alleviate the conflict of interest between dispersed small shareowners and powerful controlling managers. The fundamental corporate governance in continental Europe and in most of the rest of the world is different. There, few listed companies are widely held. Instead, the typical firm in stock exchanges around the world has a dominant shareholder, usually an individual or a family, who controls the majority of the votes. In this essay, we begin by describing the differences in the ownership structure of companies in the three main economies of continental Europe—Germany, France, and Italy—with comparisons to the United States and the United Kingdom. We next summarize the corporate governance issues that arise in firms with a dominant shareholder. We take a look at a major European corporate scandal, Parmalat, as an extreme example of investor expropriation in a family-controlled corporation. We outline the legal tools that can be used to tackle abuses by controlling shareholders. Finally, we describe the corporate governance reforms enacted by France, Germany, and Italy between 1991 and 2005 and assess the way in which investor protection in the three countries has changed.


ICR Journal ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 353-370
Author(s):  
Mohammad Abdullah

The global cumulative waqf assets have been estimated to be worth $105 billion. Though, this estimation is not based on exact data, it reflects only a glimpse of what the institution of waqf may entail in the process of and struggle for socio-economic upliftment of the ummah. However, despite possessing the potential of improving society, a substantial proportion of total awqaf is still lying dormant across the world. In modern day economy, waqf has taken a new trajectory, both as a product and as an institution/legal entity, especially in the Islamic finance industry. Consequently, this scenario automatically demands that the institution be fairly regulated and closely monitored. However, not much has been written in the corporate governance area of waqf. This article has three aims: firstly, to briefly examine the salient features of waqf from the perspective of fiqh al-awqaf, secondly, to explore the evolution of the fiqh al-awqaf in the light of waqf being metamorphosed into a corporation-like entity, and finally, to propose the possibilities of how a corporate governance model can be developed for the institution based on the existing waqf rulings and modern regulatory guidelines.


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