scholarly journals Problemas con la crítica de Fodor y Lepore al holismo semántico de Davidson

2021 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. H32a3
Author(s):  
Julián Arango
Keyword(s):  

El objetivo de este artículo es problematizar las críticas que hacen Fodor y Lepore en Holism: a shopper’s guide a la teoría holista propuesta por Donald Davidson. Para hacerlo, primero se hará una exposición de la teoría davidsoniana y se expondrán tres de las críticas hechas por Fodor y Lepore: (1) la composicionalidad es necesaria para evitar los enunciados-W; (2) la condición epistemológica de un intérprete radical es problemática; (3) el principio de caridad no tiene ningún uso en la teoría del significado, entonces no se puede derivar una conclusión holista de este principio. Una vez claras las críticas de Fodor y Lepore, se argumentará por qué no tienen un fundamento fuerte y se señalarán alguno problemas que quedan por resolver.

Polisemia ◽  
2008 ◽  
Vol 4 (6) ◽  
pp. 79-95
Author(s):  
Edisson Rincón Higuera

El presente artículo es una aproximación a las problemáticos suscitadas por el surgimiento de teorías como lo inconmensurabilidad y la indeterminación de lo traducción, propuestos por Paul Feyerabend y Quine respectivamente, y las cuestiones de fondo que ello suscita en la problemático del multiculturalismo. Luego de plantear las propuestas fundamentales de los teorías mencionadas, revisaremos la crítica que Donald Davidson realiza con la postulación del principio de caridad, como condición de lo posibilidad de la comunicación y, proponemos una línea interpretativa sobre la base de una teoría de construcción de mundo apoyados en el concepto de empatía e imaginación, como presupuesto fundamentales a la hora de entablar un diálogo.


1979 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 131-143 ◽  
Author(s):  
Max Black
Keyword(s):  

2008 ◽  
Vol 38 (4) ◽  
pp. 601-629
Author(s):  
Maura Tumulty

Some theories of language, thought, and experience require their adherents to say unpalatable things about human individuals whose capacities for rational activity are seriously diminished. Donald Davidson, for example, takes the interdependence of the concepts of thought and language to entail that thoughts may only be attributed to an individual who is an interpreter of others’ speech. And John McDowell's account of human experience as the involuntary exercise of conceptual capacities can be applied easily only to individuals who make some reasonable judgments, because conceptual capacities are paradigmatically exercised in judgments. In both cases, we seem forced towards an error theory about any ordinary understanding of impaired human individuals as minded, or as undergoing human experience.


Dialogue ◽  
1985 ◽  
Vol 24 (3) ◽  
pp. 427-442 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew Kernohan

In a recent series of papers, Donald Davidson has put forward a challenging and original philosophy of mind which he has called anomalous monism. Anomalous monism has certain similarities to another recent and deservedly popular position: functionalist cognitive psychology. Both functionalism, in its materialist versions, and anomalous monism require token-token psychophysical identities rather than type-type ones. (Token identities are identities between individual events; type identities represent a stronger claim of identities between interesting sorts of events.) Both deny that psychology can be translated into, or scientifically reduced to, neurophysiology. Both are mentalistic theories, allowing psychology to make use of intentional descriptions in its theorizing. Anomalous monism uses a belief/desire/action psychology; cognitive science makes use of information-bearing states. But these similarities must not be allowed to conceal an essential difference between the two positions. Cognitive psychology claims to be a science, making interesting, lawlike generalizations for the purpose of explaining mental activity. Anomalous monism denies that psychology is a science by denying that psychological laws can be formulated. Davidson has other ideas for psychology connected with his work on meaning and truth. Hence, the title of one of his essays on anomalous monism is “Psychology as Philosophy”.


1975 ◽  
Vol 47 (2) ◽  
pp. 287
Author(s):  
John L. Stewart ◽  
John Tyree Fain ◽  
Thomas Daniel Young ◽  
Lewis P. Simpson
Keyword(s):  

Author(s):  
Katarzyna Popek

The purpose of the text is to make some reconnaissance in the area of title "districts of metaphor" (or hunting grounds of metaphor) as well as reference to the unsolvable problems which are implied by a metaphorical mystery of metaphysical expressions. Thy are the order of the day in the main currents of philosophy. Starting from the rhetorical tradition of metaphor (the Aristotelian attempts of definition of metaphor as such) and of terms additional related with it (Max Black), I gradually illustrate what involves its post-rhetorical tradition. I show that philosophical symbolism derives from Aristotle’s hermeneutics, which becomes a gateway for understanding the mystery of metaphor. Like browsing in themselves mirrors, it grows also from simple phrases in complex sentences. In semantic sense, while the symbol has many meanings, the metaphor has a double meaning. It is not however limited by this matter, because in some sense, it has broader content than a symbol, as it introduces into language meanings that in the symbol are only internal (Paul Ricoeur). We also encounter reflective metaphors in our everyday speech and in the attempts of associative penetration into other people's expression. Conceptual decoding of metaphors is common for users of language (George Lakoff, Mark Johnson). On the other hand, there are specific districts of metaphorical expressions, which are reserved for poetic metaphors (Donald Davidson). Noteworthy are also the very unobvious contexts of metaphor in which the authors do not talk about this linguistic phenomenon directly (eg. Gottlob Frege, Ernst Cassirer). Declarative answer to the question whether the metaphor is a simply ornament of discourse or rather a mirror of the soul, is not possible too. Perhaps the metaphor as such includes the both variants. One must consider that being an ornament of speech or writing does not rule out it is also something more than just decoration. It wonders, bothers, disquiet, returning us into our souls. It is also like the unifying soul of all people – in cognitive sense.


1993 ◽  
Vol 43 (173) ◽  
pp. 555
Author(s):  
H. G. Callaway ◽  
Simon Evnine
Keyword(s):  

Philosophy ◽  
1982 ◽  
Vol 57 (222) ◽  
pp. 477-486 ◽  
Author(s):  
P. M.S. Hacker

In recent years philosophers have given much attention to the ‘ontological problem’ of events. Donald Davidson puts the matter thus: ‘the assumption, ontological and metaphysical, that there are events is one without which we cannot make sense of much of our common talk; or so, at any rate, I have been arguing. I do not know of any better, or further, way of showing what there is’. It might be thought bizarre to assign to philosophers the task of ‘showing what there is’. They have not distinguished themselves by the discovery of new elements, new species or new continents, nor even of new categories, although there has often been more dreamt of in their philosophies than can be found in heaven or earth. It might appear even stranger to think that one can show what there actually is by arguing that the existence of something needs to be assumed in order for certain sentences to make sense. More than anything, the sober reader will doubtlessly be amazed that we need to assume, after lengthy argument, ‘that there are events’.


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