Construction of Scientific Facts – Why is Relativism Essential in Bypassing Incommensurable Gaps in Humanities. Case of Personal Involvement – Biased Scientific Facts

This paper addresses the theory of knowledge in relativistic terms of Paul Feyerabend, stressing the importance of personal involvement in the research and theorizing. Since the topic is a constant and widely accepted premise the author is insisting that it has been actually ignored in the sociology and philosophy of science. It is apparent in discursive form, neglected in actual consequences for science in general. Defending the thesis of relativism had remained unacknowledged by the general scientific community. Biographies of mavericks and their struggle and exclusion from scientific community etc. had been constant in the history of science. Is science nowadays able to accept criticism and implement arguments of knowledge beyond the institutionalized standards? Throughout this article we argue that personal involvement creates biased scientific facts; acknowledging and applying tacit knowledge we move beyond personal involvement and create appropriate interpretations of facts and phenomena under investigation, where we reconsider the construction of facts and personal beliefs, knowing that our fields of expertise are incommensurable.

Três lugares para a crise de legitimidade da ciência

Neste ensaio defende-se a tese de que a “crise de legitimidade” da ciência é um fenômeno para o qual podem existir três lugares: o mundo celestial a que nos conduzem os escritos de autores como José Ortega y Gasset, Karl Jaspers, Johan Huizinga e Edmund Husserl; o mundo dantesco a que nos levam os escritos do filósofo da ciência Paul Feyerabend; e o mundo da realidade terrena a que nos conduzem os escritos de cientistas que reagem a uma situação de aberta hostilidade à ciência. Neste último caso, o termo “crise” não exprime uma desilusão pessoal com a ciência (como nos casos de Ortega y Gasset, Jaspers e Huizinga), nem as idiossincrasias de um sistema filosófico (como no caso de Husserl), nem as consequências funestas de uma bem-intencionada utopia libertária (como no caso de Feyerabend), mas uma redefinição dos caminhos a serem tomados por diferentes disciplinas científicas. Isso aconteceu na Alemanha da República de Weimar, a rigor o único lugar em que já existiu o que pode ser apropriadamente chamado de crise de legitimidade da ciência.

Análise do discurso de uma publicação ‘antivacina’ no youtube e algumas reflexões para a educação em ciências

O objetivo deste artigo foi apresentar uma pesquisa que analisou o discurso em uma publicação ‘antivacina’ no YouTube. O estudo se pautou na seguinte questão de investigação: que relações podem ser evidenciadas entre um discurso ‘antivacina’ e disposições de pensamento crítico? A análise discursiva foi encaminhada conforme Maingueneau, e algumas contribuições sobre pensamento crítico foram consideradas. As perspectivas de Paul Feyerabend e Bruno Latour foram assumidas para justificar um posicionamento simétrico frente ao discurso analisado. Como resultados identificamos a relutância de teóricos da conspiração frente a evidências e informações científicas, a demarcada oposição aos conhecimentos científicos e o caráter ideológico desses discursos. Teorias conspiratórias parecem fazer parte de um sistema cultural e psicossocial complexo, não exclusivamente relacionado às disposições de pensamento. Consideramos que esta pesquisa pode contribuir para as discussões referentes à investigação de teorias conspiratórias e para tornar esse um foco de pesquisa frutífero para a Educação em Ciências.

The Opening Phase of the Science Wars

Kuhn’s monograph fed into the broad antiestablishment spirit of the 1960s and elicited polar-opposite responses, from the defense of objectivity and realism within scientific knowledge to an enthusiastic embrace of the view of scientific knowledge as ineluctably subjective interpretations of experience. The philosopher of science Paul Feyerabend aggressively attacked the rationality of scientific reasoning and eventually rationality itself. Kuhn’s new image of science fed into the emerging postmodernist critique of reason and truth as rhetorical devices wielded for political ends. Jacques Derrida’s “deconstruction” swept the humanities and social sciences, concluding that there could not be a single correct meaning of any text, including scientists’ “reading” of the “book” of nature. Concurrently, philosophers of science, among them Israel Scheffler, Imre Lakatos, and Karl Popper, began a counterattack against Kuhn, defending the rationality and objectivity of scientific knowledge and reason generally.

Kebebasan yang Memerdekakan: Sumbangsih Pemikiran Filsafat Anarkisme Epistemologis Paul K. Feyerabend Terhadap Pemahaman Radikalisme Agama

This article discusses whether it is true that the biblical texts legitimize religious radicalism. Religious radical movements are present and carry out very violent actions, this is due to religious beliefs that are held as absolute, imposing their beliefs without seeing the beliefs of other parties so as to deny the freedom of others. The purpose of this study is to explore the philosophical thought of Paul Feyerabend’s epistemological anarchism and then see its relevance to the understanding of religious radicalism. The research method used in this paper is a literature study (library). Through this research study, it can be concluded that there is no single truth that can control and regulate human knowledge (Against Method); man must Anything Goes; knowledge cannot be measured by the same standard; and lastly is the concept of individual freedom, individual human beings must be free. AbstrakArtikel ini membahas tentang benarkah teks-teks Kitab Suci melegitimasi radikalisme agama. Munculnya berbagai gerakan-gerakan radikal agama dan melakukan aksi-aksi yang tergolong sangat kasar disebabkan pemahaman kebenaran yang dianut sebagai kebenaran mutlak, memaksakan kebenarannya tanpa melihat kebenaran pihak lain sehingga mengkungkung kebebasan orang lain. Tujuan penelitian ini adalah mengeksplorasi pemikiran filsafat anarkisme epistimologis Paul Feyerabend kemudian melihat titik relevansinya terhadap pemahaman radikalisme agama. Metode penelitian yang digunakan dalam tulisan ini adalah studi literatur (kepustakaan). Melalui kajian penelitian ini dapat disimpulkan bahwa tidak ada kebenaran yang tunggal yang dapat menguasai dan mengatur pengetahuan manusia (Against Method); manusia harus Anything Goes; pengetahuan tidak bisa diukur dengan standar yang sama; dan terakhir adalah konsep kebebasan individu, manusia individual harus bebas.

Alteridad, lenguaje y ontología en la antropología perspectivista de Eduardo Viveiros de Castro:

En este artículo adopto una mirada más serena y analítica para reexaminar algunos aspectos cruciales de la antropología perspectivista de Eduardo Viveiros de Castro, que durante su reciente apogeo ha sido discutida en términos demasiado polarizados. Al rastrear el uso de “ontología” en el contexto de este controvertido proyecto, evalúo tanto su dimensión metodológica como su dimensión ontológica. Esto no sólo me obliga a enfrentar los problemas de la alteridad y el lenguaje, sino también me lleva a explorar sus vínculos con los llamados “giros ontológicos” en la antropología y en la filosofía contemporáneas. Paralelamente, esbozo algunas pistas prometedoras para guiar la antropología más allá de las dificultades encontradas: el pluralismo epistemológico de Paul Feyerabend y las reflexiones inconclusas de Michel Foucault sobre la práctica de la parrēsia en la antigua Grecia. De esta forma, espero iniciar un diálogo inter y transdisciplinario para tender puentes entre los seguidores y los detractores del proyecto, articulado alrededor del llamamiento esencialmente político de “tomar en serio” el pensamiento nativo.

Scientist As Parrhesiastes

The scientific community of the XX and XXI centuries is a very large companionship, very fragmented and spread all over the world. Moreover, the status of the scientist, which in most cases is a member of the States’ apparati, is significantly different concerning the one of the scientists up to the First World War.The concepts of the scientific revolution of Thomas Kuhn and the scientific anarchy of Paul Feyerabend should be reconsidered in this contest. In particular, the anarchist modus operandi should be shifted from the scientific method, which has become significantly standardized with protocols, to the sociology of the scientific community. Pluralism of the scientific method is possible, but anarchy in the relationships among scientists emerges as more important. The scientist is in many cases a parrhesiastes, a person that says the truth even when he is going to pay because of that, that defends the developed theory or model, by respecting the protocols established in the scientific community. On the other side, each scientist should be a patient beholder that accepts the more solid, and intersubjectively recognized, theories of other scientists.

The Philosopher's Corner

In an effort to contribute to the recent debate around epistemological and methodological anarchism inspired by the thinking of Paul Feyerabend, we reflect on Habermas's pragmatist perspective of social science. We argue that the information systems field instantiates a sort of pluralism that goes beyond the relativistic conclusions of Feyerabend. This is evident through the different traditions of research into business processes and organizational routines. There is a healthy diversity of epistemological and methodological approaches in this research. Accompanying this diversity is an openness to novelty and change. Yet, at the same time, this does not necessitate the abandonment of rigor and a cumulative tradition implied by "anything goes." Anything does not go, and that's a good thing. There is not a singular, hegemonic approach to what constitutes strong information systems research, but neither have we devolved into anarchy.

Scientist as Parrhesiastes

The scientific community of the XX and XXI centuries is a very large companionship, very fragmented and spread all over the world. Moreover, the status of the scientist, which in most cases is a member of the States’ apparati, is significantly different with respect to the one of the scientists up to the First World War.The concepts of scientific revolution of Thomas Kuhn and scientific anarchy of Paul Feyerabend should be reconsidered in this contest. In particular, the anarchist modus operandi should be shifted from the scientific method, that has become significantly standardized with protocols, to the sociology of the scientific community. A pluralism of the scientific method is possible, but an anarchy in the relationships among scientists emerges as more important. The scientist is in many cases a parrhesiastes, a person that says the truth even when he is going to pay because of that, that defends the developed theory or model, by respecting the protocols established in the scientific community. On the other side, each scientist should be a patient beholder that accepts the more solid, and intersubjectively recognized, theories of other scientists.