Tourism Supply Chain Coordination with Price Discount and Quantity Flexibility Contracts

Author(s):  
Yuan Shi ◽  
Jing-na Ji ◽  
Zhi-yong Zhang ◽  
Lei Yang
2021 ◽  
pp. 109634802199679
Author(s):  
Xiaofeng Zhao ◽  
Jianrong Hou

Tourism supply chain management has become an important research topic as individual firms no longer compete as isolated entities but rather as supply chains in the tourism industry. Despite the evidence that benefits can be gained to improve profitability, competitiveness, and customer satisfaction, the research on how to manage the tourism supply chain is very limited. This research contributes to the literature by applying the theory of constraints (TOC) with systems thinking to tourism supply chain management. It proposes that the key issue in tourism supply chain management is the coordination of business activities and the TOC with systems thinking can effectively support tourism supply chain coordination of the various links and processes. The article examines the TOC performance measures and the drum–buffer–rope model in the context of tourism management and applies the focusing process of the TOC as a continuous improvement approach for tourism supply chain management. The research findings suggest that, given modifications to the TOC terminology and the principles, the TOC principles can work as an excellent approach to facilitate the tourism supply chain management.


Mathematics ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 586
Author(s):  
Wei Liu ◽  
Shiji Song ◽  
Ying Qiao ◽  
Han Zhao

This paper studies the supply chain coordination where the retailer is loss-averse, and a combined buyback and quantity flexibility contract is introduced. The loss-averse retailer’s objective is to maximize the Conditional Value-at-Risk of utility. It is shown the combined contract can coordinate the chain and a unique coordinating wholesale price exists if the confidence level is below a threshold. Moreover, the retailer’s optimal order quantity, expected utility and coordinating wholesale price are decreasing in loss aversion and confidence levels, respectively. We also find that when the contract parameters are restricted, the combined contract may coordinate the supply chain even though neither of its component contracts coordinate the chain.


2009 ◽  
Vol 26 (01) ◽  
pp. 135-160 ◽  
Author(s):  
LEI YANG ◽  
MINGHUI XU ◽  
GANG YU ◽  
HANQIN ZHANG

We study the coordination of supply chains with a risk-neutral supplier and a risk-averse retailer. Different from the downside risk setting, in a conditional value-at-risk (CVaR) framework, we show that the supply chain can be coordinated with the revenue-sharing, buy-back, two-part tariff and quantity flexibility contracts. Furthermore the revenue-sharing contracts are still equivalent to the buy-back contracts when the retail price is fixed. At the same time, it is shown that the risk-averse retailer of the coordinated supply chain can increase its profit by raising its risk-averse degree under mild conditions.


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