Price Discount Coordination Mechanism for CHR Express Dual-Channel Supply Chain

According to the manufacturer-leading dual-channel supply chain return problem, a linear demand function considering the change rate of product interaction between the two channels and the change rate of market demand on the return price was established. Under the premise of no cross-return, this paper analyzes the changes of the optimal profit value of the manufacturer, retailer, and supply chain of the dual-channel supply chain in the context of centralized and decentralized decision-making and through the establishment of the price discount decision model and compensation strategy to coordinate the whole supply chain profit. This paper has shown that the use of the price discount decision model and compensation policy model could make the whole supply chain profit optimum value in decentralized decision-making situations equal to profit optimum value in the centralized decision-making situations, and price discount model could make manufacturers better to maximize profit considering the same return scenario, and that compensation policy model could be more helpful to maximize profits for retailers.

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Research on the Coordination Mechanism of the Products Double Channel Supply Chain

Applied Mechanics and Materials ◽

10.4028/www.scientific.net/amm.644-650.5494 ◽

2014 ◽

Vol 644-650 ◽

pp. 5494-5497

Author(s):

Ya Shuang Wu ◽

Shou Wen Ji ◽

Yong Hai You

Keyword(s):

Supply Chain ◽

Rapid Development ◽

Direct Marketing ◽

Marketing Channel ◽

Coordination Mechanism ◽

Channel Conflict ◽

Dual Channel ◽

Channel Mode ◽

Major Factors ◽

Dual Channel Supply Chain

With the rapid development of the e-commerce, dairy enterprises have constructed the Internet direct marketing channel to expand the market and improve competiveness. Based on the dairy dual-channel supply chain as the research object, the paper firstly summarizes the characteristics and applicable scopes of the separated channel mode, hybrid channel mode, bricks and clicks mode, integration channel mode. Then, analyze the channel conflict types and the major factors. Finally, the paper discussed the price strategy, product strategy and channel strategy to coordinate the conflict.

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Coordination strategies in dual-channel supply chain considering innovation investment and different game ability

Kybernetes ◽

10.1108/k-12-2018-0669 ◽

2019 ◽

Vol 49 (6) ◽

pp. 1581-1603

Author(s):

Zonghuo Li ◽

Wensheng Yang ◽

Xiaohong Liu ◽

Hassan Taimoor

Keyword(s):

Decision Making ◽

Supply Chain ◽

Consumer Welfare ◽

Coordination Mechanism ◽

Investment Strategies ◽

Joint Decision ◽

Content Type ◽

Dual Channel ◽

Investment Level ◽

Dual Channel Supply Chain

PurposeThis paper aims to investigate the impact of retailer innovation investment and its spillover’s effect on competitive dual-channel supply chain pricing and optimization strategy, and explore the coordination mechanism considering decision maker’s bargaining ability.Design/methodology/approachThe Cournot and Stackelberg game methodology are made use of for the duopoly decentralized and joint decision-making model. The bargaining theory with different negotiation ability was used to analysis the coordination mechanism. Then this paper validates the model by simulation techniques.FindingsThe results enlightened some interesting facts, the increase in innovation demand coefficient spur rise in channel pricing, innovation investment level, supply chain profit and consumer welfare. The rise in innovation spillover coefficient leads to increase in online channel pricing, supply chain profit and consumer welfare. Due to the innovation spillover effect, retailer has to maintain channel competitiveness either through low price or high innovation investment strategies. In addition, online channel pricing, supply chain profit and consumer welfare in joint decision-making scenario is greater than that of decentralized decision-making scenario, while the difference in retailer channel pricing depends on parameters value. The increase in retailer’s joint negotiation factor leads to decrease in channel pricing and innovation investment level. Furthermore, there existence of an optimal innovative investment cost sharing proportion threshold indicates the achievement of dual-channel supply chain coordination. A refinement equilibrium can be achieved through Robinstein bargaining game. A larger interest discount factor leads to decrease in profit.Originality/valueThe research provides a theoretical reference for dual-channel supply chain pricing and coordination strategy under channel competition environment. The research can develop innovative investment strategies for retailers and implement response strategies for manufacturers.

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Pricing decision and coordination mechanism of dual-channel supply chain dominated by a risk-aversion retailer under demand disruption

RAIRO - Operations Research ◽

10.1051/ro/2021013 ◽

2021 ◽

Author(s):

Bo Yan ◽

Zhuo Chen ◽

Yanping Liu ◽

Xiaoxu Chen

Keyword(s):

Supply Chain ◽

Coordination Mechanism ◽

Optimal Decision ◽

Total Production ◽

Optimal Decisions ◽

Dual Channel ◽

Pricing Decision ◽

Decentralized Decision Making ◽

Before And After ◽

Dual Channel Supply Chain

This paper studies a dual-channel supply chain composed of a retailer and a supplier, and discusses the optimal decisions of supply chain participants under decentralized decision-making without and with demand disruption, respectively. By comparing the optimal decisions in the two scenarios, we find that the optimal decision after demand disruption is a linear function of the demand disruption plus optimal decision before demand disruption. Additionally, when the demand disruption is in interval , the optimal total production of the supply chain is equal before and after demand disruption. Moreover, the profits of the supply chain members and the value of their recognizing demand disruption are largely affected by the scale of demand disruption. Finally, the results show that the improved revenue-sharing contract can effectively improve the supply chain performance.

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Coordination Contracts of Dual-Channel Supply Chain Considering Advertising Cooperation

International Journal of Information Systems and Supply Chain Management ◽

10.4018/ijisscm.2021010103 ◽

2021 ◽

Vol 14 (1) ◽

pp. 55-89

Author(s):

Xue-Mei Zhang ◽

Ying-Ying Li ◽

Zhi Liu ◽

Qian-Wen Li

Keyword(s):

Supply Chain ◽

Stackelberg Game ◽

Marketing Channel ◽

Coordination Mechanism ◽

Optimal Decision ◽

Supply Chain System ◽

Chain System ◽

Dual Channel ◽

Dual Channel Supply Chain ◽

The Impact

To study the impact of advertising cooperation on the decisions of dual-channel supply chain, a dual-channel supply chain system consisting of a single manufacturer and a single retailer is considered. The manufacturer can sell products to customers either through a direct marketing channel or through a traditional retail channel. This paper analyses the level of advertising investment and supply chain profits of centralized and decentralized dual-channel supply chains based on a Stackelberg game. Then, the decision models of dual-channel supply chain under different contracts are constructed, and how manufacturers can optimize the profits of both sides through an effective coordination mechanism is analyzed. The research results show that the improved advertising costs and revenue sharing contract can perfectly coordinate the dual-channel supply chain system. Numerical experiments illustrate the impacts of parameters on the optimal decision results.

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