scholarly journals Luck Egalitarianism and Inherited Wealth

2021 ◽  
pp. 42-57
Author(s):  
NICHOLAS BARRY
Author(s):  
Daniel Halliday

This chapter reviews and criticizes varieties of the luck egalitarian conception of justice. It begins with the ‘naïve’ distinction between choice and circumstance, on which inequalities are permissible insofar as they depend on the former rather than the latter. The bulk of the chapter discusses more sophisticated versions of luck egalitarianism, which either supplement the naïve view with some countervailing principle (e.g. by appeal to personal prerogatives) or by constraining its scope (e.g. by focusing on the mediating effects of institutions). Later parts of the chapter evaluate other contemporary oppositions to inherited wealth grounded in interpretations of reciprocity and a concern about the role of inheritance in enabling freeriding. The chapter ends with a discussion of Ronald Dworkin’s views, which bear a formal resemblance to the position defended in the following two chapters.


2019 ◽  
Vol 23 (4) ◽  
pp. 151-173
Author(s):  
Joo-Hyun KIM ◽  
Hyeon-cheol Kim 

Author(s):  
Daniel Halliday

This chapter considers various arguments both for and against taxing inherited wealth, each of these being associated with some or other type of libertarian outlook. Libertarianism in the Lockean guises (‘left’ and ‘right’ varieties) is distinguished from its classical liberal alternative, which downplays the Lockean emphasis on private property rights in favour of a more defeasible case for small government and low taxation. These different perspectives generate a variety of quite different arguments about inheritance, some more persuasive than others. Some attention is paid to the common claim that inheritance taxes ‘punish’ virtue and generosity. It is then argued that a Rignano scheme may be particularly attractive in light of certain left-libertarian commitments and as a way of accommodating a classical liberal concern about perpetual savings.


2020 ◽  
Vol 42 (1) ◽  
pp. 219-240
Author(s):  
Jiangjin Chen

AbstractRelational Egalitarianism focuses on the construction of equal social relationships between persons. It strongly opposes luck egalitarianism, which understands equality as a distributive ideal. In Cohen’s theory of justice, luck egalitarianism and relational egalitarianism simultaneously exist, and Cohen provides arguments corresponding to each. In this paper, we explore the manifestation of tension between these two forms of egalitarianism in his theory. In addition, we also reconstruct some possible solutions provided by Cohen to soften this tension, including the three approaches of market mechanism, egalitarian ethos and value pluralism, and find them to be unsuccessful. This tension is a serious challenge that needs to be addressed in Cohen’s theory of justice.


2005 ◽  
Vol 31 ◽  
pp. 279-309 ◽  
Author(s):  
Axel Gosseries

Evidence provided by the scientific community strongly suggests that limits should be placed on greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. This means that states, firms, and individuals will have to face potentially serious burdens if they are to implement these limits. Which principles of justice should guide a global regime aimed at reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions originating from human activities, and most notably from CO2 emissions? This is both a crucial and difficult question. Admittedly, perhaps this question is too ambitious, given the uncertainties and complexities characterizing the issue of climate change. Yet, rather than listing them all at this stage, let us address the question in a straightforward manner, introducing some of these complexities as the need arises.


1990 ◽  
Vol 89 (1) ◽  
pp. 69 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark L. Ascher
Keyword(s):  

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document