Luck Egalitarianism and Relational Egalitarianism: An Internal Tension in Cohen’s Theory of Justice

2020 ◽  
Vol 42 (1) ◽  
pp. 219-240
Author(s):  
Jiangjin Chen
Keyword(s):  
Social Relationships ◽  
Market Mechanism ◽  
Value Pluralism ◽  
Luck Egalitarianism ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Egalitarian Ethos

AbstractRelational Egalitarianism focuses on the construction of equal social relationships between persons. It strongly opposes luck egalitarianism, which understands equality as a distributive ideal. In Cohen’s theory of justice, luck egalitarianism and relational egalitarianism simultaneously exist, and Cohen provides arguments corresponding to each. In this paper, we explore the manifestation of tension between these two forms of egalitarianism in his theory. In addition, we also reconstruct some possible solutions provided by Cohen to soften this tension, including the three approaches of market mechanism, egalitarian ethos and value pluralism, and find them to be unsuccessful. This tension is a serious challenge that needs to be addressed in Cohen’s theory of justice.

Rawls and Luck Egalitarianism

John Rawls ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 133-147
Author(s):  
Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen
Keyword(s):  
Luck Egalitarianism ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Early Appearance ◽  
The Social ◽  
Egalitarian Theory ◽  
Luck Egalitarian

In A Theory of Justice, Rawls famously noted that many (dis)advantages reflect the outcomes of the social and the natural lottery. In these remarks, inter alia, some have seen the early appearance in Rawls’s work of what was later developed into a full-blown luck egalitarian theory of justice. Luck egalitarianism says that it is unjust if some are worse off than others through no choice or fault of their own. This principle differs from Rawls’s theory of justice. This had led some political philosophers to criticize Rawls for not thinking through the implications of his luck egalitarian commitments. This chapter (1) presents conflicting interpretations of the role considerations about luck play in Rawls; (2) assesses the exegetical support on offer for these interpretations; and, finally, (3) discusses what role considerations about luck should play in a theory of justice in the light of recent relational egalitarian theories.

scholarly journals COMBINING DEMOCRATIC EQUALITY AND LUCK EGALITARIANISM

2018 ◽  
Vol 1 ◽  
pp. 24
Author(s):  
Lars Lindblom
Keyword(s):  
Personal Responsibility ◽  
Luck Egalitarianism ◽  
Difference Principle ◽  
Proper Place ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Democratic Equality ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Crucial Part

The concept of responsibility plays a crucial part in the debate between proponents of democratic equality, like Rawls, and defenders of luck egalitarianism, such as Dworkin. In this paper it is argued that the two theories can be combined, and that they should be combined to achieve a theory of justice that puts personal responsibility in its proper place. The concept of justice requires two different conceptions. The two theories can be combined because they deal with different problems of justice. They ought to be combined because, first, luck egalitarianism needs a theory of background justice, and second, a theory of justice must supply an answer to the question of just individual allocations, something that is not provided by democratic equality. Democratic equality and luck egalitarianism solve each other’s problems. The combined theory will lead to allocations of goods that respect both the difference principle and the envy test.

scholarly journals Rescuing Rawlsian Justice: Are Fraternity and Difference Principle Compatible?

2021 ◽  
Vol 100 (1) ◽  
pp. 60-74
Author(s):  
R.Yu. Belkovich ◽  
S.V. Vinogradov
Keyword(s):  
John Rawls ◽  
Social Order ◽  
The Political ◽  
Luck Egalitarianism ◽  
Difference Principle ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Private Interests ◽  
Distribution Of Resources ◽  
Internal Contradiction ◽  
The Difference

The revival of the academic interest in the problem of fair distribution of resources in the society, which is one of the key issues for the political thought today, is largely associated with the name of John Rawls and his Theory of Justice. The article is devoted to the analysis of Rawls’s arguments in support of the difference principle as one of the principles of social justice. According to Rawls (whose arguments later formed the foundation for a separate direction in the political-philosophical thought known as luck egalitarianism), due to the random nature of the original distribution of talents, inequality in human wellbeing cannot be justified by an appeal to a merit. However, because strict equality in distribution might reduce productivity of the owners of talent, achieving the best outcome for all requires such inequalities that incentivize the more talented to work as efficiently as possible for the benefit of the less talented. This compromise drew criticism from ardent egalitarians, among which Gerald Cohen articulated objections to the difference principle most clearly and compared the claims of the most talented for material rewards with extortion. Having considered possible justifications for the need for incentives, based on Rawls’s argument in the Theory of Justice, the authors conclude that these justifications do not solve the problem that Cohen revealed. Appealing to human nature merely translates the dispute into the methodological realm: should the theory of justice proceed from reality, or should it be guided by the ideal? In turn, the inevitability of a conflict of private interests does not fit well with Rawls’s ideal of fraternity as an integral part of a just social order. According to their conclusion, in order to resolve the internal contradiction in Rawls’s theory, it is necessary to abandon either the postulates of luck egalitarianism or difference principle. However, both of these options directly contradict Rawls’s intellectual constructs and undermine the basic foundations of his concept.

DAVID HUME E O “NÚMERO DE DUNBAR”: UMA HIPÓTESE EVOLUCIONISTA SOBRE OS FUNDAMENTOS DA MORALIDADE

2017 ◽  
Vol 44 (138) ◽  
pp. 113
Author(s):  
Marcelo De Araújo
Keyword(s):  
Social Relationships ◽  
David Hume ◽  
The Other ◽  
Social Convention ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
The Third ◽  
Moral Duties ◽  
Personal Histories ◽  
The One ◽  
Number Of Individuals

Resumo: O objetivo deste artigo é caracterizar o conceito de justiça como uma convenção social indispensável para a emergência de obrigações morais no contexto de grupos que ultrapassam o “numero de Dunbar”. O artigo retoma, por um lado, a teoria da justiça proposta por David Hume na terceira seção de Uma Investigação sobre os Princípios da Moral, e, por outro lado, a hipótese de Robin Dunbar acerca do número máximo de indivíduos com os quais uma pessoa pode manter relações sociais estáveis que envolvam laços de amizade, vínculos de família, e histórias pessoais compartilhadas.Abstract: The aim of this article is to characterize the concept of justice as na indispensable social convention for the emergence of moral duties in the contexto of groups that surpass the so-called “Dunbar’s number”. The article resumes, on the one hand, David Hume’s theory of justice, as it is discussed in the third section of An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, and on the other hand it resumes Robin Dunbar’s hypothesis relative to the maximum number of individuals with whom a person may keep stable social relationships that comprise kinship, fellowship, and a sense of shared personal histories.

Justice, Pluralism, and the Egalitarian Ethos

Dialogue ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 58 (4) ◽  
pp. 721-728
Author(s):  
KRISTIN VOIGT
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
A Value ◽  
Fundamental Value ◽  
Fundamental Values ◽  
Egalitarian Ethos

One of the central aims of Kyle Johannsen’s monograph, A Conceptual Investigation of Justice, is to defend the idea that we should think of justice as a fundamental value—a value that can come into conflict with other fundamental values. This pluralism is associated in particular with G.A. Cohen’s work and his critique of John Rawls’s theory of justice. In this commentary, I sketch some of the implications of Cohen’s pluralism for a Cohenite ethos of justice.

scholarly journals Meaning and context in political theory

2020 ◽  
pp. 147488512092537
Author(s):  
Albert Weale
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
Political Theory ◽  
Economic Planning ◽  
Luck Egalitarianism ◽  
Price Mechanism ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Main Thesis ◽  
Pelagian Controversy ◽  
Liberal Political Theory

The two books offer a contextual reinterpretation of Rawlsian and post-Rawlsian liberalism. Nelson’s main thesis is that debates in liberal political theory re-enact theological debates about theodicy going back to the Pelagian controversy. This claim is criticized for its historical inaccuracy. Nelson’s invocation of theodicy as a refutation of luck egalitarianism and the Rawlsian rejection of desert rest on a claim of possibility that is too weak to uphold a plausible refutation. Forrester locates Rawls’s rejection of desert in the thinking of his contemporaries. She not only shows the development of Rawls’s thought but also details its broad influence. However, her thesis that the role of economic planning in a theory of justice remained undeveloped by Rawls ignores the intrinsic difficulties of designing a system of economic planning. The persistent antinomies of grace and free will in metaphysics, and of planning and the price mechanism in economics, show the continuing relevance of meaning beyond context.

Preceptoral Politics, Yeoman Democracy and the Enabling State

1988 ◽  
Vol 23 (3) ◽  
pp. 261-275 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Marquand
Keyword(s):  
Social Relationships ◽  
Liberal Theory ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Social Collaboration ◽  
Authority Relations ◽  
Exchange Relations

TRIADS ARE IN FASHION. IN POLITICS AND MARKETS, Charles Lindblom distinguishes between three kinds of social relationships — the exchange relations characteristic of markets; the authority relations characteristic of states; and what he calls ‘preceptoral’ relations, the relations of teachers to pupils, of advertisers to consumers, of indoctrinators to the indoctrinated. In the epilogue to The Liberal Theory of Justice, Brian Barry proposes a different, but in some respects complementary, triad. There are, he suggests, three ‘models’ of social collaboration.

scholarly journals Fairness og statsborgerskab

Politik ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Kristian Kriegbaum Jensen ◽  
Lasse Nielsen
Keyword(s):  
Luck Egalitarianism ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Personal Effort ◽  
Luck Egalitarian

The Danish requirements for citizenship are often grounded on an ideal about rewarding personal effort and responsibility. A similar ideal is known from luck egalitarianism, a widely known and accepted theory of justice. This article unfolds a luck egalitarian argument in defence of the Danish requirements and investigates, in light of this argument, whether the requirements relevantly reflect effort and responsibility. The article concludes dismissively and offers a number of ways of improving Danish citizenship policy in terms of fairness.        

scholarly journals Luck egalitarianism without moral tyranny

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jesse Spafford
Keyword(s):  
Alternative Interpretation ◽  
Luck Egalitarianism ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Full Compliance ◽  
Luck Egalitarians ◽  
Acceptable Theory

AbstractLuck egalitarians contend that, while each person starts out with a claim to an equal quantity of advantage, she can forfeit this claim by making certain choices. The appeal of luck egalitarianism is that it seems to satisfy what this paper calls the moral tyranny constraint. According to this constraint, any acceptable theory of justice must preclude the possibility of an agent unilaterally, discretionarily, and foreseeably leaving others with less advantage under conditions of full compliance with the theory. This paper argues that claim forfeiture is built into luck egalitarianism specifically to preclude such moral tyranny. However, it contends that the dominant interpretation of luck egalitarianism fails to fully satisfy the moral tyranny constraint. It offers an alternative interpretation that both eliminates the possibility of moral tyranny and rescues the position from two other prominent objections that have been directed against luck egalitarianism.

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