scholarly journals Retweeting Constitution of Zambia (Amendment) Bill Number 10 of 2019: Support and Outrage

2021 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Brian Chanda Chiluba ◽  

passed into law could have greatly created uneven impacts on key sectors of society within Zambia. In trying to review the support and outrage of Bill 10 on Twitter, this article uses thematic analysis to investigate 600 Bill 10-related tweets from 21st June 2019 to 21st June 2020 that were retweeted at least 500. The statistical cybermetrics and thematic approaches used generated quick insights into widely resonating subjects of Bill 10 related issues at the time of debate in Zambia. The findings in this article are highly suggestive of the value of Twitter for disseminating information and in this case more especially about understandings, contents and contexts of governance issues of Bill 10. Twitter also offered or requested for support, the ability of many citizens with divergent views and different political affiliations to adjust to the process of the amendment of Bill 10, and information about the contents of the Bill in Zambia. This article highlights, that as gathered from Twitter, it is key to entrench fundamental principles in constitution amendment processes and such principles in a constitutional text, the idea is to firmly embed them, making them very difficult for any governing body to change for their own advantage. Bill 10 retweets shows that amendment procedures are vital for the protection of the underlying constitutional principles, and are generally considered to have a somewhat unassailable status. As shown by many tweets analysed, a government supporting amendment to the constitutional amendment procedure, could in itself be considered an abuse of power.

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brian Chanda Chiluba

At least to the majority of tweets, the Zambian Constitution of Zambian Amendment Bill number 10 if successfully passed into law could have greatly created uneven impacts on key sectors of society within Zambia. In trying to review the support and outrage of Bill 10 on Twitter, this article uses thematic analysis to investigate 600 Bill 10-related tweets from 21st June 2019 to 21st June 2020 that were retweeted at least 500. The statistical cybermetrics and thematic approaches used generated quick insights into widely resonating subjects of Bill 10 related issues at the time of debate in Zambia. The findings in this article are highly suggestive of the value of Twitter for disseminating information and in this case more especially about understandings, contents and contexts of governance issues of Bill 10. Twitter also offered or requested for support, the ability of many citizens with divergent views and different political affiliations to adjust to the process of the amendment of Bill 10, and information about the contents of the Bill in Zambia. This article highlights, that as gathered from Twitter, it is key to entrench fundamental principles in constitution amendment processes and such principles in a constitutional text, the idea is to firmly embed them, making them very difficult for any governing body to change for their own advantage. Bill 10 retweets shows that amendment procedures are vital for the protection of the underlying constitutional principles, and are generally considered to have a somewhat unassailable status. As shown by many tweets analysed, a government supporting amendment to the constitutional amendment procedure, could in itself be considered an abuse of power.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brian Chanda Chiluba

At least to the majority of tweets, the Zambian Constitution of Zambian Amendment Bill number 10 if successfully passed into law could have greatly created uneven impacts on key sectors of society within Zambia. In trying to review the support and outrage of Bill 10 on Twitter, this article uses thematic analysis to investigate 600 Bill 10-related tweets from 21st June 2019 to 21st June 2020 that were retweeted at least 500. The statistical cybermetrics and thematic approaches used generated quick insights into widely resonating subjects of Bill 10 related issues at the time of debate in Zambia. The findings in this article are highly suggestive of the value of Twitter for disseminating information and in this case more especially about understandings, contents and contexts of governance issues of Bill 10. Twitter also offered or requested for support, the ability of many citizens with divergent views and different political affiliations to adjust to the process of the amendment of Bill 10, and information about the contents of the Bill in Zambia. This article highlights, that as gathered from Twitter, it is key to entrench fundamental principles in constitution amendment processes and such principles in a constitutional text, the idea is to firmly embed them, making them very difficult for any governing body to change for their own advantage. Bill 10 retweets shows that amendment procedures are vital for the protection of the underlying constitutional principles, and are generally considered to have a somewhat unassailable status. As shown by many tweets analysed, a government supporting amendment to the constitutional amendment procedure, could in itself be considered an abuse of power.


2016 ◽  
Vol 1 (18) ◽  
pp. 3 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mauro Arturo Rivera León

In spite of being formally rigid, the Mexican Constitution is frequently amended. In this article, I analyze the constitutional amendment procedure in order to understand the causes, consequences and potential solutions of the accelerated rhythm of constitutional amendments in Mexico.


Author(s):  
Yaniv Roznai

A central feature within constitutional design is the amendment procedure or formula, through which formal changes to the constitution can take place. There is a growing trend in global constitutionalism to impose various limitations on constitutional amendment powers (‘unamendability’). These restrictions on the ability to amend constitutions may be procedural, for example by demanding special procedural conditions for amending the constitution. Others are temporal and require constitutional actors to adhere to certain specifications as to the timing of various steps in the formal amendment process, either at the proposal or ratification stages, or both. More contentious is the imposition of substantive limitations on amending constitutional subjects (provisions, principles, rules, symbols, or institutions) through the formal constitutional amendment provision (‘substantive unamendability’). Substantive unamendability of a constitutional subject may be explicit in the form of –what is often termed – eternity or unamendable clauses, or may be implicit as result of courts’ interpretation of the constitutional text, declaring that even in the absence of explicit unamendability, certain constitutional principles are implicitly unamendable. The Chapter focuses on unamendability in the Caribbean. It reviews some of the formal or temporal limitations that we find in Caribbean Constitutions; then reviews explicit substantive limitations, focusing on Cuba, Haiti and Dominican Republic, and implied substantive limitations, as applied in Belize and hinted in Puerto Rico. The Chapter demonstrates that the global trend of limitations on formal constitutional change finds its manifestations also in Caribbean Constitutions.


Author(s):  
K.T. Thomas

This essay discusses the lack of any discernible attempt by the bench in the NJAC Case to read down the provisions of the 99th Amendment to the Constitution of India. This essay argues that neither the overwhelming majority with which the Amendment was passed in Parliament, nor the Court’s own precedent, where it has inclined towards reading down amendments came to the aid of the 99th Amendment. This essay also argues how the mere apprehension of abuse of power by the eminent persons or the Law Minister ought not to have been deemed sufficient to invalidate a constitutional amendment. In parting, the author provides some thoughts and recommendations, to both legislators and courts on how to ensure that future constitutional amendments do not meet the fate of the 99th Amendment, and receive the respect they deserve.


Subject Colorado Party splits and the outlook for re-election. Significance Ahead of municipal elections on November 15, all political parties selected their candidates on July 26. The 2.2 million registered members of the ruling Colorado Party also elected its governing body, the leaders of its 455 local party branches and representatives to its party conventions. Pedro Alliana, the chosen candidate of President Horacio Cartes, was voted in as new party president. Impacts Cartes appears to be laying the groundwork for a constitutional amendment and re-election bid. However, he will find it difficult to carry his party with him. The Colorados themselves may derail much of Cartes's legislative and business agenda.


2019 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 7-18
Author(s):  
Maxime St-Hilaire ◽  
Patrick F. Baud ◽  
Elena S. Drouin

Not only is there no clear answer in Canadian law as to what the 'supreme law' of Canada comprises, but no agreement on how to find that answer. In this short paper, we claim to solve the problem by proposing a new, workable, definition of the Canadian Constitution as supreme law that discards the document list approach of subsection 52(2), Constitution Act 1982, in favour of one that, through subsection 52(3), is based on the constitutional amendment procedure of Part V, which relates to provisions.


2019 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 7
Author(s):  
Maxime St-Hilaire ◽  
Patricia F. Baud ◽  
Elena S. Drouin

Not only is there no clear answer in Canadian law as to what the 'supreme law' of Canada comprises, but no agreement on how to find that answer. In this short paper, we claim to solve the problem by proposing a new, workable, definition of the Canadian Constitution as supreme law that discards the document list approach of subsection 52(2), Constitution Act 1982, in favour of one that, through subsection 52(3), is based on the constitutional amendment procedure of Part V, which relates to provisions.


Author(s):  
Luis Jimena Quesada

El presente trabajo sugiere que la reforma constitucional de 2011 (art. 135) para incluir el límite máximo de endeudamiento e imponer la estabilidad presupuestaria en España ha confirmado que las fuerzas e intereses económicos prevalecen en la práctica sobre unos teóricamente sólidos principios constitucionales, tanto a nivel europeo como nacional. En efecto, se han producido en paralelo algunas paradojas: en primer lugar, la ausencia de un real Gobierno económico europeo (con un asimétrico enfoque consistente en un Consejo Europeo de 27 y una Cumbre del Euro de 17) al lado de la débil posición de un Gobierno nacional (sin mayoría parlamentaria), han sido capaces no obstante de operar un «abuso» de las disposiciones constitucionales como instrumento anticrisis. En segundo término, las contundentes normas económicas y de competencia incluidas en el Derecho Europeo primario, junto con la material flexibilidad de la Constitución económica española, no se han mostrado tampoco adecuadas para impedir la relativización de los teóricamente rígidos procedimientos de revisión de los Tratados Europeos y del procedimiento especial de reforma constitucional en España. Se llega así como conclusión a la necesidad de reforzar: tanto la posición de la ciudadanía/demos a nivel europeo e interno, como los fundamentos dogmáticos de la Teoría del Derecho constitucional (europeo y nacional).This essay suggests that the 2011 Constitutional Amendment (Art. 135) to include a debt ceiling provision and impose a balance budget standard in Spain has confirmed that economic forces and interests prevail in practice over theoretical solid constitutional principles, both at European and domestic levels. Indeed, some parallel paradoxes have emerged: firstly, the absence of a real European economic government (the asymmetric approach consisting of one European Council for 27 and one Euro Summit for 17) together with the weak position of a National government (governing without a parliamentary majority) have nevertheless produced an «abuse» of constitutional provisions as an anti-crisis instrument. Secondly, the prominent economic and competition rules included in European Primary Law together with the material flexibility of the Spanish Economic Constitution have not been suitable to prevent from relativizing theoretical rigid revision procedures of European Treaties and Spanish special constitutional amendment procedure. The final conclusion is the need to strengthen both: the position of Citizenship/Demos at European and domestic level as well as the dogmatic foundation of the Theory of (European and National) Constitutional Law.


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