scholarly journals Understanding Constitutional Amendments in Mexico: Perpetuum Mobile Constitution

2016 ◽  
Vol 1 (18) ◽  
pp. 3 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mauro Arturo Rivera León

In spite of being formally rigid, the Mexican Constitution is frequently amended. In this article, I analyze the constitutional amendment procedure in order to understand the causes, consequences and potential solutions of the accelerated rhythm of constitutional amendments in Mexico.

Author(s):  
Richard Albert

Some constitutional amendments are not amendments at all. They are self-conscious efforts to repudiate the essential characteristics of the constitution and to destroy its foundations. They dismantle the basic structure of the constitution while at the same time building a new foundation rooted in principles contrary to the old. Changes on this scale are not properly called constitutional amendments. They are better understood as constitutional dismemberments. A constitutional dismemberment is incompatible with the existing framework of the constitution. It intends deliberately to disassemble one or more of the constitution’s elemental parts by altering a fundamental right, an important structural design, or a core aspect of the identity of the constitution. To use a rough shorthand, the purpose and effect of a constitutional dismemberment are the same: to unmake the constitution. But what, then, is a constitutional amendment? This chapter explains that there are four fundamental features to a constitutional amendment: its subject, authority, scope, and purpose. The most important feature of an amendment is its scope, which at all times must not exceed the boundaries of the existing constitution. This chapter therefore defines a constitutional amendment in terms of what it is and what it is not, with illustrations drawn from around the globe. This chapter considers constitutions from Barbados, Belize, Brazil, Canada, Dominica, Guyana, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, New Zealand, and the United States.


2019 ◽  
Vol 17 (3) ◽  
pp. 756-786
Author(s):  
Ngoc Son Bui

Abstract Laos, a socialist state in Southeast Asia, adopted an amended Constitution in 2015. This article investigates and explains this experience from the perspective of comparative constitutional amendment, supported by a qualitative empirical methodology: extensive formal interviews with several local constitutional amenders and informal conversations with a local lawyer and several legal scholars. It argues that Laos has introduced progressive constitutional amendments—notably, the redefinition of the position, structure, and functions of state institutions, including the imposition of term limits on executive power holders; strengthened commitment to a market economy; new commitments to human rights protection, judicial independence, and adversarial trials; and the creation of new institutions, namely, the local people’s councils, the state audit, and the election committee—to facilitate the improvement of its socialist constitutional system which in turn will promote the improvement of the material well-being of the living conditions of local people.


Water ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (24) ◽  
pp. 3519
Author(s):  
Lara Côrtes ◽  
Camila Gianella ◽  
Angela M. Páez ◽  
Catalina Vallejo Piedrahíta

In this paper we compare recent efforts towards the constitutionalization of the right to water in Brazil, Colombia, and Peru to understand the opportunities and limitations related to the attempts to enhance access to piped water to the highest normative level. Peru passed a constitutional amendment in 2017 while Brazil and Colombia have seen much right-to-water activism but have not succeeded in passing such reforms. We explore the role of the existing domestic legal frameworks on drinkable water provision and water management towards the approval of constitutional amendments. We find that all three countries have specialized laws, water governing institutions, and constitutional jurisprudence connecting access to water with rights, but the legal opportunity structures to enforce socio-economic rights vary; they are stronger in Colombia and Brazil, and weaker in Peru. We argue that legal opportunity structures build legal environments that influence constitutional reform success. Legal opportunity structures act as incentives both for social movements to push for reforms and for actors with legislative power to accept or reject them. Our findings also show that in some contexts political cost is a key element of constitutional reforms that enshrine the right to water; therefore, this is an element that should be considered when analyzing these processes.


Author(s):  
Sergey P. Kazankov

The article discusses the issue of the procedure for changing the Constitution of the Russian Federation. Examples of norms of foreign constitutions are given, which constitutionalists recognize as rigid constitutions in the order of their amendment. The ways of changing the Constitution of the Russian Federation are considered: revision, adoption of amendments, amendment of Art. 65Identified problems such as the form of the amendment to the Constitution, the moment of entry into force of the amendment, the introduction by the Law of the Russian Federation on the amendment to the Constitution of the Russian Federation of 2020 a nationwide vote as an additional condition for the entry into force of the amendment, as well as additional powers of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation to verify compliance with Chapters 1, 2 and 9 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation of the provisions of the Law of the Russian Federation on the amendment to the Constitution of the Russian Federation that have not entered into force, as well as the procedure for the entry into force of Art. 1 of the Amendment Act. The critical notes are offered. In particular, the author comes to the conclusion that the approval of the constitutional amendment by the parliaments of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation is not a moment, but a condition for its entry into force, therefore, the law on the amendment cannot introduce additional conditions for the entry into force of constitutional amendments, since this leads to a violation requirements of Art. 136 of the Constitution, which cannot be amended by the federal parliament in the manner prescribed by chapter 9 of the Constitution.


Author(s):  
Yaniv Roznai

A central feature within constitutional design is the amendment procedure or formula, through which formal changes to the constitution can take place. There is a growing trend in global constitutionalism to impose various limitations on constitutional amendment powers (‘unamendability’). These restrictions on the ability to amend constitutions may be procedural, for example by demanding special procedural conditions for amending the constitution. Others are temporal and require constitutional actors to adhere to certain specifications as to the timing of various steps in the formal amendment process, either at the proposal or ratification stages, or both. More contentious is the imposition of substantive limitations on amending constitutional subjects (provisions, principles, rules, symbols, or institutions) through the formal constitutional amendment provision (‘substantive unamendability’). Substantive unamendability of a constitutional subject may be explicit in the form of –what is often termed – eternity or unamendable clauses, or may be implicit as result of courts’ interpretation of the constitutional text, declaring that even in the absence of explicit unamendability, certain constitutional principles are implicitly unamendable. The Chapter focuses on unamendability in the Caribbean. It reviews some of the formal or temporal limitations that we find in Caribbean Constitutions; then reviews explicit substantive limitations, focusing on Cuba, Haiti and Dominican Republic, and implied substantive limitations, as applied in Belize and hinted in Puerto Rico. The Chapter demonstrates that the global trend of limitations on formal constitutional change finds its manifestations also in Caribbean Constitutions.


EDIS ◽  
2008 ◽  
Vol 2008 (6) ◽  
Author(s):  
Rodney L. Clouser

A series of 16 fact sheets by Rodney L. Clouser, inform the public on issues related to statutory and constitutional proposals adopted by the Taxation and Budget Reform Commission (TBRC). Fact sheets FE733 through FE741 address statutory changes and fact sheets FE742 through FE748 address constitutional amendments. Published by the UF Department of Food and Resource Economics, July 2008.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brian Chanda Chiluba

At least to the majority of tweets, the Zambian Constitution of Zambian Amendment Bill number 10 if successfully passed into law could have greatly created uneven impacts on key sectors of society within Zambia. In trying to review the support and outrage of Bill 10 on Twitter, this article uses thematic analysis to investigate 600 Bill 10-related tweets from 21st June 2019 to 21st June 2020 that were retweeted at least 500. The statistical cybermetrics and thematic approaches used generated quick insights into widely resonating subjects of Bill 10 related issues at the time of debate in Zambia. The findings in this article are highly suggestive of the value of Twitter for disseminating information and in this case more especially about understandings, contents and contexts of governance issues of Bill 10. Twitter also offered or requested for support, the ability of many citizens with divergent views and different political affiliations to adjust to the process of the amendment of Bill 10, and information about the contents of the Bill in Zambia. This article highlights, that as gathered from Twitter, it is key to entrench fundamental principles in constitution amendment processes and such principles in a constitutional text, the idea is to firmly embed them, making them very difficult for any governing body to change for their own advantage. Bill 10 retweets shows that amendment procedures are vital for the protection of the underlying constitutional principles, and are generally considered to have a somewhat unassailable status. As shown by many tweets analysed, a government supporting amendment to the constitutional amendment procedure, could in itself be considered an abuse of power.


1935 ◽  
Vol 29 (4) ◽  
pp. 610-630
Author(s):  
Charles G. Haines

Validity of Constitutional Amendments. The courts continue to scan with rather meticulous care the procedure for the adoption of constitutional amendments. Where the sole purpose of a proposed constitutional amendment under the initiative provisions of the constitution was to provide for the levy of a “syncrotax,” or a tax on the basis of gross receipts in lieu of all other state taxes, a petition with a short title reading “initiative measure providing for adoption of gross receipts act” was held fatally defective in view of the requirement that every initiative petition have a short title showing the nature of the petition and the subject to which it relates. But according to the supreme court of Florida, a proposal to amend the constitution need not have a title, need not be read on different days or at different times, and need not be concurred in by the governor. And the dissenting justices protested that the majority failed to uphold the requirement that a proposed amendment shall be entered upon the respective journals of the two houses with the yeas and nays, showing a three-fifths vote in favor of the amendment. There must be, however, a violation of express constitutional requirements for the courts to interfere with the procedure in the adoption of amendments.


Author(s):  
K.T. Thomas

This essay discusses the lack of any discernible attempt by the bench in the NJAC Case to read down the provisions of the 99th Amendment to the Constitution of India. This essay argues that neither the overwhelming majority with which the Amendment was passed in Parliament, nor the Court’s own precedent, where it has inclined towards reading down amendments came to the aid of the 99th Amendment. This essay also argues how the mere apprehension of abuse of power by the eminent persons or the Law Minister ought not to have been deemed sufficient to invalidate a constitutional amendment. In parting, the author provides some thoughts and recommendations, to both legislators and courts on how to ensure that future constitutional amendments do not meet the fate of the 99th Amendment, and receive the respect they deserve.


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