Judicial Review and Parliamentary Power

Author(s):  
K.T. Thomas

This essay discusses the lack of any discernible attempt by the bench in the NJAC Case to read down the provisions of the 99th Amendment to the Constitution of India. This essay argues that neither the overwhelming majority with which the Amendment was passed in Parliament, nor the Court’s own precedent, where it has inclined towards reading down amendments came to the aid of the 99th Amendment. This essay also argues how the mere apprehension of abuse of power by the eminent persons or the Law Minister ought not to have been deemed sufficient to invalidate a constitutional amendment. In parting, the author provides some thoughts and recommendations, to both legislators and courts on how to ensure that future constitutional amendments do not meet the fate of the 99th Amendment, and receive the respect they deserve.

Author(s):  
Sergey P. Kazankov

The article discusses the issue of the procedure for changing the Constitution of the Russian Federation. Examples of norms of foreign constitutions are given, which constitutionalists recognize as rigid constitutions in the order of their amendment. The ways of changing the Constitution of the Russian Federation are considered: revision, adoption of amendments, amendment of Art. 65Identified problems such as the form of the amendment to the Constitution, the moment of entry into force of the amendment, the introduction by the Law of the Russian Federation on the amendment to the Constitution of the Russian Federation of 2020 a nationwide vote as an additional condition for the entry into force of the amendment, as well as additional powers of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation to verify compliance with Chapters 1, 2 and 9 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation of the provisions of the Law of the Russian Federation on the amendment to the Constitution of the Russian Federation that have not entered into force, as well as the procedure for the entry into force of Art. 1 of the Amendment Act. The critical notes are offered. In particular, the author comes to the conclusion that the approval of the constitutional amendment by the parliaments of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation is not a moment, but a condition for its entry into force, therefore, the law on the amendment cannot introduce additional conditions for the entry into force of constitutional amendments, since this leads to a violation requirements of Art. 136 of the Constitution, which cannot be amended by the federal parliament in the manner prescribed by chapter 9 of the Constitution.


2020 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 19-48
Author(s):  
Yaniv Roznai ◽  
Tamar Hostovsky Brandes

AbstractThe world is experiencing a crisis of constitutional democracies. Populist leaders are abusing constitutional mechanisms, such as formal procedures of constitutional change, in order to erode the democratic order. The changes are, very often, gradual, incremental, and subtle. Each constitutional change, on its own, may not necessarily amount to a serious violation of essential democratic values. Yet, when examined in the context of an ongoing process, such constitutional changes may prove to be part of the incremental, gradual process of democratic erosion in which the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. This Article explores how courts can respond to such constitutional changes. We argue the Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendment Doctrine should be adapted to respond to existing constitutional practices that utilize incremental and subtle amendments to dismantle the democratic order. We suggest that an aggregated judicial review should be developed. We must also rethink the automatic immunity – the result of two hundred years of revolutionary constitutional theory – provided to complete constitutional replacement from constitutional restrictions and scrutiny. Finally, as opposed to the instinct to require judicial self-restraint with respect to constitutional changes that concern the judiciary itself, we suggest that this is perhaps the type of changes that require strictest scrutiny.


2021 ◽  
pp. 166-188
Author(s):  
Linares Cantillo

This chapter illustrates the Colombian Constitutional Court's explicit and implicit powers to undertake the judicial review of constitutional amendments. It begins by describing and analysing the 'explicit' procedural limits of the Colombian 1991 Constitution and the doctrine about the implicit unamendability. Through a quantitative analysis of both types of judicial review, the chapter demonstrates how the two approaches have developed in Colombia, and how in that context, there is an inverse relationship between the claims based on implicit limits (increasing behaviour) and those of explicit limits (decreasing behaviour). It then sheds some insights on the discretion that judges deploy when enforcing these implicit limits. The chapter raises some criticism on the fact that the Colombian Court does not have a clear interpretation on its own competence and scope to review constitutional amendments. It also claims that the excessive use of the doctrine of implicit unamendability has the undesired effect of focusing only in these principles, thus 'relaxing' procedural judicial review, giving the idea of less strict examination of the compliance with the rules governing the constitutional amendment process, and thus decreasing the quality in deliberation.


Author(s):  
О. В. Бойко

The scientific article identifies the peculiarities of appealing the decisions, actions or omissions of public administration subjects on the provision of public services at the stage of initiation and preparation for judicial review of an administrative case. The author substantiates the feasibility of improving the legal regulation of the procedure for holding a preliminary hearing before the court hearing of the case. In particular, it is considered expedient to set the terms of the preparatory meeting from the moment of receipt of the administrative claim, as well as to determine the cases when the parties are not reconciled.It is established that the preliminary stage of the court hearing often ends with the conclusion of the preliminary proceedings and the appointment of the case to trial in the field of public services. This is not against the law. However, it should be borne in mind that in accordance with Art. 121 of the CAS of Ukraine such a decision is delivered by the consequences of preparatory proceedings, not the previous court hearing. Obviously, preparatory proceedings are not limited to, and do not always end at, a previous court hearing. Preparation may continue after a preliminary hearing. Therefore, the decision to close the preliminary proceedings and assign the case to trial after the consequences of the previous court hearing can only be made if the judge has taken all the measures necessary to hear the case. If during a previous court hearing in the field of public services, to which all persons involved in the case have arrived, the issues necessary for its consideration have been resolved, then, with the written consent of these persons, a court hearing may be initiated on the same day. In this case, the termination order is also delivered.


2018 ◽  
Vol 33 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Chuks Okpaluba

‘Accountability’ is one of the democratic values entrenched in the Constitution of South Africa, 1996. It is a value recognised throughout the Constitution and imposed upon the law-making organs of state, the Executive, the Judiciary and all public functionaries. This constitutional imperative is given pride of place among the other founding values: equality before the law, the rule of law and the supremacy of the Constitution. This study therefore sets out to investigate how the courts have grappled with the interpretation and application of the principle of accountability, the starting point being the relationship between accountability and judicial review. Therefore, in the exercise of its judicial review power, a court may enquire whether the failure of a public functionary to comply with a constitutional duty of accountability renders the decision made illegal, irrational or unreasonable. One of the many facets of the principle of accountability upon which this article dwells is to ascertain how the courts have deployed that expression in making the state and its agencies liable for the delictual wrongs committed against an individual in vindication of a breach of the individual’s constitutional right in the course of performing a public duty. Here, accountability and breach of public duty; the liability of the state for detaining illegal immigrants contrary to the prescripts of the law; the vicarious liability of the state for the criminal acts of the police and other law-enforcement officers (as in police rape cases and misuse of official firearms by police officers), and the liability of the state for delictual conduct in the context of public procurement are discussed. Having carefully analysed the available case law, this article concludes that no public functionary can brush aside the duty of accountability wherever it is imposed without being in breach of a vital constitutional mandate. Further, it is the constitutional duty of the courts, when called upon, to declare such act or conduct an infringement of the Constitution.


2019 ◽  
Vol 67 (4) ◽  
pp. 899-930
Author(s):  
Han-Ru Zhou

Abstract Principles form part and parcel of our law and legal discourse, so much so that we seldom think of what they are and what they entail. For centuries they have been invoked daily to interpret and argue about the law. But when it comes to matters of constitutional law, principles are further called upon to perform a perennially controversial function: to help police the boundaries of state action. In most common law jurisdictions with a written constitution, this function of principles runs against the generally accepted view that the exercise of judicial review must ultimately be governed and restricted by the terms of the national constitution. This Article argues that the exercise of judicial review based on principles is not confined to that view, once the relationship between principles and the constitution is unpacked and recontextualized. While the English-language literature on principles over the past half-century has been dominated by a select group of Anglo-American scholars, there is a wealth of untapped insights from other parts of the world. One of the major contributions by continental legal theorists even predates the earliest modern Anglo-American writings on the subject by more than a decade. Overall, the law literature in common law and civil law systems reveals a significant degree of commonalities in the basic characters of principles despite the absence of initial evidence of transsystemic borrowings. The wider conceptual inquiry also displays a shift in the focus of the debate, from the protracted search for a clear-cut distinction between rules and principles towards a redefinition of principles’ relationship with “written” law, be it in the form of a civil code or a constitutional instrument. From this inquiry reemerge “unwritten” principles not deriving from codified or legislated law although they have been used to develop the law. Translated into the constitutional domain, these unwritten principles bear no logical connection with the terms of the constitution. Their main functions cover the entire spectrum from serving as interpretive aids to making law by filling gaps. The theoretical framework fits with an ongoing four-century-old narrative of the evolution of constitutional principles and judicial review across most common law-based systems. Constitutional principles are another area where Anglo-American law and legal discourse is less exceptional and more universal than what many assume. Throughout modern Western history, legal battles have been fought and ensuing developments have been made on the grounds of principles. Our law and jurisprudence remain based on them.


1994 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 40-72 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jane Sherron de Hart

“ERA Won't Go Away!” The words were chanted at rallies and unfurled on banners at countless marches as the deadline—June 30, 1982—approached for ratification of the Equal Rights Amendment. To include in the Constitution the principle of equality of rights for women, supporters insisted, was an essential of republican government in a democratic society. Congress had shared that perception in 1972, passing a series of measures aimed at strengthening and expanding federal legislation banning discrimination on the basis of sex. Included was a constitutional amendment simply stating that “Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or any state on account of sex.” Thirty-five of the thirty-eight states necessary for a three-fourths majority needed to amend the Constitution had given their approval.


1991 ◽  
Vol 12 (x) ◽  
pp. 61-82
Author(s):  
Richard Cicchillo

For Americans, long accustomed to judicial review of the law, the traditional absence of a similar system of constitutional control in France comes as a surprise. Closer examination however, reveals that the French politico-historico-judicial tradition inherited from the Ancien Régime and the Revolution of 1789 is deeply opposed to the development of "government by the judges." Why did the Revolution react against the judiciary? How has the idea of constitutional control evolved in modern France? What are the possible sources of legitimacy for an institution (the Conseil constitutionnel) and a concept (judicial review) cut off from the sanction of tradition? What is the future of the Conseil?


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