scholarly journals A two-echelon supply chain model with price and warranty dependent demand and pro-rata warranty policy under cost sharing contract

2021 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 47-75
Author(s):  
Biswarup Samanta ◽  
◽  
Bibhas Chandra Giri ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Numerical Study ◽  
Chain Model ◽  
Selling Price ◽  
Market Demand ◽  
Warranty Period ◽  
Supply Chain Model ◽  
Warranty Cost ◽  
Parameter Values

In this article, a two-echelon supply chain model with a single-vendor a single-buyer is considered. The vendor's production process is imperfect and the market demand is assumed to be dependent on the buyer's selling price and warranty period. The vendor consents to return a definite portion of the buyer's purchase value, if any product is found defective within the length of warranty. The refund value or the warranty cost is considered as a function of the warranty period and the buyer's selling price of the item. This warranty cost is assumed to be fully borne by the vendor in the first model (Model I) while in the second model (Model II), it is assumed that the buyer agrees to bear a portion of the warranty cost. The proposed models are solved under decentralized scenario. We also derive and optimize the average total profit of the supply chain in order to obtain the optimal decisions of the centralized model. We consider a Stackelberg game between the vendor and the buyer in the decentralized scenario, where the vendor is assumed to be the leader and the buyer as the pursuer. Through numerical study, it is observed that, with respect to all the key decisions of the models, Model II provides better outcomes than Model I. Sensitivity analysis is also carried out to examine the impacts of changes of parameter-values on the optimum decisions.

scholarly journals Supply Chain Decisions and Coordination under the Combined Effect of Overconfidence and Fairness Concern

Complexity ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-16
Author(s):  
Zhang Zhijian ◽  
Peng Wang ◽  
Miyu Wan ◽  
Junhua Guo ◽  
Jian Liu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Supply Chain Coordination ◽  
Joint Effect ◽  
Optimal Order ◽  
Chain Model ◽  
Order Quantity ◽  
Supply Chain Model ◽  
Fairness Concerns ◽  
Fairness Concern

The purpose of this study was to examine the joint effect of overconfidence and fairness concern on supply chain decisions and design contracts to achieve a win-win situation within the supply chain. For this study, a centralized supply chain model was established without considering the retailers’ overconfidence and fairness concern. Furthermore, the retailers’ overconfidence and fairness concerns were introduced into the decentralized supply chain, while the Stackelberg game model between the manufacturer and the retailer was built. Furthermore, an innovative supply chain contract, i.e., buyback contract, with promotional cost sharing was designed to achieve supply chain coordination along with overconfidence and fairness concern. Finally, a numerical analysis was also conducted to analyze the effect of overconfidence, fairness concern, and the validity of the contract. The principal findings of the study include the positive correlation between retailers’ overconfidence and optimal order quantity, sales effort, expected utility, and profit. Although the order quantity and sales efforts were not affected by the fairness concern of the retailer, the contract achieved coordination with a win-win outcome when the level of overconfidence and fairness concern was moderate.

scholarly journals Optimal Pricing and Ordering Policy for Two Echelon Varying Production Inventory System

2014 ◽  
Vol 2014 ◽  
pp. 1-11 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brojeswar Pal ◽  
Shib Sankar Sana ◽  
Kripasindhu Chaudhuri
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Raw Materials ◽  
Chain Model ◽  
Selling Price ◽  
Lot Size ◽  
Ordering Policy ◽  
Supply Chain Model ◽  
Production Inventory ◽  
Test Feasibility ◽  
Optimal Ordering

The paper proposes a two-stage supply chain model for price sensitive demand in imperfect production system while manufacturer and supplier are the members of the chain. The supplier screens the raw materials first and supplies good materials to the manufacturer at a constant rate. The production rate varies randomly within a finite interval. The inventory cycle of the manufacturer starts with shortages and production and it finishes with shortages again, in which shortages are partially backlogged. We consider a mixture of LIFO (last in, first out) and FIFO (first in, first out) dispatching policies to fill the backlogged demand. Thus, the objective of the proposed paper is to determine the optimal ordering lot-size and selling price of the manufacturer such that the per unit average integrated expected profit of the supply chain model is maximized. A numerical example is provided to analyze and illustrate the behavior and application of the model. Finally, sensitivity analysis of the key parameters are presented to test feasibility of the model.

scholarly journals Pricing Strategies of a Three-Stage Supply Chain: A New Research in the Big Data Era

2017 ◽  
Vol 2017 ◽  
pp. 1-16
Author(s):  
Pan Liu
Keyword(s):  
Big Data ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Chain Model ◽  
Pricing Strategies ◽  
Supply Chain Model ◽  
Investment Cost ◽  
New Research ◽  
New Situation ◽  
Big Data Technology

In the Big Data era, Data Company as the Big Data information (BDI) supplier should be included in a supply chain. In the new situation, to research the pricing strategies of supply chain, a three-stage supply chain with one manufacturer, one retailer, and one Data Company was chosen. Meanwhile, considering the manufacturer contained the internal and external BDI, four benefit models about BDI investment were proposed and analyzed in both decentralized and centralized supply chain using Stackelberg game. Meanwhile, the optimal retail price and benefits in the four models were compared. Findings are as follows. (1) The industry cost improvement coefficient, the internal BDI investment cost of the manufacturer, and the added cost of the Data Company on using Big Data technology have different relationships with the optimal prices of supply chain members in different models. (2) In the retailer-dominated supply chain model, the optimal benefits of the retailer and the manufacturer are the same, and the optimal benefits of the Data Company are biggest in all the members.

Non-Cooperative Game Theoretic Approach in Supply Chain With Imperfect Quality Items and Credit Financing

2018 ◽  
pp. 215-232
Author(s):  
Rita Yadav ◽  
Sarla Pareek ◽  
Mandeep Mittal
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Decision Variable ◽  
Chain Model ◽  
Selling Price ◽  
Theoretic Approach ◽  
Credit Period ◽  
Imperfect Quality ◽  
Inspection Process ◽  
Credit Financing

This paper considers a supply chain model for imperfect quality items in which retail price of the buyer influences the demand of the product. The seller offers fix credit period for the buyer to stimulate his sales. Each delivered lot, goes through an inspection process at the buyer's end. After the inspection, items are separated into two parts, one is perfect quality items and another is imperfect quality items. The perfect quality items are sold at selling price and the imperfect items are sold at a discounted price immediately after the inspection process. The credit period offered by the seller and the selling price of the seller, both are considered as a decision variable. Relationship between seller and buyer is derived from the non-cooperative Seller- Stackelberg game approach. Optimal selling price, credit period and order quantity are determined by maximizing expected total profit of the supply chain. At the end, numerical examples with sensitivity analysis are given to explain the theory of the paper.

scholarly journals Effects of Variable Production Rate and Time-Dependent Holding Cost for Complementary Products in Supply Chain Model

2017 ◽  
Vol 2017 ◽  
pp. 1-13 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mitali Sarkar ◽  
Sun Hur ◽  
Biswajit Sarkar
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Production Rate ◽  
Graphical Representation ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Time Dependent ◽  
Chain Model ◽  
Complementary Products ◽  
Supply Chain Model ◽  
Holding Cost ◽  
Variable Production

Recently, a major trend is going to redesign a production system by controlling or making variable the production rate within some fixed interval to maintain the optimal level. This strategy is more effective when the holding cost is time-dependent as it is interrelated with holding duration of products and rate of production. An effort is made to make a supply chain model (SCM) to show the joint effect of variable production rate and time-varying holding cost for specific type of complementary products, where those products are made by two different manufacturers and a common retailer makes them bundle and sells bundles to end customers. Demand of each product is specified by stochastic reservation prices with a known potential market size. Those players of the SCM are considered with unequal power. Stackelberg game approach is employed to obtain global optimum solution of the model. An illustrative numerical example, graphical representation, and managerial insights are given to illustrate the model. Results prove that variable production rate and time-dependent holding cost save more than existing literature.

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