scholarly journals The cognitive foundations of misinformation on science

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Antoine Marie ◽  
Sacha Altay ◽  
Brent Strickland
Keyword(s):  
Belief Formation ◽  
Naive Theories ◽  
Myside Bias ◽  
Scientific Expertise ◽  
Cognitive Foundations

Populated by many misleading naïve theories, a difficulty understanding the foundations of scientific expertise and conversely, a tendency to trust one’s own intuitions too much and ignore one’s own ignorance, a built-in myside bias, paranoid tendencies, a propensity to simplify when remembering and to exaggerate when communicating, and so forth, the human mind’s evolved complexion is, to say the least, little predisposed to form accurate scientific beliefs. But this needs not be the end of the story, as many of those cognitive proclivities can, under certain conditions, be leveraged to favor accurate belief formation.

Response to “The Narrative Turn and Psychology” (A Review of Narrative Impact: Social and Cognitive Foundations)

PsycCRITIQUES ◽  
2005 ◽  
Vol 50 (18) ◽  
Author(s):  
Melanie C. Green ◽  
Jeffrey J. Strange ◽  
Timothy C. Brock
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Foundations

Tenth Graders' Naive Theories of the Seasons

2001 ◽  
Author(s):  
Darrell S. Rudmann ◽  
William F. Brewer
Keyword(s):  
Tenth Graders ◽  
Naive Theories

Interpreting encoding fluency: How naive theories of intelligence influence JOLs

2009 ◽  
Author(s):  
David B. Miele ◽  
Bridgid Finn ◽  
Daniel C. Molden ◽  
Janet Metcalfe
Keyword(s):  
Theories Of Intelligence ◽  
Naive Theories

Science, Politics, and the Pandemic

2020 ◽  
Vol 119 (820) ◽  
pp. 303-309
Author(s):  
J. Nicholas Ziegler
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Biomedical Research ◽  
Scale Up ◽  
Political Leadership ◽  
The United States ◽  
Scientific Advice ◽  
The United Kingdom ◽  
Effective Policy ◽  
Scientific Expertise ◽  
The Uk

Comparing the virus responses in Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States shows that in order for scientific expertise to result in effective policy, rational political leadership is required. Each of these three countries is known for advanced biomedical research, yet their experiences in the COVID-19 pandemic diverged widely. Germany’s political leadership carefully followed scientific advice and organized public–private partnerships to scale up testing, resulting in relatively low infection levels. The UK and US political responses were far more erratic and less informed by scientific advice—and proved much less effective.

Intuitions and Arguments: Cognitive Foundations of Argumentation in Natural Theology

2017 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 57-82 ◽  
Author(s):  
Helen De Cruz ◽  
Johan De Smedt
Keyword(s):  
Social Context ◽  
Raw Materials ◽  
Natural Theology ◽  
The Social ◽  
Social Theories ◽  
Cognitive Foundations

This paper examines the cognitive foundations of natural theology: the intuitions that provide the raw materials for religious arguments, and the social context in which they are defended or challenged. We show that the premises on which natural theological arguments are based rely on intuitions that emerge early in development, and that underlie our expectations for everyday situations, e.g., about how causation works, or how design is recognized. In spite of the universality of these intuitions, the cogency of natural theological arguments remains a matter of continued debate. To understand why they are controversial, we draw on social theories of reasoning and argumentation.

Consciousness, Metacognition, & Perceptual Reality Monitoring

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hakwan Lau
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Justification ◽  
Order Theory ◽  
Higher Order ◽  
Belief Formation ◽  
Reality Monitoring ◽  
Conscious Perception ◽  
Brute Fact ◽  
Higher Order Theory ◽  
Subjective Level

I introduce an empirically-grounded version of a higher-order theory of conscious perception. Traditionally, theories of consciousness either focus on the global availability of conscious information, or take conscious phenomenology as a brute fact due to some biological or basic representational properties. Here I argue instead that the key to characterizing the consciousness lies in its connections to belief formation and epistemic justification on a subjective level.

Why do children essentialize social groups?

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gil Diesendruck
Keyword(s):  
Group Identity ◽  
Social Groups ◽  
Young Age ◽  
Intergroup Attitudes ◽  
Need To Belong ◽  
Attitudes And Behaviors ◽  
And Behaviors ◽  
Cognitive Foundations

The tendency to essentialize social groups is universal, and arises early in development. This tendency is associated with negative intergroup attitudes and behaviors, and has thus encouraged the search for remedies for the emergence of essentialism. In this vein, great attention has been devoted to uncovering the cognitive foundations of essentialism. In this chapter, I suggest that attention should also be turned towards the motivational foundations of essentialism. I propose that considerations of power and group identity, but especially a “need to belong”, may encourage children’s essentialization of social groups. Namely, from a young age, children are keen to feel members of a group, and that their membership is secure and exclusive. Essentialism is the conceptual gadget that satisfies these feelings. And to the extent that groups are defined by what they do, this motivated essentialism also impels children to be adamant about the maintenance of unique group behaviors.

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