scholarly journals The Issue of Proxies, And why EU law matters for recommender systems

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mireille Hildebrandt

Recommendations are meant to increase sales or ad revenue, as these are the first priority of those who pay for them. As recommender systems match their recommendations with inferred preferences, we should not be surprised if the algorithm optimises for lucrative preferences and thus co-produces the preferences they mine. This relates to the well-known problem of feedback loops, filter bubbles and echo chambers. In this article I will discuss the implications of the fact that computing systems necessarily work with proxies when inferring recommendations and raise a number of questions about whether recommender systems actually do what they are claimed to do, while also analysing the often perverse economic incentive structures that have a major impact on relevant design decisions. Finally, I will explain how the GDPR and the proposed AI Act will help to break through various vicious circles, by constraining how people may be targeted (GDPR) and by requiring documented evidence of the robustness, resilience, reliability and the responsible design and use of high risk recommender systems (AI Act).

Author(s):  
Robert E. Goodin ◽  
Kai Spiekermann

This chapter reflects on the election of Donald Trump and the vote of the British electorate in favour of ‘Brexit’ from the European Union. While we refrain from judging the outcomes of these votes, we do discuss concerns pertaining to the lack of truthfulness in both campaigns. After rehearsing the lies on which the Trump and Brexit campaigns were based, we consider different explanations as to why these campaigns were nevertheless successful, and where this leaves the argument for epistemic democracy. Particularly worrisome are tendencies towards ‘epistemic insouciance’, ‘epistemic malevolence’, and ‘epistemic agnosticism’. We also consider the problematic influence of social media in terms of echo chambers and filter bubbles. The core argument in favour of epistemic democracy is that the pooling of votes by majority rule has epistemically beneficial properties, assuming certain conditions. If these assumptions are not met, or are systematically corrupted, then epistemic democracy is under threat.


2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 141-148 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gabriele Giacomini

This viewpoint makes a theoretical effort to label the organization of the virtual sphere under new concepts: ‘encastellation’ and the ‘paradox of pluralism’. The former is a metaphorical synthesis of already-known concepts (selective exposure, polarization, homophily, echo chambers and filter bubbles). In the second case, we emphasize the existence of a ‘paradox of online pluralism’: the internet has increased the possibility for everyone to make their voice heard (in quantitative terms), but at the same time it appears to also be increasing the distance between voices, putting in jeopardy the achievement of the aims of the pluralist political system (in qualitative terms). In conclusion, we express doubts about the feasibility of the deliberative vision of democracy in the current virtual sphere.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jens Bülte

Therefore, we may say in conclusion that the criminal liability of an official veterinarian who issues a certificate despite recognising the possibility that if transport takes place animals will suffer actions that fall under the conditions set out by § 17 No. 2a or No. 2b of the Animal Welfare Act, is not prevented by the principles of neutral aid or by the primacy of application of EU law (margin note 6-18)The principles of neutral aid are not applicable to the official veterinarian who is on watch for the protection of transported animals because approval of transport associated with wrongdoing is not a neutral action but eo ipso an action that is dangerous to the legal interest. Furthermore, his action is not subject to the protection of occupational freedom defined by the Basic Law in such a way that a restriction of criminal liability for aiding and abetting would be necessary or make sense. In fact, it would be contrary to the spirit and purpose of state control in terms of animal protection as a constitutional value (margin note 19-37).The primacy of application of European law does not limit criminal liability because even the interpretation of the regulations of the animal transport ordinance means that in a case where animal cruelty at the destination is suspected it is not only that no approval has to be granted but that no approval may be granted. EU law provides an unambiguous prohibition of any cooperation on the part of veterinary authorities in such transport (margin note 38-66).The arguments stated so far by the administrative courts supporting a duty to issue a preliminary certificate do not have sufficient validity, and they lead to a contradiction between criminal law and administrative law due to an artificially isolated view of the coherent life situation. There is, on the basis of EU law and constitutional law, no right to the issue of a preliminary certificate to carry out transport within the country for the purpose of circumventing regulatory safeguards against transport to countries that have a high risk in terms of animal welfare and which would therefore give rise to a concrete danger of animal cruelty in the country of destination or during transport (margin note 67-98).A veterinarian who issues such a preliminary certificate is liable to prosecution due to aiding and abetting animal cruelty abroad if actions are committed during transport to a country with high risk in terms of animal welfare or at the time of slaughter that are punishable under German law. This applies even if he is acting under the impression of current case law of the administrative courts because although in these decisions the question of criminal liability for cooperation in Germany for animal cruelty abroad is called into doubt (without valid reason), it is not denied. It is true that the veterinarian has impunity if he issues a preliminary certificate on the basis of a court order because he will then be acting on the basis of a court order that justifies his action. However, the possible criminal liability of a transporter due to aiding and abetting animal cruelty abroad and also of his legal adviser in the individual case who obtains the permits in court required for the transport remains unaffected by this.


Author(s):  
Jeremy J. Michalek ◽  
Panos Y. Papalambros ◽  
Steven J. Skerlos

A methodology is presented for studying the effects of automobile emission policies on the design decisions of profit-seeking automobile producers in a free-entry oligopoly market. The study does not attempt to model short-term decisions of specific producers. Instead, mathematical models of engineering performance, consumer demand, cost, and competition are integrated to predict the effects of design decisions on manufacturing cost, demand, and producer profit. Game theory is then used to predict vehicle designs that producers would have economic incentive to produce at market equilibrium under several policy scenarios. The methodology is illustrated with three policy alternatives for the small car market: corporate average fuel economy (CAFE) regulations, carbon dioxide emissions taxes, and diesel fuel vehicle quotas. Interesting results are derived, for example, it is predicted that in some cases a stiffer regulatory penalty can result in lower producer costs because of competition. This mathematical formulation establishes a link between engineering design, business, and marketing through an integrated optimization model that is used to provide insight necessary to make informed environmental policy.


2021 ◽  
pp. 389-409
Author(s):  
Hanna Gunn ◽  
Michael Patrick Lynch

In this chapter, Hanna Gunn and Michael Patrick Lynch examine the connection between epistemic agency and the internet. They identify two conditions that are true of responsible epistemic agency: first, responsible epistemic agents aim to develop epistemic virtues, merit, and capacities that help them to responsibly change their epistemic environment, as well as the capacities that enable them to recognize and respect these epistemic traits in others. Second, responsible epistemic agents treat other epistemic agents with a form of respect that demonstrates a willingness to learn from them. Gunn and Lynch then show that the ways in which the internet makes information more widely available can also undermine our ability to be responsible epistemic agents. For instance, the personalization of online spaces can unwittingly lead users into echo chambers and filter-bubbles and away from a diverse range of perspectives, and fake news and information pollution can make for a hostile online epistemic environment.


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