The role of the Supreme Court in the practice of Canadian federalism, specifically the extent of its power and the effects of that power, is a hotly contested issue in Canadian political science. While some scholars have argued that the Court has taken on too political of a role that must be restricted, this paper develops the Court as a constitutional ‘umpire,’ whose rulings serve the important, but limited, functions of allocating political resources to incentivize negotiation, and establishing jurisdictional boundaries for said negotiations, leaving specific policy decisions to political, as opposed to legal, actors. Concerning the net outcome of the Court’s jurisprudence on the distribution of legislative powers, this paper illustrates the Court’s overall balancing approach, with grants of power to one level of government met with increases in authority to the other, in all major policy areas. Thus, ultimately shown to embrace both a limited and impartial approach to constitutional adjudication, the Court has done much to enhance its democratic legitimacy and constitutional utility.