Uncertain Accommodation: Aboriginal Identity and Group Rights in the Supreme Court of Canada

2018 ◽  
Vol 99 (4) ◽  
pp. 657-658
Author(s):  
Ryan Beaton
2009 ◽  
Vol 42 (4) ◽  
pp. 957-979 ◽  
Author(s):  
Caroline Dick

Abstract.In revisiting Michael Murphy's critique of the cultural test adopted by the Supreme Court of Canada to interpret Aboriginal rights, this article takes up the suggestion that the works of Charles Taylor and Will Kymlicka support an inherent understanding of Aboriginal rights. An assessment of the jurisprudence suggests that the Court's approach reflects, rather than contradicts, Taylor's and Kymlicka's rights frameworks, which invoke the same discourse of culture and identity embraced by the Court. The article also contends that the role played by culture in Canada's Aboriginal rights jurisprudence extends well beyond the cultural rationale adopted by the Court.Résumé.En revisitant la critique de Michael Murphy sur l'examen culturel adopté par la Court Suprême du Canada dans l'interprétation des droits indigènes, cet article adopte la suggestion que les travaux de Charles Taylor et Kymlicka supportent une définition inhérente des droits indigènes. Une évaluation de la jurisprudence suggère que la position de la cour reflète, plutôt que contredit, l'approche des droits mise en avant par Taylor et Kymlicka. Celle-ci, en effet accepte le même discours culturel et identitaire que la court. L'article affirme également que le rôle joué par la culture dans la jurisprudence Canadienne sur les droits indigènes se prolonge bien au delà du raisonnement culturel adopté par la court.


2021 ◽  
Vol 30 (5) ◽  
pp. 118-137
Author(s):  
Tatiana Vasilieva ◽  

This article explores the evolution of the Supreme Court of Canada’s approach to the application of the concept of human dignity in constitutional equality cases. Traditionally, in human rights cases, this concept serves only to strengthen the argument, to show that the violation affects the person’s intrinsic worth. It is only in Canada and in South Africa that there is experience in applying the concept as a criterion for identifying discrimination. In 1999, in Law v. Canada, the Supreme Court recognized the purpose of Article 15(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms of 1982 to be the protection of human dignity and stated that discrimination must be established based on assessment of the impact of a program or law on human dignity. However, in 2008, in R. v. Kapp, the Court noted that the application of the concept of human dignity creates difficulties and places an additional burden of prove on the plaintiff. It is no coincidence that victims of discrimination have preferred to seek protection before human rights tribunals and commissions, where the dignity-based test is not used. Subsequently, the Supreme Court of Canada rejected the use of the concept of human dignity as a criterion for identifying discrimination. The unsuccessful experience of applying the concept of human dignity as legal test has demonstrated that not every theoretically correct legal construction is effective in adjudication.


2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 25-39
Author(s):  
Vera Rusinova ◽  
Olga Ganina

The article analyses the Judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada on the Nevsun v. Araya case, which deals with the severe violations of human rights, including slavery and forced labor with respect of the workers of Eritrean mines owned by a Canadian company “Nevsun”. By a 5 to 4 majority, the court concluded that litigants can seek compensation for the violations of international customs committed by a company. This decision is underpinned by the tenets that international customs form a part of Canadian common law, companies can bear responsibility for violations of International Human Rights Law, and under ubi jus ibi remedium principle plaintiffs have a right to receive compensation under national law. Being a commentary to this judgment the article focuses its analysis on an issue that is of a key character for Public International Law, namely on the tenet that international customs impose obligations to respect human rights on companies and they can be called for responsibility for these violations. This conclusion is revolutionary in the part in which it shifts the perception of the companies’ legal status under International Law. The court’s approach is critically assessed against its well-groundness and correspondence to the current stage of International law. In particular, the authors discuss, whether the legal stance on the Supreme Court of Canada, under which companies can bear responsibility for violations of International Human Rights Law is a justified necessity or a head start.


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