The concept of human dignity in the case-law of the Supreme Court of Canada on Charter Equality Rights

This article explores the evolution of the Supreme Court of Canada’s approach to the application of the concept of human dignity in constitutional equality cases. Traditionally, in human rights cases, this concept serves only to strengthen the argument, to show that the violation affects the person’s intrinsic worth. It is only in Canada and in South Africa that there is experience in applying the concept as a criterion for identifying discrimination. In 1999, in Law v. Canada, the Supreme Court recognized the purpose of Article 15(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms of 1982 to be the protection of human dignity and stated that discrimination must be established based on assessment of the impact of a program or law on human dignity. However, in 2008, in R. v. Kapp, the Court noted that the application of the concept of human dignity creates difficulties and places an additional burden of prove on the plaintiff. It is no coincidence that victims of discrimination have preferred to seek protection before human rights tribunals and commissions, where the dignity-based test is not used. Subsequently, the Supreme Court of Canada rejected the use of the concept of human dignity as a criterion for identifying discrimination. The unsuccessful experience of applying the concept of human dignity as legal test has demonstrated that not every theoretically correct legal construction is effective in adjudication.

State of emergency in Poland: constitutional regulation and “hybrid” nature during the COVID-19 pandemic

The COVID-19 pandemic became widespread across the world throughout 2020 and 2021 in an emergency that gravely impacted the health and lives of people around the world. States have taken exceptional measures to combat the pandemic, including controversial decisions to introduce emergency regimes, which have been questioned in regards to their compliance with constitutional regulations. The fight against the COVID-19 pandemic requires special measures, however they must remain within the constitutional framework. Consequently, the pandemic and its effect upon the legality of regimes in a state of emergency has captured the attention of legal scholars. The aim of this study is to analyse the constitutional regulation of the state of emergency in the Republic of Poland which was introduced in the country during the COVID-19 pandemic. In Poland, an emergency regime was introduced following an order by the Minister of Health. However the state of emergency (here, natural disaster) as stated by the Constitution was not introduced, although, according to analysts, some state bodies and officials had confirmed that all the necessary conditions for this were met. On 2 March 2020, the so-called Special Law on Coronavirus was adopted, followed by other regulations to fight the pandemic. These analysts stated that the measures introduced by the new acts corresponded to a legal regime containing the constitutional characteristics of a state of emergency, but lacked the appropriate constitutional procedure for their introduction. Presidential elections were held at this time, however legally they cannot be held during a state of emergency, as it indicates the presence of political interests in the choice of the regime. The unconstitutional procedure of the introduction of emergency measures alongside their characteristics of the state of emergency make it possible to consider the epidemic regime introduced in Poland a “hybrid” state of emergency, which is not detailed by the Constitution or legislation. On this basis, the study concludes that reasons behind the unconstitutional response to the COVID-19 pandemic in Poland can be found in both the Constitution, and in the manifestations of the crisis of the constitutional and legal system, which began with the reform of Poland’s Constitutional Tribunal by the ruling Law and Justice party in 2015.

Emergency powers of the authorities of the constituent units of the federation (states) in Russia, the USA and Brazil amid the spread of a new coronavirus infection

Due to the new coronavirus pandemic, high alert regimes were introduced across the Russian Federation in spring 2020. These emergency regimes were established exclusively by the state bodies of the Russian Federation’s constituent units – federal authorities did not introduce their own emergency regimes. This decentralized strategy of fighting the pandemic was also introduced by the USA and Brazil. Their states, without the sanction of the federal government, and in the case of Brazil, ignoring its bans, set emergency restrictions similar to those in Russia. The legal regulation of emergency regimes existed before 2020, when constituent units of the federation (states) actively used their emergency powers. However, the regimes introduced during the fight against the pandemic were slightly different to previous ones. The restrictions on rights and freedoms within these regimes were so severe that not only their proportionality was questioned, but there were also doubts as to whether the regional level of the government had the authority to establish such strict restrictions. In addition, the pandemic exposed old problems and revealed new shortcomings in the legal regulation of emergency regimes: lack of control over the realization of the emergency regime by legislative (representative) authorities, and gaps in legislative regulation – notably in the establishment of possible restrictions and of a mechanism for scrutinizing their proportionality. All this raised questions about the proportionality of the established restrictions. The Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation resolved a very insignificant amount of the problems. While the United States and Brazil faced similar issues, the practice of scrutinizing implemented restrictions in these countries was more common. This article takes domestic and foreign experiences into account, while examining certain aspects of the establishment and the operation of regional emergency regimes.

The rights of the defendant and public interest in proving insanity under the law of New York

Allocation of the burden of proof is a key issue of criminal procedure that is affected by multiple legal and social factors. Under due process principles, the defendant’s right to a fair and impartial trial is deemed to be the epicenter of the whole structure. However, efficient law enforcement is a prominent public interest that must be considered. This article explores the correlation between public and private interest in proving insanity under the law of New York, which provides great empirical background due to its long history of legal disputes and legislative changes. Considering the nature and structure of the burden of proof, the author concludes that there are several principles for its fair allocation: the due party that bears both the burden and the risk of its nonperformance; the feasibility of the burden; the adequate opportunity for the other party to rebut; the concentration of resources upon needs that are not presumed but in fact exist. All the mentioned principles lay the ground for the harmonization of constitutional guaranties for the defendant as well as the successful enforcement of criminal law. The current New York approach to insanity defense as an affirmative one along with the history of its implementation tends to prove its compliance with such requirements. This finding suggests that bearing the burden shall not be treated as impairment by default, but can protect both the interest of this party and the integrity of the whole process.

Legal restrictions on the right of association in political parties and their interpretation in court decisions: comparative legal analysis

The article examines the issue of exercising the freedom of association in political parties in Russia in a comparative analysis with the leading democratic countries of the world. Modern democracies cannot be imagined without political parties, which are the representors of the interests of their voters in legislative bodies and local government bodies. The development of civil society and the entire political system in the country depends on how the freedom of association in political parties and the access of parties to participate in elections is realized. The development of legislation on political parties in the Russian Federation proceeded unevenly. In the first years after the adoption of the Constitution the legislative body did not introduce strict requirements for parties. The adoption of a special federal law on political parties in 2001 became a turning point in the development of the party system. The author identifies two large blocks of restrictions on the creation of parties. The first is legislative restrictions, the second is the restrictions that arise from the unfair activities of legislative and law enforcement agencies. In this work, legislative restrictions are compared with restrictions in other democracies, as well as based on legal positions developed by the European Court of Human Rights. The author comes to the opinion that some restrictions on the creation of parties are not necessary now, in the meantime they significantly narrow the possibilities of party creation and political competition. First, we are talking about a ban on the creation of regional parties. The Constitutional Court in its legal positions indicated that this restriction is temporary and will be lifted over time. Within the framework of this work, the author will give suggestions on changing the approach to the creation of political parties in Russia, which should affect the emergence of new strong parties at different levels of public authority. The author believes that a system of “controlled multiparty system” has developed in Russia, which is implemented both in changing the legislation on political parties based on the interests of the “party in power” and the practice of the registration body, which prevents the formation of new parties claiming to redistribute the existing distribution of forces. Based on the analysis of the legislation on political parties, law enforcement practice, decisions of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation, the ECHR and the legislation of foreign countries, the author proposes approaches to reforming the existing party system, which include small cosmetic changes and large-scale changes in approaches to the creation of parties.

Public hearings as an institution of deliberative democracy in major Russian and American cities

Currently, public hearings are one of the most widespread forms of deliberative municipal democracy in Russia. This high level of demand, combined with critique of legal regulations and the practices for bringing this system to reality – justified, in the meantime, by its development (for example, by the Agency for Strategic Initiatives and the Public Chambers of the Russian Federation) of proposals for the correction of corresponding elements of the legal code – make both the study of Russian experiences in this sphere and comparative studies of legal regulations and practical usage of public hearings in Russia and abroad extremely relevant. This article is an attempt to make a contribution to this field of scientific study. If the appearance of public hearings in Russia as an institution of Russian municipal law is connected with the passing of the Federal Law of 6 October 2003 No.131-FZ, “On the general organisational principles of local government in the Russian Federation,” then in the United States, this institution has existed since the beginning of the 20th century, with mass adoption beginning in the 1960s. In this time, the United States has accumulated significant practical experience in the use of public hearings and their legal formulation. Both countries are large federal states, with their own regional specifics and diversity, the presence of three levels of public authority and different principles of federalism, which cause differences in the legal regulation of municipal public hearings. For this reason, this article undertakes a comparative legal analysis of Russian and American experiences of legal regulation and practical use of public hearings, on the example of several major municipalities – the cities of Novosibirsk, Nizhny Novgorod, Voronezh and New York, Los Angeles, and Chicago. A comparison of laws influencing the public hearing processes in these cities is advisable, given the colossal growth in the role of city centers in the industrial and post-industrial eras. Cities in particular are the primary centers for economic growth, the spread of innovations, progressive public policy and the living environment for the majority of both Russian and American citizens. The cities under research are one of the largest municipalities in the two countries by population, and on such a scale, the problem of involving residents in solving local issues is especially acute. In this context, improving traditional institutions of public participation is a timely challenge for the legislator, and the experiences of these cities are worth describing. The unique Russian context for legal regulations of public hearings involves the combination of overarching federal law and specific municipal decrees that regulate the hearing process. There are usually two municipal acts regulating public hearings on general issues of the city district (charter, budget, etc.) and separately on urban planning. In the United States, the primary regulation of public hearings is assigned to the state and municipality level, with a whole series of corresponding laws and statutes; meanwhile, methodological recommendations play a specific role in the organisation of hearings, which are issued by the state department of a given state. It is proposed that regulating the corresponding relationships at the federal subject level will permit a combination of the best practices of legal administration with local nuances, thereby reinforcing the guarantee of the realization of civil rights to self-government. There are other features in the process of organizing and conducting public hearings in the United States, which, as shown in the article, can be perceived by Russian lawmakers as well in order to create an updated construct of public discussions at the local level.

Russian Federation: Opinion of the Venice Commission No.1014/2020 dated on 6 July 2021 on the Compatibility with international human rights standards of a series of Bills introduced to the Russian State Duma between 10 and 23 November 2020, to amend laws affecting “foreign agents”

In the adopted at the 127th plenary session Opinion Venice Commission analyzed the objectives and rationale for the legislative amendments to the laws affecting “foreign agents”; expanding the range of individuals and legal entities that can be designated as “foreign agents”; expansion of administrative requirements and restrictions for “foreign agents”; expansion of sanctions for violation of these requirements and restrictions. The Commission concluded that the adoption of these amendments constitutes a serious violation of fundamental human rights, including freedom of association and expression, the right to privacy, the right to participate in public affairs, and the principle of non-discrimination and expressed especial concern about the cumulative impact of the latest amendments on organizations, individuals, the media and civil society in general.

Supra-constitutional norms in constitutional law

The idea of supra-constitutionality was formulated in the science of constitutional law in the second quarter of the 20th century and associated with the names of M.Hauriou and K.Schmitt, who for the first time noticed the possibility of the existence of norms that are higher than the constitution. This article is an attempt to give the doctrine of supra-constitutionality an actual theoretical and dogmatic meaning in the context of the study of the material limits of constitutional changes. The doctrine of supra-constitutionality claims to play an important role in explaining that unchangeable norms can exist in constitutional law and that they cannot be excluded, changed, limited, overcome, affected by the other sources of constitutional law, including the constitution itself. Supra-constitutionality is viewed as a characteristic of unchangeable constitutional norms that constitute the material limits of constitutional changes. Supra-constitutionality presupposes the existence of norms that surpass the rest of the constitutional norms and predetermine their content through the definition of what can, should and should not be included in the constitution or excluded from it. The basis of constitutional supra-constitutionality is the argument of hierarchical differentiation. In addition to recognizing unchangeable constitutional norms as supra-constitutional, the article raises the question of the existence of natural law and international law supra-constitutional norms. Natural law supra-constitutional norms have an external and non-positive character. They are not enshrined in the constitution, but stem from a reasonably understood concept of what is due in the most civilized societies, which is determined by the constitutional court. International law supra-constitutionality is understood as the superiority of the norms of international law over the constitution. It has an external and positive character. International law supra-constitutionality can cause political objections from opponents of the absolute rule of international law. Supra-constitutional constitutional, natural and international law norms can come into conflict with each other. The paradox of the doctrine of supra-constitutionality lies in the fact that it creates a hierarchy of norms within the constitution itself, distinguishing between simple and supra-constitutional constitutional norms, or distinguishes certain non-positive norms that are outside the constitution, as having priority over the constitution, or puts some norms of international law over all norms of national law, including the constitution. The purpose of the doctrine of supra-constitutionality is to preserve the inviolable fundamental (natural or generally recognized) values, which justifies its logical flaws and paradoxicality.

Persistence in changes: on the true causes of the irresistible attraction of the constitutions of exotic countries: Book review: The Oxford Handbook of Caribbean Constitutions / ed. by R.Albert, D.O’Brien, S.Wheatle. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020

In the great international literature on comparative constitutional law, main theoretical observations and constructions normally been made on the ground of principle Western models interpretation. That is quite natural because the experience of established democracies in their historical and political implications formed the basis and resource of inspiration for many new nations looking forward to create the similar forms of constitutional government in spite of various cultural and social difficulties. But this approach substitute the problem by its ideal solution sometimes ignoring the whole bulk of emotions, hesitations, exaggerated hops, disappointments and interests, which are represented in regions and countries of so-called “periphery zone” of legal development acutely pressed to search their own strategy of constitutional modernization in quite different cultural and political context. This problem becomes the central point in the monumental work under review – “The Oxford handbook of Caribbean Constitutions”. The book providing a solid ground for the complex academic deliberation of one of such regions – a very specific group of countries, which formerly were part of the great European colonial empires, recently proclaimed their independence and stay in a permanent process of constitutional self-determination trying to find their proper way in legal globalization. Carefully summarizing the materials and ideas of this collective work, the author of this review article discusses some general conceptual items of this type of constitutionalism: the role of common culture and history in pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial legal development; the impact of “colonial legacy” in formation of post-independence constitutionalism of respective countries. He reconsider the place of indigenous forms and imported imperial constitutional design in the establishment of the new constitutionalism and administrative governance; the specific trend to hybridization of different legal traditions, norms and institutes in process of their evolution and selection through constitutional amendments, constitutional jurisprudence and projects of reforms. In concluding part of this article the author summing up his vision of continuity and ruptures in legal development balance of Caribbean region in comparison with Post-Soviet region’s current constitutional transformation.