Law and Economics as the Methodology of Administrative Law - Review on the Distribution Industry Development Act through the Coase Theorem -

2020 ◽  
Vol 88 ◽  
pp. 149-178
Author(s):  
Jung-Mi Bang
Author(s):  
Nuno Garoupa ◽  
Sofia Amaral-Garcia

This chapter provides a rational choice theory to explain why features of administrative law vary across jurisdictions. It relates these varying features of administrative law to economic performance (as measured by macroeconomic variables or more specific variables such as rule of law, judicial effectiveness, governance indicators, or quality of legal institutions). The chapter also reveals a normative dimension related to the inevitable question of which arrangements or institutions produce better results. To that end, it reviews the current economic models of administrative adjudication. The chapter next takes a look at some more specific topics: specialized agencies, specialized courts, and state liability. Finally, it looks at the role of the interaction between administrative and constitutional law as well as rule-making and other types of executive policy-making.


2003 ◽  
Vol 15 (4) ◽  
pp. 389-416 ◽  
Author(s):  
David A. Moss ◽  
Michael R. Fein

It is now more than forty years since Ronald Coase's seminal article on the Federal Communications Commission first appeared in the pages of the Journal of Law and Economics. The article remains important for a number of reasons, not least of which is that it offered his first articulation of the Coase Theorem. Of even greater importance for our purposes, the article literally redefined the terms of debate over American broadcast regulation, in both historical and contemporary treatments of the subject.


2006 ◽  
Vol 45 (4II) ◽  
pp. 1323-1342 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ahmad Rafay Alam

In the study of law and economics, the Coase Theorem posits that an efficient allocation of resources will result when transactions costs are zero.1 These “transaction costs” may be viewed as impediments to an efficient allocation of resources and can take many forms. For example, long distances between a prospective vendor and purchaser of property and a lack of communication facilities between them would impede even the best of intentions to enter into a bargain. Similarly, the cost of mobilising labour and materials might impede a property developer from pursuing a tender for civil works. In some cases, a high rate of Stamp Duty on transactions can result in the parties reconsidering their decision to enter into such bargains. To the extent this author can claim knowledge of economics, the Coase Theorem also suggests that transaction costs and inefficiencies hamper the natural flow of bargains, result in inefficient allocation of resources and thus impact the economy. Some transaction costs are small enough to ignore whereas some, imposed, for example, by the law, are unavoidable. In such cases, a mutual understanding between the parties may see the burden of these transaction costs shared or, in others, avoided altogether. For example, the statutory requirements that all leases purporting to grant a term in excess of one year or which reserve an annual rent must be registered and stamped2 often results, in owners of residential property granting indefinitely renewable leases of 11 months and thus avoiding such requirements.


2018 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 391-415 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maria DE BENEDETTO

The question of effective law has been studied in many fields of research, such as philosophy and sociology of law, law and economics, public policy and behavioural sciences. This article aims to treat it as a genuine administrative law issue which is currently having a significant impact on administrative procedures, especially affecting the way in which rules are adopted and implemented. Furthermore, the article attempts to reconcile conflicting views in existing literature on the meaning of effective law and on which factors lead to effectiveness by proposing an integrated approach: starting from a regulatory perspective it considers both traditional determinants of effectiveness, ie compliance and enforcement, as well as the emerging aspect of outcomes, focused on the idea that a rule can be defined as effective when its desired effects have been achieved and the public interest which justifies the rule has been safeguarded without producing unwanted or disfunctional consequences.Far from being simply a decisional problem for institutions (arising in legislative, regulatory and administrative procedures), effectiveness calls for a “steering administration” and represents a criterion for decision-making, since expected effectiveness can be used in the logic of “whether” and “how” institutions should arrive at decisions.


2021 ◽  
Vol 30 (4) ◽  
pp. 459
Author(s):  
Adam Ostrowski

<p>The aim of the article is to analyse source materials related to the functioning of the Chair of Administration Science and Administrative Law at the University of Poznań. The study discusses the problems experienced by the then-contemporary scientific and lecturing staff, and also characterised the atypical structure of the Faculty of Law and Economics, as composed of the sections of state law and economy. The organization of the chairs of administrative law at the University of Poznań was separated and their main research and development directions and the most important representatives were indicated. The article broadly discusses the issue of teaching administrative law in comparison to other chairs of the University of Poznań, so that the conclusions give the best possible image of the discussed subject.</p>


Criminologie ◽  
2005 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 9-34 ◽  
Author(s):  
Laureen Snider

This paper examines the ideological and political collapse of laws regulating corporate crime in North America. In an era where social control and criminalization are steadily increasing, corporate crime has been normalized, shorn of its negative, criminal implications, de-regulated in law. The paper asks why this has happened, looking first at the century-long battle waged by labour and other counter-hegemonic groups to censure and control the antisocial acts of corporations through the passage of criminal legislation. Second, it examines the role criminology as a discipline played in this process, and the subsequent replacement of criminological discourse and influence by the newly-ascendent law and economics movement, which has provided the much of the academic support for de-regulation. Both developments, it is argued, are linked to changes in global capitalism and the weakened nation-state. Finally, the paper argues that the removal of regulation through criminal or administrative law, and of its accompanying rhetorics of denunciation, has grave consequences for social policy. The structural and ideological forces of global capitalism that have normalized corporate crime have also provided ideal conditions for increases in its incidence and impact.


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