Wearing religious symbols at work in the ECtHR’s judgments

Freedom of speech and freedom of conscience and religion are essential human rights which are protected, among others, by the ECHR. The number of the European Court of Human Rights’ decisions on wearing religious symbols (in a form of a Christian cross, a Muslim veil or a headscarf) at work remains small. Nevertheless, some interpretation guidelines can be identified in particular on how to ensure that an interference with Article 9 of the 1950 Convention has to be proportionate and “necessary in a democratic society”. Owing to a lack of European-wide consensus on states’ approach to religion, a state exercises a wide margin of appreciation. Nevertheless, a state always has to take into account rights of the others, in particular those who are dependent on (e.g. patience at hospital) employees or are prone to an impact of employees (e.g. pupils and students). Thus, dress codes confirming a secular nature and religious neutrality of a State not always violates Article 9 of the ECHR. Rules apply mainly to public bodies, but a state liability may also be found to private company’s cases. Details of each employment contract and of the employee’s conduct have to be always analysed. The dress code rules applied to man and women and irrespective to their religion, so the Court has not declared it to be discriminatory because of sex or religion of employees.

STATE LIABILITY VIS-À-VIS VICTIMS OF CRIME IN POST-1994 SOUTH AFRICAN CASE LAW – SOMETHING NEW OR A REINVENTED WHEEL?

Since 1994 South African courts have dealt with numerous cases where victims of crime have sued the State for its failure to protect them from criminal violation. This article explores these cases in order to ascertain the juristic nature of this liability and the criteria applied in ascertaining whether said liability exists under given circumstances. The author concludes that the legal remedy granted victims is based on the normal rules of the law of delict. Despite the constant reference by judges to constitutional imperatives, the matter is guided by the normal delictual criteria of reasonableness and public policy which, granted, have to be ascertained in deference to constitutional norms. The essential test has thus not changed since to the inception of the Constitution. Nevertheless, it appears that the courts have drawn fresh impetus from the Constitution in granting the claim of the victim of crime. South African courts have thus far shown opposition to the granting of punitive or constitutional damages to victims of crime though the possibility of the granting thereof in future has not been ruled out unequivocally.

A RESPONSABILIDADE CIVIL DO ESTADO POR DANOS DECORRENTES DE ATOS JUDICIAIS

The civil liability of the State for damages resulting from judicial acts is a subject much debated in the scope of jurisprudence and doctrine. As it is known the discussion on the civil liability of the State is old and extends to the present day, throughout history an attempt has been made to analyze the breadth of this type of liability and its impacts on society, and with the damages arising from non-judicial acts it was different. Although the institute of civil liability is comprehensive, this work will restrict itself to the discussion around the possibility of state liability in indemnity actions arising from judicial acts, whether due to judicial acts or judicial acts, will present favorable arguments and unfavorables present in the doctrine and jurisprudence on the subject, as well as the analysis in the concrete case of an action for damages.

The European Human Rights System and the Right to Life Seen through Suicide Prevention in Places of Detention: Between Risk Management and Punishment

This paper analyses the shortcomings of European suicide prevention policy in places of detention, a topic that has been neglected in the European legal literature. Four interrelated characteristics of the suicide prevention policies developed by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) are responsible for the failures of these policies. First, the risk-based approach relies on individual risk calculations by national detention authorities to the detriment of environmental factors and a holistic approach. Second, there is an unacknowledged tension in the jurisprudence of the ECtHR between the right to life of detainees and the right to life of potential victims of terrorism and other serious crimes. Third, the jurisprudence on state liability, with its individual risk-based approach, has been translated into highly restrictive death avoidance national practices, which infringe human dignity and reinforce detainees’ willingness to commit suicide. Finally, the right to life does not effectively limit the inherent punitiveness of suicide prevention policies.

STATE LIABILITY FOR FINAL COURT ORDERS SOUNDING IN MONEY: AT LONG LAST ALIGNMENT WITH THE CONSTITUTION

Since the commencement of the State Liability Act 20 of 1957 the (until 2011) prevailing legislation rendered it almost impossible to satisfy judgment debts sounding in money against the State. There has been a continuous struggle in South Africa “to reach a balance between State immunity from tort liability and government accountability to the State’s citizens”. The State Liability Amendment Act of 2011 (following on the Constitutional Court’s decision in Nyathi v MEC for Department of Health Gauteng 2008 5 SA 94 (CC)) will enable judgment creditors to obtain effective relief against the State.

8. Public enforcement of EU law (Articles 258–260 TFEU); review of legality and damages (Articles 263, 265, 268, 277 and 340(2) TFEU)

This chapter focuses on direct actions before the Court of Justice. It is divided into two sections. Section I deals with direct actions relating to public enforcement of EU law between the Commission and Member States (Article 258 TFEU) and between Member States (Article 259 TFEU). The financial consequences of failure to remedy infringements are also covered (Article 260 TFEU). Section II deals with actions challenging the legality of binding institutional acts (action for annulment, Article 263 TFEU); action for failure to act (Article 265 TFEU); and the plea of illegality (Article 277 TFEU). It briefly examines the action for damages against EU institutions (Articles 268 and 340(2) TFEU), a Treaty-based action from which parallels can be drawn to the evolution of state liability, through the Court’s case law.

7. Doctrines of European Union law: direct effect, supremacy, state liability for breach of EU law and other remedies

This chapter examines the main doctrines or principles of EU law. It is divided into three sections. It starts with a discussion on the principle of direct effect and indirect effect, with reference to regulations, directives and international agreements. It then considers the doctrine of supremacy or primacy of EU law with reference to a selection of Member States and the UK. The chapter also considers state liability for breach of EU law, and other remedies.