Phûsis: The Fatalities of Appearance
Nature is the first component of the Pyrrhonian Fourfold; and Chapter Five argues that Hume’s naturalism is constitutive of his scepticism, rather than opposed to it or distinct from it. The chapter’s excursus describes a properly sceptical naturalism, a naturalism stripped of epistemic and metaphysical claims and import. Chapter Five grounds its argument first upon Hume’s ideas about animality and the association of ideas and proceeds to lay out the subtle interplay of necessity and contingency in Hume’s theories concerning causality, reason, perception, and imagination. The chapter interprets the reassertion of nature at the end of Treatise 1.4.7 as a crucially Pyrrhonian-Apelleticmoment moment that presents atûchikos finding about human fortune and fate. Nature more generally is rendered in Hume as the press of humanity’s fatedness to impressions or appearances in common life. The text compares Hume’s ideas with those of various rationalists, as well as with the work of Immanuel Kant, Ralph Waldo Emerson, and Stanley Cavell.