scholarly journals Reputation or Interaction: What Drives Cooperation on Economic Sanctions?

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dawid Walentek
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Strong Predictor ◽  
Economic Sanctions ◽  
International Organisations ◽  
Collective Action Problem ◽  
Instrumental Approach ◽  
Repeated Interaction ◽  
Economic Coercion ◽  
Theory Framework

This article studies cooperation on multilateral economic sanctions. Despite low effectiveness and sanction-busting, multilateral economic sanctions are a popular tool of foreign policy. We explore an instrumental approach to sanctions and develop a game theory framework where sender states face a collective action problem when coordinating multilateral coercion. We indicate that cooperation can be achieved through repeated interactions and reputation. We test empirically the two mechanisms with the TIES data on economic sanctions and adherence to past sanction regimes and the Correlates of War data on membership in International Organisations. Our results indicate that reputation is a strong predictor of cooperation on multilateral economic coercion. The effect of repeated interaction appears conditional on reputation; states with poor reputation mediate its effect through repeated interaction.

Economic Coercion as an Instrument of Foreign Policy: U.S. Economic Measures Against Cuba and the Dominican Republic

1973 ◽  
Vol 25 (3) ◽  
pp. 387-413 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anna P. Schreiber
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Dominican Republic ◽  
Economic Sanctions ◽  
Economic Coercion ◽  
Target States

The application of economic sanctions against Rhodesia and the results of that effort raise the question of the effectiveness of economic coercion as an instrument of foreign policy. A review of U.S. economic coercion against Cuba, in effect since June 1960, and against the Dominican Republic during the period 1960–1962 may be timely and instructive. By exploring the steps leading to the application of U.S. economic coercion, its objectives, and its concrete impact on the target states it may be possible to develop some useful generalizations about the role of economic weapons as tools of foreign policy.

Economic Coercion and Sanctions

2021 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Mathematical Models ◽  
Nuclear Proliferation ◽  
Economic Sanctions ◽  
Data Sets ◽  
Woodrow Wilson ◽  
Policy Goals ◽  
Economic Coercion ◽  
Run Up ◽  
Target Country

Since at least the Athenian trade ban on Megara, in the run-up to the Peloponnesian War, states have used economic sanctions to pursue their foreign policy goals. Using a definition popularized by Hufbauer, et al. (Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, 2017, p. 3), political scientists consider economic sanctions to be the “deliberate, government-inspired withdrawal, or threat of withdrawal, of customary trade or financial relations.” Sanctions are imposed by a sender country on a target country. While praised by Woodrow Wilson as a way to force the target government to change its policies while sparing its civilians from the scourges of war, by the end of the 1990s critics charged that sanctions were impotent to change the target government’s behavior but were deadly for civilians. Sanctions have been credited with ending apartheid and preventing nuclear proliferation, and have been criticized for facilitating genocide in the former Yugoslavia and causing the deaths of hundreds of thousands of children in Iraq (although the latter claim has since been proven to be false). In order to go beyond considering only a handful of examples and consider sanctions comprehensively, political scientists have developed mathematical models to examine how sanctions work in theory, and comprehensive data sets of sanctions cases to study them statistically. They have examined why senders impose sanctions, how targets respond, and what sanctions do to the civilians who live under them.

scholarly journals Trade, economic and sanctions wars: an attempt to theoretically differentiate the ideas in the context the international relations science

2020 ◽  
pp. 12-22
Author(s):  
Dmitriy Viktorovich Mukhamadeev ◽  
Yan Nikolaevich Shevchenko
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Policy ◽  
International Relations ◽  
Economic Sanctions ◽  
Developed Countries ◽  
Policy Instrument ◽  
Past Century ◽  
Economic Diplomacy ◽  
Policy Goals ◽  
Economic Coercion ◽  
Trade Wars

The research purpose of this article is to attempt to differentiate the concepts and theoretical backgrounds of economic sanctions and trade wars as popular instruments of economic coercion. In the authors’ opinion, such differentiation is critically important for the conceptualization of economic sanctions as a foreign policy instrument kindling the interest of both specialists in international relations and the global and regional international politics practitioners. From a practical perspective, the interest in analyzing this issue is determined by the fact that over the past century, economic sanctions have become one of the key instruments of achieving a state’s foreign policy goals. They are mostly used by developed countries with extensive economic and technological capabilities (e.g. U.S.), which are striving for abatements of their less powerful partners regarding foreign and domestic policy issues. Yet another argument in favour of studying economic sanctions, trade wars and other instruments of economic coercion in the context of the theory of international relations is the possibility to shed more light on the nature of power as the most significant concept of modern political science. A detailed analysis of theoretical discussions about the phenomenon of trade and economic wars compared with economic sanctions allows the authors to outline a set of fundamental differences between these phenomena in the context of modern economic diplomacy.   

scholarly journals A game theory framework for ISP streaming traffic management

2011 ◽  
Vol 68 (11) ◽  
pp. 1162-1174 ◽  
Author(s):  
V. Bioglio ◽  
R. Gaeta ◽  
M. Grangetto ◽  
M. Sereno ◽  
S. Spoto
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Traffic Management ◽  
Streaming Traffic ◽  
Theory Framework

scholarly journals Liberal world order and economic coercion in modern foreign policy of the U.S.

2021 ◽  
pp. 52-62
Author(s):  
Oğuz Alperen Turhan
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Conflicts Of Interest ◽  
American Foreign Policy ◽  
World Order ◽  
Single System ◽  
Global System ◽  
Economic Coercion ◽  
The U.S

The article studies the evolution of liberal world order within the framework of conventional directions of the U.S.’ foreign policy. The purpose of this work is to reveal the peculiarities of development of the U.S.’ foreign policy in terms of liberal world order. For this purpose, the U.S.’ foreign policy is considered through the prism of Walter Russel Mead’s “four schools of American foreign policy”. The author analyzes the development and transformation of liberalism in the context of using economic coercion in the U.S.’ foreign policy. The article also considers the topical problems of development of the liberal world order faced by the realist and liberal paradigms. Representatives of both groups realize the failure of the liberal world order, but offer different strategies of defining the U.S.’ foreign policy course. Representatives of the liberal paradigm believe that the liberal world order entered a phase of self-destruction because of accelerated integration of unequal states in a single system. Realists, in their turn, claim that transformations in the structure of the global system determine the functionality of the liberal world order. Specifically, the revisionist position of Russia and China is a reaction to the imposed principles, and serves as a basis for the transition to the multipolar system. Thus, conflicts of interest between the parties cause the use of measures of coercion.

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