scholarly journals Estimating the Family Labor Supply Functions Derived from the Stone-Geary Utility Function

10.3386/w0228 ◽  
1978 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Hurd

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 1-30
Author(s):  
Itzik Fadlon ◽  
Torben Heien Nielsen

We provide new evidence on households’ labor supply responses to fatal and severe nonfatal health shocks in the short run and medium run. To identify causal effects, we leverage administrative data on Danish families and construct counterfactuals using households that experience the same event a few years apart. Fatal events lead to considerable increases in surviving spouses’ labor supply, which the evidence suggests is driven by families who experience significant income losses. Nonfatal shocks have no meaningful effects on spousal labor supply, consistent with their adequate insurance coverage. The results support self-insurance as a driving mechanism for the family labor supply responses. (JEL D12, D15, G22, I12, J22)



2006 ◽  
Vol 40 (1) ◽  
pp. 15-37 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shahina Amin ◽  
Shakil. Quayes ◽  
Janet M. Rives


1991 ◽  
Vol 46 (2) ◽  
pp. 199-226 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ben Craig ◽  
Raymond G. Batina


2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Itzik Fadlon ◽  
Torben Heien Nielsen


Econometrica ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 87 (1) ◽  
pp. 291-326 ◽  
Author(s):  
George-Levi Gayle ◽  
Andrew Shephard


2004 ◽  
Vol 34 (3) ◽  
pp. 431-440 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jaime Orrillo ◽  
Paulo R. A. Loureiro

Assume a labor supply consisting of two types of workers, 1 and 2. Both workers are equally productive and exhibit supply functions with the same elasticity. We consider a firm (entrepreneur or shareholders) that is competitive in the output market and monopsonistic in input markets. The firm uses the services of a manager who has a high human capital and whose wage is given by the market. It is supposed that the manager does not like to work with one type of worker, say type 1. If we allow the manager's effort to be an additional input without any extra (in addition to his salary) cost for the firm, then the firm's pricing decision will be different for both workers. That is, there will be a wage differential and therefore endogenous economic discrimination2 in the labor markets.



1995 ◽  
Vol 55 (1) ◽  
pp. 27-57 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alan L. Olmstead ◽  
Paul W. Rhode

This article analyzes a large quantity of new data documenting the actual characteristics and behavior of early reaper adopters. It shows that a surprisingly large number of small-scale farmers were among the early purchasers and that institutional evolution—the emergence of local markets and cooperative exchanges for reaper services—encouraged rapid diffusion. These findings call into question the standard interpretation of northern farms as self-contained production units and, more specifically, challenge the usefulness of both the farm-specific-threshold model and the family-labor-constraint model.





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