scholarly journals Financial Incentives and Earnings of Disability Insurance Recipients: Evidence from a Notch Design

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Philippe Ruh ◽  
Stefan Staubli
2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 269-300
Author(s):  
Philippe Ruh ◽  
Stefan Staubli

Most countries reduce disability insurance (DI ) benefits for beneficiaries earning above a specified threshold. Such an earnings threshold generates a discontinuous increase in tax liability—a notch—and creates an incentive to keep earnings below the threshold. Exploiting such a notch in Austria, we provide transparent and credible identification of the effect of financial incentives on DI beneficiaries’ earnings. Using rich administrative data, we document large and sharp bunching at the earnings threshold. However, the elasticity driving these responses is small. Our estimate suggests that relaxing the earnings threshold reduces fiscal cost only if program entry is very inelastic. (JEL H55, J14, J31)


2014 ◽  
Vol 104 (2) ◽  
pp. 624-655 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andreas Ravndal Kostøl ◽  
Magne Mogstad

Using a local randomized experiment that arises from a sharp discontinuity in Disability Insurance (DI) policy in Norway, we provide transparent and credible identification of how financial incentives induce DI recipients to return to work. We find that many DI recipients have considerable capacity to work that can be effectively induced by providing financial work incentives. We further show that providing work incentives to DI recipients may both increase their disposable income and reduce program costs. Our findings also suggest that targeted policies may be the most effective in encouraging DI recipients to return to work. (JEL D14, H55, J14, J22, J28)


De Economist ◽  
2007 ◽  
Vol 155 (1) ◽  
pp. 73-98 ◽  
Author(s):  
Annemiek H. Van Vuren ◽  
Daniel J. Van Vuuren

2011 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 18-22
Author(s):  
Rosemary Griffin

National legislation is in place to facilitate reform of the United States health care industry. The Health Care Information Technology and Clinical Health Act (HITECH) offers financial incentives to hospitals, physicians, and individual providers to establish an electronic health record that ultimately will link with the health information technology of other health care systems and providers. The information collected will facilitate patient safety, promote best practice, and track health trends such as smoking and childhood obesity.


2017 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 61-76 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anaïs Thibault Landry ◽  
Marylène Gagné ◽  
Jacques Forest ◽  
Sylvie Guerrero ◽  
Michel Séguin ◽  
...  

Abstract. To this day, researchers are debating the adequacy of using financial incentives to bolster performance in work settings. Our goal was to contribute to current understanding by considering the moderating role of distributive justice in the relation between financial incentives, motivation, and performance. Based on self-determination theory, we hypothesized that when bonuses are fairly distributed, using financial incentives makes employees feel more competent and autonomous, which in turn fosters greater autonomous motivation and lower controlled motivation, and better work performance. Results from path analyses in three samples supported our hypotheses, suggesting that the effect of financial incentives is contextual, and that compensation plans using financial incentives and bonuses can be effective when properly managed.


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