Mechanisms for Incentivizing Top Managers of the Company in the Long Term

Motivating and rewarding company employees requires constant development and improvement the remuneration of the top management of the company is especially difficult. For this, compensation plans are being developed, which can be conditionally divided into two groups: bonus and stock-based option programs. Bonus programs provide for large-scale remuneration of managers based on the company’s performance in the current year. Compensation plans that reward top management with shares are effective. Such programs are developed only for selected top managers who have a direct impact on the financial results of the company.The purpose of the study is to substantiate the optimal mechanisms for remunerating top managers in Russian conditions and to determine the directions for the development of compensation plans. The object of the research is the mechanisms of involvement and motivation of managers. The subject of the research is the remuneration of the top managers of the company. Methods and methodology of work. General scientific methods were used, such as analysis, synthesis, method of classification and typology, generalization, abstraction, modeling. It has been established that in Russia it is advisable to use «phantom» shares because the domestic legislative framework does not define the mechanisms of reward with shares as broadly as is customary in developed countries. It is also recommended to apply bonus programs with payments in installments for 2–3 years. Directions have been identified to improve the effectiveness of bonus and option compensation plans in Russia.

The impact of sales controls on manufacturers’ agents’ tactical decisions: the importance of inter-organizational climate

Purpose Organizational climate is an essential dynamic to leverage in salesforce performance. This study aims to develop a model that explores the determinants of independent manufacturers’ representatives’ (i.e. IMRs’) intentions to comply with their principals’ requests for additional tasking. Using agency theory, the authors explore the application of behavior and outcome-based controls upon dyadic manufacturer-IMR relationships for these additional performance/task requests. Design/methodology/approach Data from over 1,000 US-based IMRs were used to test two constructs; inter-organizational climate and perceptions of mutual satisfaction within the agency-principal dyad. Compliance behaviors tested were IMRs’ intentions to engage in non-selling-related tasks and intentions to allocate additional selling time to principals’ products. The following four exogenous controls were tested: perceived goal congruence between IMRs and principals; IMRs’ perceptions of principals’ expertise; mutual communications between IMRs and principals in the supply chain dyad; resources and sales support programs provided by principals to IMRs; and IMRs’ perceptions of the adequacy and fairness of the principals’ compensation plans. Findings Two constructs – inter-organizational climate and perceptions of mutual satisfaction with the agency-principal dyad – mediated the effects of exogenous sales controls on two compliance behaviors. The model’s data were analyzed using Partial least squares structural equation modeling (PLS-SEM). A marker variable was deployed to check for common method variance also supported using the Partial least squares (PLS) factor solution. Most variables demonstrated significant direct and mediated effects on each compliance behavior. Variables that emphasized behavioral-based controls dominated intentions for IMRs to engage in non-selling tasks. The principal commission structure, the only sales outcome-based control in the study, most influenced IMRs’ intentions to commit additional sales time to their principals’ products. Research limitations/implications This study only examined the intentions of IMRs to engage in additional selling activities and their intention to engage in non-selling tasks. Principals may desire longer-term commitments from IMRs. The model developed here can be modified to capture additional behavioral and attitudinal outcomes including, for example, the exit intentions of IMRs. Practical implications Principals are well-advised to foster a positive inter-organizational climate that fuels perceptions of mutually satisfying working relationships with their IMRs. These mutually satisfying working relationships can, by themselves, positively influence IMRs to acquiesce to reasonable requests made by principals. This advice appears to be particularly crucial when asking IMRs to engage in additional non-selling tasks. The total pattern of path estimates points to the conclusion that capable sales control plays an important role in fostering positive inter-organizational climates. The inter-organizational climate – mutual satisfaction link proved crucial as a mediator of the impact of sales controls on IMRs’ behavioral compliance intentions. Originality/value Knowing the impact of sales controls on IMR’s affords businesses the ability to use these controls for behavioral compliance intentions on non-selling tasks.

Director Compensation in the Banking Industry Around the Dodd-Frank Act

Directors’ monitoring and advising activities as agents were supposed to increase after the Dodd-Frank Act in 2010. The Dodd-Frank Act significantly increases the pressure on the board of directors to be more effective agents of the stockholders even after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) became effective. Director compensation, especially incentive-based compensation, is intended to align with the interests of shareholders and motivate director behavior. This paper empirically tests how banks respond to the Dodd-Frank Act by redesigning their director compensation plans. Our findings suggest that banks recognize the need for improved board monitoring by highlighting the importance of director workload and qualifications through the design of director compensation packages in the post-Dodd-Frank Act period. We also find that the negative impact of excessive director equity compensation on firm performance was attenuated after the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act. The findings of this study shed light on the rationale of director compensation policies for banking firms.

A Flood Inundation Modeling Approach for Urban and Rural Areas in Lake and Large-Scale River Basins

Fluvial floods are one of the primary natural hazards to our society, and the associated flood risk should always be evaluated for present and future conditions. The European Union’s (EU) Floods Directive highlights the importance of flood mapping as a key stage for detecting vulnerable areas, assessing floods’ impacts, and identifying damages and compensation plans. The implementation of the EU Flood Directive in Greece is challenging because of its geophysical and climatic variability and diverse hydrologic and hydraulic conditions. This study addressed this challenge by modeling of design rainfall at the sub-watershed level and subsequent estimation of flood design hydrographs using the Natural Resources Conservation Service (NRCS) Unit Hydrograph Procedure. The HEC-RAS 2D model was used for flood routing, estimation of flood attributes (i.e., water depths and flow velocities), and mapping of inundated areas. The modeling approach was applied at two complex and ungauged representative basins: The Lake Pamvotida basin located in the Epirus Region of the wet Western Greece, and the Pinios River basin located in the Thessaly Region of the drier Central Greece, a basin with a complex dendritic hydrographic system, expanding to more than 1188 river-km. The proposed modeling approach aimed at better estimation and mapping of flood inundation areas including relative uncertainties and providing guidance to professionals and academics.

EXPRESS: Variable Compensation and Salesperson Health

Positive effects of incentives on salespeople’s motivation, effort, and performance are well-established in literature. This article takes a novel look at their influence on salespeople’s health. The results of four empirical studies, including more than 1,400 salespeople, suggest that an increasing variable compensation share (i.e., greater pay-for-performance component in salespeople’s compensation plans) increases salespeople’s stress, resulting in emotional exhaustion and more sick days. These outcomes are more likely for salespeople with lower personal ability and fewer social resources. The harmful effects of the variable compensation share on salespeople’s health reduce the positive effects of this incentive on sales performance. To practice better marketing for a better world, if variable compensation is used, the authors recommend that managers screen new hires for job-related resources and help their existing staff build such resources. In addition, companies may personalize incentive schemes and sensitize managers to the stress-inducing effects of variable compensation shares.

Involving Sales Managers in Sales Force Compensation Design

Sales force incentive design often involves significant participation by sales managers in designing the compensation plans of salespeople who report to them. Although sales managers hold valuable territory-level information, they may benefit from misrepresenting that information given their own incentives. The author uses a game theoretic model to show (1) how a firm can efficiently leverage a manager’s true knowledge and (2) the conditions under which involving the manager is optimal. Under the proposed approach, the firm delegates sales incentive decisions to the manager within restrictive constraints. She can then request relaxed constraints by fulfilling certain requirements. The author shows how these constraints and requirements can be set to ensure the firm’s best possible outcome given the manager’s information. Thus, this “request mechanism” offers an efficient, reliable alternative to approaches often used in practice to incorporate managerial input, such as internal negotiations and behind-the-scenes lobbying. The author then identifies the conditions under which this mechanism outperforms the well-established theoretical approach of offering the salesperson a menu of contracts to reveal territory-level information.

Lender Monitoring and the Efficacy of Managerial Risk-Taking Incentives

Firms provide convexity in managers' compensation plans (vega) to induce risk-averse managers to pursue risky, positive net present value projects. The resulting alignment of managers' and shareholders' incentives creates conflicts with lenders, who face an increased risk of default when managers pursue risky investments. We hypothesize that lenders would respond by stepping up their monitoring and threatening foreclosure to inhibit managers from acting on their vega incentives. Strong lender monitoring should thus reduce the efficacy of vega incentives. We test this hypothesis in a unique setting, where lenders purchase credit insurance, reduce their exposure to downside risk, and lower their monitoring. Afterward, we find a stronger association between vega incentives and the firm's risky investments. We contribute to the literature by showing that strong lender monitoring reduces the effectiveness of vega incentives and, thus, of the compensation mechanisms that boards of directors put in place to resolve manager-shareholder conflicts.

The Behavioural Economics of Executive Incentives

The conventional design of executive compensation plans is based on an outdated model of executive agency. Behavioural economics has provided a better understanding of the relationship between executives’ pay and their motivation through detailed examination of the psychology of incentives. Four key points emerge from the research. First, executives are much more risk averse than financial theory predicts. Second executives are very high time discounters, thus reducing the perceived value of deferred rewards. Third, intrinsic motivation is much more important than admitted by traditional economic theory. Fourth, executives are more concerned about the perceived fairness of their awards relative to peers than in absolute amounts. Research suggests that companies would be better off paying generous salaries and using annual cash bonuses to incentivise desired actions and behaviours. Executives should be required to invest bonuses in company shares until they have sufficient ‘skin in the game’ to align their interests with shareholders.