scholarly journals "The Federal Deposit Insurance Fund That Didn't Put A Bite on U.S. Tax Payers"

10.3386/w4648 ◽  
1994 ◽  
Author(s):  
Edward Kane ◽  
Robert Hendershott
Author(s):  
Krimminger Michael

This chapter explores the US and UK’s response to the 2007–9 Global Financial Crisis. In both cases, funding for the resolution and restructuring of failing financial companies came from public sources-generally national governments and central banks funded by the private creditors or other private sources. In the UK, the resolution actions relied solely on taxpayer financing. In the US, the government’s actions relied on Federal Reserve funding, Treasury funding through the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), and Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) funding from the Deposit Insurance Fund. The chapter also assesses the role of bail-in under the Resolution Authorities and concludes with a brief summary of the UK and EU approach to single point of entry (SPOE) strategy.


1989 ◽  
Vol 3 (4) ◽  
pp. 11-29 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lawrence J White

In early 1989, the system of deposit insurance in the United States was in crisis. The Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC), the U.S. government agency that provided deposit insurance for savings and loan (thrift) institutions, had sustained massive losses from the insolvencies of hundreds of thrifts. Tens of billions of dollars of general Treasury revenues will be necessary to make good the losses in the insurance fund, which had previously been financed solely through premiums assessed on thrifts' deposits. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), which provides similar insurance for deposits in commercial banks, has sustained much smaller losses but is considered to be in poor enough financial condition that its premium assessments will increase substantially. This article will review the current system of deposit insurance and advocate a set of necessary reforms.


Author(s):  
Kleftouri Nikoletta

Banking crises prompted the United States to make lending of last resort, deposit insurance, and bank resolution federal responsibilities long before banks crossed state lines in large numbers. The US system offers an existing and successful model, whereby the deposit insurance and resolution functions are combined under a single institution, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. The key objective underpinning the FDIC’s choice among different resolution options is that the chosen resolution is that which would result in the least cost to the deposit insurance fund. This chapter sets out the role of the FDIC as the deposit insurer, supervisor, and resolution authority, while also examining some key principles of the US approach to dealing with failing banks.


1981 ◽  
Vol 36 (1) ◽  
pp. 51 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen A. Buser ◽  
Andrew H. Chen ◽  
Edward J. Kane

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