The Reform of Federal Deposit Insurance

1989 ◽  
Vol 3 (4) ◽  
pp. 11-29 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lawrence J White
Keyword(s):  
Commercial Banks ◽  
Deposit Insurance ◽  
Current System ◽  
The United States ◽  
Government Agency ◽  
Insurance Fund ◽  
Financial Condition ◽  
Savings And Loan ◽  
Federal Deposit Insurance ◽  
The U.S

In early 1989, the system of deposit insurance in the United States was in crisis. The Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC), the U.S. government agency that provided deposit insurance for savings and loan (thrift) institutions, had sustained massive losses from the insolvencies of hundreds of thrifts. Tens of billions of dollars of general Treasury revenues will be necessary to make good the losses in the insurance fund, which had previously been financed solely through premiums assessed on thrifts' deposits. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), which provides similar insurance for deposits in commercial banks, has sustained much smaller losses but is considered to be in poor enough financial condition that its premium assessments will increase substantially. This article will review the current system of deposit insurance and advocate a set of necessary reforms.

10 The US Paradigm: Deposit Insurer as Resolution Authority

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kleftouri Nikoletta
Keyword(s):  
Deposit Insurance ◽  
The United States ◽  
Insurance Fund ◽  
Single Institution ◽  
Successful Model ◽  
Bank Resolution ◽  
Large Numbers ◽  
The Us ◽  
Federal Deposit Insurance

Banking crises prompted the United States to make lending of last resort, deposit insurance, and bank resolution federal responsibilities long before banks crossed state lines in large numbers. The US system offers an existing and successful model, whereby the deposit insurance and resolution functions are combined under a single institution, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. The key objective underpinning the FDIC’s choice among different resolution options is that the chosen resolution is that which would result in the least cost to the deposit insurance fund. This chapter sets out the role of the FDIC as the deposit insurer, supervisor, and resolution authority, while also examining some key principles of the US approach to dealing with failing banks.

Origins of too-big-to-fail policy in the United States

2020 ◽  
Vol 27 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-15
Author(s):  
George C. Nurisso ◽  
Edward Simpson Prescott
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Federal Reserve ◽  
Systemic Risk ◽  
Deposit Insurance ◽  
The United States ◽  
Too Big To Fail ◽  
Interstate Banking ◽  
Legal Constraints ◽  
Federal Deposit Insurance ◽  
Over Time

This article traces the origin of too-big-to-fail policy in modern US banking to the bailout of the $1.2b Bank of the Commonwealth in 1972. It describes this bailout and those of subsequent banks through that of Continental Illinois in 1984. During this period, market concentration due to interstate banking restrictions is a factor in most of the bailouts and systemic risk concerns were raised to justify the bailouts of surprisingly small banks. Finally, most of the bailouts in this period relied on the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation's use of the Essentiality Doctrine and Federal Reserve lending. A discussion of this doctrine is used to illustrate how legal constraints on regulators may become less constraining over time.

13 Resolution in the UK and US: Variations to the Same Goals

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Krimminger Michael
Keyword(s):  
Deposit Insurance ◽  
Global Financial Crisis ◽  
Single Point ◽  
Insurance Fund ◽  
Troubled Asset Relief Program ◽  
Point Of Entry ◽  
The Us ◽  
The Uk ◽  
Federal Deposit Insurance ◽  
National Governments

This chapter explores the US and UK’s response to the 2007–9 Global Financial Crisis. In both cases, funding for the resolution and restructuring of failing financial companies came from public sources-generally national governments and central banks funded by the private creditors or other private sources. In the UK, the resolution actions relied solely on taxpayer financing. In the US, the government’s actions relied on Federal Reserve funding, Treasury funding through the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), and Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) funding from the Deposit Insurance Fund. The chapter also assesses the role of bail-in under the Resolution Authorities and concludes with a brief summary of the UK and EU approach to single point of entry (SPOE) strategy.

scholarly journals FDICIA and Risk Shifting 1n the Banking Industry

2006 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 87-116
Author(s):  
Seok-Weon Lee
Keyword(s):  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Risk Taking ◽  
Deposit Insurance ◽  
Banking Industry ◽  
Systematic Risk ◽  
Full Sample ◽  
Risk Taking Behavior ◽  
Federal Deposit Insurance ◽  
Asset Size ◽  
The U.S

This is an empirical study that examines how the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA) of 1991 in the U.S. banking industry affects the moral hazard risk-taking incentives of banks. We find that FDICIA appears to be effective in significantly reducing the systematic risk-taking incentives of the banks. Considering that the banks' asset portfolios are necessarily largely systematic risk-related, the significant decrease in their systematic risk-taking incentives provides some evidence of the effectiveness of FDICIA. However, with respect to the nonsystematic risk-taking behavior, the results generally indicate statistically insignificant decreases in the risk-taking incentives after FDICIA. To well-diversified investors who can diversify nonsystematic risk away, nonsystematic risk may not be a risk any more. However, to maintain a sound banking environment and to reduce the risk to individual banks, this result implies that regulatory agents should monitor the banks’ nonsystematic risk-taking behavior more closely, as long as it is positively related to the banks’ failures. We further test the change in the risk-taking incentives by partitioning the full sample into two groups: Banks with higher moral hazard incentives as those with larger asset size and lower capital ratio and banks with lower moral hazard incentives as those with smaller asset size and higher capital ratio. The main result for this test is that, with FDICIA, the decrease in the risk-taking incentives of the banks with higher moral hazard incentives (larger asset-size and lower capital-ratio banks) is less than that of the banks with lower moral hazard incentives (smaller asset-size and higher capital-ratio banks), with respect to both systematic and nonsystematic risk-taking measures. Furthermore, the change in the nonsystematic risk-taking incentives of the banks with higher moral hazard incentives is rather mixed, while their systematic incentives are decreased. These findings imply that the regulatory agents should allocate more time and effort toward monitoring the banks with higher moral hazard incentives with particular emphasis on their nonsystematic risk-taking behavior.

Venture Philanthropy and Teacher Education Policy in the U.S.: The Role of the New Schools Venture Fund

2015 ◽  
Vol 117 (5) ◽  
pp. 1-44 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kenneth Zeichner ◽  
César Peña-Sandoval
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Public Policy ◽  
Teacher Education ◽  
Current System ◽  
The United States ◽  
New Schools ◽  
Venture Philanthropy ◽  
Policy And Practice ◽  
The U.S

Background & Purpose This article focuses on the growing role of venture philanthropy in shaping policy and practice in teacher education in the United States. Our goal is to bring a greater level of transparency to private influences on public policy and to promote greater discussion and debate in the public arena about alternative solutions to current problems. In this article, we focus on the role of one of the most influential private groups in the United States that invests in education, the New Schools Venture Fund (NSVF), in promoting deregulation and market-based policies. Research Design We examine the changing role of philanthropy in education and the role of the NSVF in developing and promoting a bill in the U.S. Congress (the GREAT Act) that would create a system throughout the nation of charter teacher and principal preparation programs called academies. In assessing the wisdom of the GREAT Act, we examine the warrant for claims that education schools have failed in their mission to educate teachers well and the corresponding narrative that entrepreneurial programs emanating from the private sector are the solution. Conclusions We reject both the position that the status quo in teacher education is acceptable (a position held by what we term “defenders”) and the position that the current system needs to be “blown up” and replaced by a market economy (“reformers”). We suggest a third position (“transformers”) that we believe will strengthen the U.S. system of public teacher education and provide everyone's children with high-quality teachers. We conclude with a call for more trenchant dialogue about the policy options before us and for greater transparency about the ways that private interests are influencing public policy and practice in teacher education.

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