scholarly journals Space and Species Interactions in Welfare Estimates for Invasive Species Policy

2021 ◽  
Vol 9 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephanie Brockmann ◽  
Hongyan Zhang ◽  
Doran M. Mason ◽  
Edward S. Rutherford

Aquatic invasive species (AIS) can cause catastrophic damages to lake ecosystems. Bigheaded carp are one such species that pose a current threat to Lake Michigan. Bigheaded carp are expected to have spatially differentiated impacts on other aquatic species in the metapopulation. Policymakers must decide how much to invest in mitigation or conservation policies, if at all, by understanding how invasions impact social welfare or social wellbeing. Estimates of social welfare implications, however, may be biased if important interactions between species and space are overly simplified or aggregated out of the model. In this analysis, a bioeconomic model that links an ecological model with an economic model of recreational fishing behavior is used to complete a comparative analysis of the social welfare implications across several different ecological specifications to demonstrate what biases exist if species interactions are neglected or if ecological characteristics are assumed to be homogenous across space. Results of the bigheaded carp case study suggest that social welfare losses from the invasion vary substantially if species interactions are excluded and vary less if space is treated homogeneously.

1984 ◽  
Vol 58 (2) ◽  
pp. 181-198 ◽  
Author(s):  
James Midgley

2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-14
Author(s):  
Yingjun Zhu ◽  
Zhitong Gao ◽  
Ruihai Li

To control the “uniqueness” risk in Public-Private Partnership (PPP) projects of transportation infrastructure, we design a simplified “uniqueness” contract model by incorporating the impact of the initial investment which is based on the Bertrand model. The nonlinear programming method is adopted to derive the optimal “uniqueness” contracts for incumbent private capital, the public, and the social welfare, respectively. The simulation results show that the achievement of the optimal “uniqueness” contract is essentially the result of a compromise between the private capital, the public, and social welfare. The extent to which such a contract reduces the probability of “uniqueness” risk mainly depends on the equilibrium relation between the interests of private capital and the public. The initial investment is not related to the government default when the contract does not take into account the interests of the private capital. Furthermore, the “uniqueness” contracts between private capital and the government are mainly for anticompetitive purpose in the PPP market of transportation infrastructure. Unless the contract terms focus on the improvement of social welfare, entering a “uniqueness” contract will cause social welfare losses.


2019 ◽  
pp. 1-24
Author(s):  
Yibai Yang

This study explores the welfare effects of patent protection in a Romer-type expanding variety model in which R&D and capital accumulation are both engines of growth. It shows that the comparison between the productivity of R&D and that of capital plays an important role in the welfare analysis. When the relative productivity of R&D compared to capital is high (low), social welfare takes an inverted-U shape for (is decreasing in) the strength of patent protection, and the welfare-maximizing degree of patent protection is no greater than (identical to) the growth-maximizing degree. Moreover, the model is calibrated to the US economy and the numerical results support these welfare implications.


2020 ◽  
Vol 46 (5) ◽  
pp. 1402-1411
Author(s):  
Ben S. Breaker ◽  
Kevin L. Pangle ◽  
Kevin C. Donner ◽  
Jason B. Smith ◽  
Benjamin A. Turschak ◽  
...  

2012 ◽  
Vol 21 (4) ◽  
pp. 506-514 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sarah M. Emery ◽  
Patrick J. Doran ◽  
John T. Legge ◽  
Matthew Kleitch ◽  
Shaun Howard

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document