scholarly journals Game Theory-Based Smart Mobile-Data Offloading Scheme in 5G Cellular Networks

2020 ◽  
Vol 10 (7) ◽  
pp. 2327
Author(s):  
Huynh Thanh Thien ◽  
Van-Hiep Vu ◽  
Insoo Koo
Keyword(s):  
Traffic Congestion ◽  
Cellular Network ◽  
Rapid Development ◽  
Optimal Solution ◽  
Nash Bargaining Solution ◽  
Mobile Internet ◽  
Nash Bargaining ◽  
Smart Devices ◽  
Bargaining Solution ◽  
Mobile Data

Mobile-data traffic exponentially increases day by day due to the rapid development of smart devices and mobile internet services. Thus, the cellular network suffers from various problems, like traffic congestion and load imbalance, which might decrease end-user quality of service. This work compensates for the problem of offloading in the cellular network by forming device-to-device (D2D) links. A game scenario is formulated where D2D-link pairs compete for network resources. In a D2D-link pair, the data of a user equipment (UE) is offloaded to another UE with an offload coefficient, i.e., the proportion of requested data that can be delivered via D2D links. Each link acts as a player in a cooperative game, with the optimal solution for the game found using the Nash bargaining solution (NBS). The proposed solution aims to present a strategy to control different parameters of the UE, including harvested energy which is stored in a rechargeable battery with a finite capacity and the offload coefficients of the D2D-link pairs, to optimize the performance of the network in terms of throughput and energy efficiency (EE) while considering fairness among links in the network. Simulation results show that the proposed game scheme can effectively offload mobile data, achieve better EE and improve the throughput while maintaining high fairness, compared to an offloading scheme based on a maximized fairness index (MFI) and to a no-offload scheme.

scholarly journals Finding Multiple Equilibria for Raiffa–Kalai–Smorodinsky and Nash Bargaining Equilibria in Electricity Markets: A Bilateral Contract Model

Designs ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 3
Author(s):  
Reinaldo C. Garcia ◽  
Javier Contreras ◽  
Bárbara Caldeira Macedo ◽  
Daniel da Silva Monteiro ◽  
Matheus L. Barbosa
Keyword(s):  
Electricity Markets ◽  
Electricity Market ◽  
Multiple Equilibria ◽  
Optimal Solution ◽  
Price Volatility ◽  
Nash Bargaining Solution ◽  
Nash Bargaining ◽  
Bargaining Solution ◽  
Generation Company ◽  
Electricity Spot Market

In a deregulated market, energy can be exchanged like a commodity and the market agents including generators, distributors, and the end consumers can trade energy independently settling the price, volume, and the supply terms. Bilateral contracts (BCs) have been applied to hedge against price volatility in the electricity spot market. This work introduces a model to find all solutions for the equilibria implementing the Raiffa–Kalai–Smorodinski (RKS) and the Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS) approaches in an electricity market based on BCs. It is based on creating “holes” around an existing equilibrium within the feasibility set, yielding a new (smaller) feasibility set at each iteration. This research has two players: a generation company (GC) and an electricity supplier company (ESC), aiming to achieve the highest profit for each of them. The results present all possible RKS and NBS, in addition to showing all assigned energies for a case study at different time frames. The multiple equilibria solutions allow the ESC and the GC to apply different strategies knowing that they can still achieve an optimal solution.

The (Stabilized) Nash Bargaining Solution as a Principle of Distributive Justice

Utilitas ◽  
2010 ◽  
Vol 22 (4) ◽  
pp. 447-473 ◽  
Author(s):  
MICHAEL MOEHLER
Keyword(s):  
Distributive Justice ◽  
Moral Reasoning ◽  
Bargaining Power ◽  
Nash Bargaining Solution ◽  
Nash Bargaining ◽  
Original Position ◽  
Bargaining Solution ◽  
Moral Intuitions ◽  
Instrumental Reasoning ◽  
Relative Bargaining Power

It is argued that the Nash bargaining solution cannot serve as a principle of distributive justice because (i) it cannot secure stable cooperation in repeated interactions and (ii) it cannot capture our moral intuitions concerning distributive questions. In this article, I propose a solution to the first problem by amending the Nash bargaining solution so that it can maintain stable cooperation among rational bargainers. I call the resulting principle the stabilized Nash bargaining solution. The principle defends justice in the form ‘each according to her basic needs and above this level according to her relative bargaining power’. In response to the second problem, I argue that the stabilized Nash bargaining solution can serve as a principle of distributive justice in certain situations where moral reasoning is reduced to instrumental reasoning. In particular, I argue that rational individuals would choose the stabilized Nash bargaining solution in Rawls’ original position.

scholarly journals Investigating the Temporal Effect of User Preferences with Application in Movie Recommendation

2017 ◽  
Vol 2017 ◽  
pp. 1-10 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wen-Jun Li ◽  
Qiang Dong ◽  
Yan Fu
Keyword(s):  
Rapid Development ◽  
User Preferences ◽  
Mobile Internet ◽  
Smart Devices ◽  
Data Sets ◽  
Rating Data ◽  
Temporal Effect ◽  
Proposed Model ◽  
Target User ◽  
The Difference

As the rapid development of mobile Internet and smart devices, more and more online content providers begin to collect the preferences of their customers through various apps on mobile devices. These preferences could be largely reflected by the ratings on the online items with explicit scores. Both of positive and negative ratings are helpful for recommender systems to provide relevant items to a target user. Based on the empirical analysis of three real-world movie-rating data sets, we observe that users’ rating criterions change over time, and past positive and negative ratings have different influences on users’ future preferences. Given this, we propose a recommendation model on a session-based temporal graph, considering the difference of long- and short-term preferences, and the different temporal effect of positive and negative ratings. The extensive experiment results validate the significant accuracy improvement of our proposed model compared with the state-of-the-art methods.

Dynamic Subcarrier and Power Allocation Based on Nash Bargaining Solution in Symmetric Cooperative OFDMA Networks

2011 ◽  
Vol 187 ◽  
pp. 510-515
Author(s):  
Wei Liu ◽  
Jing Min Tang
Keyword(s):  
Power Allocation ◽  
Nash Bargaining Solution ◽  
Nash Bargaining ◽  
Bargaining Solution ◽  
Subcarrier Allocation ◽  
Allocation Scheme ◽  
Allocation Algorithm ◽  
Cooperative Scheme ◽  
Joint Resource Allocation ◽  
Adaptive Power

In this paper, subcarrier and power allocation are jointly considered in a three-node symmetric cooperation orthogonal frequency-division multiple access uplink system. With the help of Nash bargaining solution, the dynamic subcarrier allocation scheme and the adaptive power allocation scheme are proposed for joint optimization. The joint resource allocation is decomposed and solved by dynamic subcarrier allocation algorithm and adaptive power allocation algorithm. Simulation results show the effectiveness of the proposed cooperative scheme.

scholarly journals Raiffa-Kalai-Smorodinsky Bargaining Solution for Bilateral Contracts in Electricity Markets

Energies ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 13 (9) ◽  
pp. 2397
Author(s):  
Reinaldo Crispiniano Garcia ◽  
Javier Contreras ◽  
Matheus de Lima Barbosa ◽  
Felipe Silva Toledo ◽  
Paulo Vinicius Aires da Cunha
Keyword(s):  
Electricity Markets ◽  
Price Volatility ◽  
Spot Market ◽  
Nash Bargaining Solution ◽  
Nash Bargaining ◽  
Bargaining Solution ◽  
Market Pricing ◽  
Bilateral Contracts ◽  
Generation Company

In electricity markets, bilateral contracts (BC) are used to hedge against price volatility in the spot market. Pricing these contracts requires scheduling from either the buyer or the seller aiming to achieve the highest profit possible. Since this problem includes different players, a Generation Company (GC) and an Electricity Supplier Company (ESC) are considered. The approaches to solve this problem include the Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS) equilibrium and the Raiffa–Kalai–Smorodinsky (RKS) bargaining solution. The innovation of this work is the implementation of an algorithm based on the RKS equilibrium to find a compromise strategy when determining the concessions to be made by the parties. The results are promising and show that the RKS approach can obtain better results compared to the Nash equilibrium method applied to a case study.

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