scholarly journals “Metaphysics about Metaphysics.” Kant on Theoretical, Practical and Practico-Theoretical Metaphysics

2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 163
Author(s):  
Günter Zöller
Keyword(s):  
Practical Philosophy ◽  
Moral Freedom ◽  
Metaphysics Of Morals ◽  
Critical Writings ◽  
Practical Metaphysics

The essay investigates the relation between metaphysics and practical philosophy in Kant by reconstructing Kant‘s systematic typology of metaphysics as developed in his critical writings. Section 1 deals with Kant’s rigorous reduction of philosophy to metaphysics. The focus here is on the epistemological turn effectuated by Kant with regard to metaphysics (theoretical metaphysics). Section 2 is concerned with Kant’s reconceptualization of (pure) practical philosophy as a metaphysics sui generis. At the center stands here Kant’s supplementation of the metaphysics of nature through a metaphysics of morals based on moral freedom (practical metaphysics). Section 3 addresses the merging of theoretical and practical metaphysics in Kant. The focus here lies on Kant’s introduction of a novel, practically validated form of (quasi-)theoretical metaphysics (practico-theoretical metaphysics). Throughout the essay combines an analytic interest in the forms and functions of metaphysics in Kant with a systematic interest in the practical and practico-theoretical transformation of previously theoretical metaphysics in Kant, which morphs from a doctrine of the objects of nature through a doctrine of the laws of freedom to a doctrine of wisdom regarding the supersensible.

Kant's Critique of Right

2002 ◽  
Vol 6 ◽  
pp. 35-59 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gary Banham
Keyword(s):  
English Language ◽  
Initial Orientation ◽  
Practical Philosophy ◽  
Perpetual Peace ◽  
Language Writing ◽  
Relative Neglect ◽  
Metaphysics Of Morals ◽  
Philosophy Of Right

This article has two objectives: first, to bring to the fore Kant's neglected distinction between ‘critique’ and ‘doctrine’ and, second, to relate this distinction to Kant's notion of a philosophy of right. Kant's culminating contribution to practical philosophy, the Metaphysics of Morals, contains a doctrine of right and this ‘doctrine’ has received relatively little attention thus far in English-language writing on Kant. One of the reasons for this relative neglect is, I believe, due to the prevalent attention provided to Kant's practical critique at the expense of his practical doctrine. I aim to provide an account of Kant's critique of right in order to enable an understanding of Kant's doctrine of right to be provided with some initial orientation. I will be suggesting that this critique of right is presented in Toward Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch.

scholarly journals Kant's Account of Respect: A Bridge between Rationality and Anthropology

2007 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 40-60
Author(s):  
Jane Singleton
Keyword(s):  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Practical Philosophy ◽  
A Posteriori ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Rational Part ◽  
Metaphysics Of Morals

Kant starts the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals by emphasizing the importance of separating the a priori or rational part of moral philosophy from the a posteriori or empirical aspects. Indeed, he reserves the term moral philosophy for the rational part. He writes ‘ethics … the empirical part might be given the special title practical anthropology, the term moral philosophy being properly used to refer just to the rational part’. Throughout his writings in both theoretical and practical philosophy the distinction between what is a priori and what is a posteriori is given paramount importance. We need to separate that which has its source a priori from its application to, for example human beings.

Degrees of Responsibility in Kant’s Practical Philosophy

2015 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 183-209 ◽  
Author(s):  
Claudia Blöser
Keyword(s):  
Practical Philosophy ◽  
Full Responsibility ◽  
Metaphysics Of Morals

AbstractIt has been argued that Kant’s practical philosophy cannot allow for degrees of responsibility for one’s actions. However, it would be uncompromising to allow for only two possibilities: either full responsibility or none. Moreover, in the Metaphysics of Morals Kant himself claims that there can be degrees of responsibility, depending on the magnitude of the obstacles that have to be overcome when acting. I will show that this claim is consistent with Kant’s theory as a whole and thereby make transparent how degrees of responsibility are possible for Kant. The solution is based on the distinction between two senses of responsibility: taking oneself to be an accountable person is an all-or-nothing affair, whereas praise- or blameworthiness for a particular action can still be a matter of degree.

Vom Unvermögen zum Un-Vermögen

2018 ◽  
Vol 66 (2) ◽  
pp. 162-182 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jörg Noller
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
Practical Philosophy ◽  
Second Step ◽  
Moral Law ◽  
Metaphysics Of Morals ◽  
Good And Evil ◽  
Positive Capacity

Abstract Are we free to act irrationally and evilly? Or are irrational and evil actions just consequences of our incapacity to act morally? The article discusses theses questions by referring to Kant’s practical philosophy. In a first step, I shall address Kant’s thesis given in his Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals that a free will and a will under moral law be the same. This raises the problem of how it is possible to act immorally. In a second step, I will reconstruct Karl Leonhard Reinhold’s attempt to make freedom to act immorally also viable by conceiving of freedom as a “basic faculty” (“Grundvermögen”). Finally, I argue that Schelling in his Freedom Essay builds on Reinhold, defining freedom as a “vital, positive capacity for good and evil” and making immoral actions comprehensible.

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