Do Business Groups Help Their Affiliated Firms in Their Performance? : Evidence from the Time of High External Capital Market Frictions

2019 ◽  
Vol 32 (3) ◽  
pp. 351-381
Author(s):  
Ryoonhee Kim ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Capital Market ◽  
Business Groups ◽  
Market Frictions ◽  
External Capital

External Factors of Big Business Transformation in Russia

2005 ◽  
pp. 72-89 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ya. Pappe ◽  
Ya. Galukhina
Keyword(s):  
Financial Market ◽  
Capital Market ◽  
Business Groups ◽  
External Factors ◽  
Big Business ◽  
Business Transformation ◽  
Global Standards ◽  
The World ◽  
Principal Subject

The paper is devoted to the role of the global financial market in the development of Russian big business. It proves that terms and standards posed by this market as well as opportunities it offers determine major changes in Russian big business in the last three years. The article examines why Russian companies go abroad to attract capital and provides data, which indicate the scope of this phenomenon. It stresses the effects of Russian big business’s interaction with the world capital market, including the modification of the principal subject of Russian big business from integrated business groups to companies and the changes in companies’ behavior: they gradually move away from the so-called Russian specifics and adopt global standards.

Online Appendix for Managing Capital Market Frictions via Cost-Reduction Investments

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fehmi Tanrisever ◽  
Nitin Joglekar ◽  
Sinan Erzurumlu ◽  
Moren Levesque
Keyword(s):  
Capital Market ◽  
Cost Reduction ◽  
Market Frictions ◽  
Online Appendix

scholarly journals The Effect Of Internal Capital Market Of Korean Large Business Groups On Investment Efficiency

2017 ◽  
Vol 33 (5) ◽  
pp. 903-918
Author(s):  
Minwoo Lee ◽  
Yuwon Choi ◽  
Sanghyuk Moon
Keyword(s):  
Capital Markets ◽  
Capital Market ◽  
Stock Price ◽  
Business Groups ◽  
Internal Capital Markets ◽  
Investment Efficiency ◽  
Internal Capital Market ◽  
Factors Affecting ◽  
Controlling Shareholders ◽  
Internal Capital

This study examines whether the effect of funding through internal capital markets on investment efficiency is differentiated by the incentives of controlling shareholders as measured by the divergence between cash flow rights and voting rights of controlling shareholders (hereafter, wedge). To empirically analyze hypotheses of this study, 1,189 firm-year observations were collected from Korean firms listed on the Korea Composite Stock Price Index (KOSPI) belonging to a large business group designated by the Korea Fair Trade Commission over the period from 2005 to 2012. The results of the analysis are as follows. First, we find that the magnitude of internal funding, as measured by total payables to the related parties, is positively (+) associated with investment inefficiency. Second, the interaction variables of total payables to the related parties and the wedge have a significant positive (+) effect on investment inefficiency. In other words, the deterioration of investment efficiency due to the increase in total payables to the related parties was mainly caused by firms with a big wedge. This result suggests that the effect of internal capital markets on investment efficiency of large business groups may be differentiated by the wedge that is proxy of the controlling shareholder’s incentive. This study provides additional evidence on previous studies on the investment efficiency of large business groups by considering both the internal capital market and incentives for funding using the internal capital market, which are important factors affecting the investment of large corporate groups. Also, the results of this study are expected to provide implications for the regulatory policy of large business groups which have recently become an issue in Korea.

With one hand tied behind their back

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Graeme Guthrie
Keyword(s):  
New York ◽  
Capital Markets ◽  
Capital Market ◽  
Cable Television ◽  
Share Repurchases ◽  
Internal Capital Market ◽  
Internal Capital ◽  
External Capital ◽  
Investment Returns ◽  
Break Up

This chapter uses the New York cable television provider Cablevision to describe the way in which boards can delegate some of the task of monitoring management to participants in external capital markets. Unlike a firm’s current shareholders, who have little say over how their funds are allocated, external capital markets provide their funds only if the investment returns are adequate. This chapter shows how managers of firms with substantial cash-generating assets in place can use the collateral that these assets provide to weaken the discipline of external capital markets. It shows how their ability to do this is restricted if the board authorizes share repurchases or special dividends funded by increased borrowing, as these replace “soft” payouts to shareholders with “hard” payouts to bondholders. Managers’ ability to exploit collateral is further restricted if the board uses spinoffs to break up the firm’s internal capital market.

Financial Weakness and Product Market Performance: Internal Capital Market Evidence

2016 ◽  
Vol 51 (1) ◽  
pp. 307-332 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ryoonhee Kim
Keyword(s):  
Financial Crisis ◽  
Market Share ◽  
Capital Market ◽  
Business Groups ◽  
Asian Financial Crisis ◽  
Financial Leverage ◽  
High Group ◽  
Data Set ◽  
Internal Capital Market ◽  
Negative Effect

AbstractUsing a data set of Korean business groups in the period 1999–2006, just after the Asian Financial Crisis, this study shows how business groups’ financial leverage can lead group-affiliated firms to lose market share to industry rivals. This analysis reveals that the negative effect of group leverage is greater when an affiliated firm is financially weak. Additionally, high group leverage is more detrimental to firms operating in fast-growing industries, discouraging affiliated firms from investing while encouraging their rivals. The results suggest that groups’ financial positions encompass a substantial strategic dimension of group-affiliated firms.

Capital Market Frictions, Leasing and Investment

2009 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vasantharao Chigurupati ◽  
Shantaram P. Hegde
Keyword(s):  
Capital Market ◽  
Market Frictions

scholarly journals The Political Economy of Debt and Entitlements

2020 ◽  
Vol 87 (6) ◽  
pp. 2568-2599 ◽  
Author(s):  
Laurent Bouton ◽  
Alessandro Lizzeri ◽  
Nicola Persico
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Capital Market ◽  
Economic Model ◽  
Fiscal Rules ◽  
Market Frictions ◽  
The Political ◽  
Allocation Of Resources ◽  
The Future ◽  
Political Economic

Abstract This article presents a dynamic political-economic model of total government obligations. Its focus is on the interplay between debt and entitlements. In our model, both are tools by which temporarily powerful groups can extract resources from groups that will be powerful in the future: debt transfers resources across periods; entitlements directly target the future allocation of resources. We prove the following results. First, the presence of endogenous entitlements dampens the incentives of politically powerful groups to accumulate debt, but it leads to an increase in total government obligations. Second, fiscal rules can have perverse effects: if entitlements are unconstrained, and there are capital market frictions, debt limits lead to an increase in total government obligations and to worse outcomes for all groups. Analogous results hold for entitlement limits. Third, our model sheds some lights on the influence of capital market frictions on the incentives of governments to adopt fiscal rules, and implement entitlement programs. Finally, we identify preference polarization as a possible explanation for the joint growth of debt and entitlements.

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