scholarly journals Waiter–Client and Client–Waiter Colourability and $k$–SAT Games

10.37236/6290 ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 24 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Wei En Tan

Waiter–Client and Client–Waiter games are two–player, perfect information games, with no chance moves, played on a finite set (board) with special subsets known as the winning sets. Each round of the biased $(1:q)$ Waiter–Client game begins with Waiter offering $q+1$ previously unclaimed elements of the board to Client, who claims one and leaves the remaining $q$ elements to be claimed by Waiter immediately afterwards. In a $(1:q)$ Client–Waiter game, play occurs in the same way except in each round, Waiter offers $t$ elements for any $t$ in the range $1\leqslant t\leqslant q+1$. If Client fully claims a winning set by the time all board elements have been offered, he wins in the Client–Waiter game and loses in the Waiter–Client game. We give an estimate for the threshold bias (i.e. the unique value of $q$ at which the winner of a $(1:q)$ game changes) of the $(1:q)$ Waiter–Client and Client–Waiter versions of two different games: the non–2–colourability game, played on the edge set of a complete $k$–uniform hypergraph, and the $k$–SAT game. More precisely, we show that the threshold bias for the Waiter–Client and Client–Waiter versions of the non–2–colourability game is $\frac{1}{n}\binom{n}{k}2^{\mathcal{O}_k(k)}$ and $\frac{1}{n}\binom{n}{k}2^{-k(1+o_k(1))}$ respectively. Additionally, we show that the threshold bias for the Waiter–Client and Client–Waiter versions of the $k$–SAT game is $\frac{1}{n}\binom{n}{k}$ up to a factor that is exponential and polynomial in $k$ respectively. This shows that these games exhibit the probabilistic intuition.

2004 ◽  
Vol 32 (3) ◽  
pp. 315-338 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stefano Demichelis ◽  
Klaus Ritzberger ◽  
Jeroen M. Swinkels

2004 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 89-115 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thorsten Clausing

A syntactic formalism for the modeling of belief revision in perfect information games is presented that allows to define the rationality of a player's choice of moves relative to the beliefs he holds as his respective decision nodes have been reached. In this setting, true common belief in the structure of the game and rationality held before the start of the game does not imply that backward induction will be played. To derive backward induction, a “forward belief” condition is formulated in terms of revised rather than initial beliefs. Alternative notions of rationality as well as the use of knowledge instead of belief are also studied within this framework.


2017 ◽  
Vol 42 (2) ◽  
pp. 427-433
Author(s):  
P. Jean-Jacques Herings ◽  
Arkadi Predtetchinski

2013 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 21-25
Author(s):  
Ewa Drabik

Abstract Certain type of perfect information games (PI-games), the so-called Banach-Mazur games, so far have not been applied in economy. The perfect information positional game is defined as the game during which at any time the choice is made by one of the players who is acquainted with the previous decision of his opponent. The game is run on the sequential basis. The aim of this paper is to discuss selected Banach-Mazur games and to present some applications of positional game


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